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Abstract 
In Australia, the strata mechanism is used with increasing frequency by developers 
as the primary method for division of real property assets and on-sale of individual 
property lots. Any land that falls within the strata scheme but outside the 
individually owned lots is termed the common property. Individual lot owners have 
right of access and use of the common property. They are also legally tied to the 
common property and responsible for its maintenance. To facilitate the 
maintenance, upkeep, access and use, a committee of management is required. 
While some research has been undertaken into strata issues within the states of 
Queensland and New South Wales, little is known of the Victorian or Tasmanian 
context. Fewer studies still concentrate on the committee of management and their 
interaction with strata managers, even within the international sphere.  
The privatised governance structures within apartment and townhouse 
developments have evolved into complex organisations that make consequential 
decisions that affect property owners. This thesis examines the growth of the strata 
industry and the influence that strata managers have over committees of 
management. Issues of trust, participation, openness and transparency in this 
contractual relationship are investigated. The thesis also investigates the links that 
strata managers have with developers and how this shapes the owner corporation. 
While the growth in strata titled properties can be understood as a legal or planning 
issue, this thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of how these non-profit 
organisations, relying on volunteer labour, are managed as part of a shareholder 
democracy. Within the Australian context, the owner corporation is shaped and 
constrained by wider society through the taxation system and wider economic 
context. The thesis also looks critically at the organisations‟ capacity to govern by 
drawing on qualitative interviews with strata managers and committees of 
management. This approach highlights the strengths and weaknesses of externally 
sourced, contractual help within the strata environment. 
The thesis considers the implications of this empirical, sociologically informed 
approach for studying strata title. Theoretical insights were gained through the 
application of structuration theory in order to investigate the actions taken by 
different stakeholders, and the reflexive monitoring that occurs within strata 
organisations. The power plays (and therefore conflict) identified in the interviews 
are then investigated further through using the concepts of coercive, mimetic and 
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normative forms of isomorphism employed by new institutionalists. This thesis 
demonstrates that developers have a great deal of influence on committees of 
management through their role in establishing these organisations, but that 
managers exercise agency while working within these structures.  
The thesis also advances some policy recommendations for the strata industry 
suggested by the empirical research. These include the need to address the lack of 
purchaser knowledge; the need for owners, strata managers and committees of 
management to understand trust, conflict and training issues; the need to address 
the complexities of upgrading buildings particularly where environmentally 
sustainable retrofitting occurs; and the need to understand the impact of various 
tenancy types on the functioning of the owner corporation.  
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1.0 Thesis introduction 
The growth of private spaces within cities is a feature of the current era. The 
proliferation of privately governed suburbs and cities has been widely commented 
on among urban planners and housing theorists. For many academics, it is the 
spatial spread of this phenomenon that is crucial. Others are interested in the 
reasons why it has arisen and have linked it to issues of fear and segregation, 
economic rationalism, growth of middle class elitism and issues of private 
governance. These topics are not just linked to the growth of gated, private cities 
and suburbs. Rather, they are central to the growth in all strata communities 
including master-planned communities, apartment complexes and the Australian 
experience of the subdivided suburban lot with a unit in the back. There is an 
increasing focus on the compact, walkable city and urban consolidation. However, 
the impact for strata developments, property owners and renters has yet to be 
addressed at any level of Australian government. 
Within the Australian context there have been key legislative and economic drivers 
that have triggered the growth of strata titled property, though these may have 
been experienced simultaneously across the western world. However, the 
discussion about private governance needs to be broadened to focus on the 
creation and functioning of the overarching organisation. Specifically, this thesis 
sees strata developments as unique non-profit organisations with key 
responsibilities. This includes collective ownership of common property, creating 
rules that govern behaviour within the common property and maintaining and 
upgrading communal property. As such, the organisation or „owner corporation‟, 
which all owners within the complex are part of, accesses expertise from a variety 
of sources and in a variety of ways. The „committee of management‟ is the 
management group formed within each owner corporation. It is made up of owners 
from the owner corporation. Key to this relationship is that of the contracted-in 
strata manager.  
This thesis explores three key areas: 
a. How does the governance of owner corporations (as organisations) 
work?  
b. Within owner corporations, how do strata managers and the committee 
of management interact to impact governance?  
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c. Can structuration theory be used to explain governance within the 
owner corporation? 
 
The focus is on residential, and mixed residential/commercial owner corporations. 
Both contain the complexity of personal as well as economic interests. To better 
understand the relationships that exist between the strata manager and the owner 
corporation, I have applied Giddens‟ (1984; 1993) structuration approach which 
considers both structure and agency as enabling and constraining. This is a good 
description for the owner corporation since the owner corporation legislation is 
designed to give agency to the owners within the scheme. 
1.1 Chapter introduction 
In this chapter, I begin by outlining the overall structure and content of the thesis. I 
then determine the study boundaries by discussing the key sites of investigation, 
Tasmania and Victoria, and their commonalities. Finally, I provide a list of key 
definitions to help guide the reader through this thesis.  
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has five parts organised into eleven chapters. Part A contains three 
sections. The first provides an introduction to the context of the research; the 
second outlines the structure of the thesis; and the third explains the physical 
boundaries of the research as well as the limitations of the research. 
Part B reviews current academic literature relevant to the strata title environment. It 
focuses on urban densification and what this means in terms of the creation of 
organisational form and governance of those organisations. The chapter reviews 
aspects of organisational literature relevant to the strata environment. I argue that 
the organisation exists and has real meaning for the actors involved, that there is a 
commonality of structures and duties that the organisation needs to perform, and 
that similarities and differences to other organisational forms should be taken into 
account and can be used to learn from. Within the organisation, insufficient 
knowledge exists on how two key stakeholder groups - the strata manager and the 
committee of management – interact within each other and thus affect structural, 
processes and procedures of governance within the organisation. It raises three 
questions: 
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a. How does the governance of owner corporations (as organisations) 
work?  
b. Within owner corporations, how do strata managers and the committees 
of management interact to impact governance?  
c. Can structuration theory be used to explain governance within the 
owner corporation? 
Part C contains the theoretical overview and a discussion of the methods used. 
Chapter three explains how Giddens‟ (1984; 1993) structuration theory is applied to 
the strata context. Giddens (1993) claim that both structure and agency are at once 
enabling and constraining is acknowledged within the organisational context. In this 
part, I begin to explore the interplay between the governing structures, set up to 
cope with the influx of urban dwellers, the strata manager and the actual owners 
who make up the owner corporation. I question the movement of knowledge 
between players, who the experts are and how reflexive monitoring provides 
agency for different sets of actors. A constructed epistemology is advocated with 
an emphasis on the power paradigm. 
Chapter Four outlines the actual methods used to source, collect, analyse and 
interpret the data for this research as well as the theoretical perspective. An 
interpretive thematic approach is outlined along with the reasons for choosing such 
an approach. This includes a thematic analysis of semi structured interviews with 
strata managers and committee chairs using NVivo as an aid.  
In line with Pels (2000), Creswell (1998) and Mills (1959), a method that includes 
both interviews and collected documents including media reports is chosen. In this 
chapter I discuss the semi structured nature of the interview questions in terms of 
qualitative research. I describe how I recruited potential participants and the 
reasoning behind excluding some participants. Chapter five introduces each 
participant to the reader.  
Part D contains three chapters. Chapter Five documents the results from the 
media analysis and finds that strata properties are advertised for sale on the basis 
of luxury, convenience and maintenance free. By contrast, issues of cost, levies 
and the compulsory nature of belonging to a strata organisation are rarely 
advertised. It adds to an area in which location specific information only has been 
undertaken to date. That is, it highlights the lack of upfront information for 
prospective purchasers of strata property within the Melbourne area.  
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Chapters Six and Seven provide an analysis of the interview data around four 
specific themes of governance, stakeholder participation and cohesion, the 
relationship between the strata manager and the owner corporation and finally the 
expertise that each party has.  
Part E contains two chapters. Chapter Eight outlines the findings, relating them 
back to the theoretical framework of Giddens (1984; 1993) structuration theory. 
The shaping of organisations through new institutionalism is discussed. It also 
considers Di Maggio and Powell„s (1991) concept of isomorphism as this relates to 
the power and conflict paradigms. Chapter Nine summarises the key findings and 
identifies gaps for future research. A number of policy implications are also 
discussed in the context of future directions for strata research. Through this lens, 
the reader is left with the sense of a complex organisation situated within wider 
political and societal expectations.  
1.3 Study Boundaries 
Within Australia, each state enacts its own legislation and it should be noted here 
that a full assessment of legislation does not form part of this thesis. Indeed such 
an undertaking would in itself constitute a separate thesis in which the intricacies of 
the legislation are explained. Nor I do not have the legal background for such an 
undertaking. Sherry (2009) clearly addresses the commonalities between the 
different State legislation in the Australian context and from a legal construct, and 
my focus is on this commonality between the states of Victoria and Tasmania.  
Specifically, I am concerned with the commonalities of shared property, the 
creation of rules that govern behaviour and maintaining and upgrading communal 
property rather than the intricacies of fine print and legalese. Whether a committee 
of management is made up of four or five representatives is not relevant to this 
thesis. Rather this thesis is more concerned with the commonalities between 
Australian states, one of these being that owner corporation or body corporate are 
required to have a functioning committee of management made up of owners. In 
no instance can non owners join, or hold voting rights. Moreover to focus on the 
differences in legislation would detract from the organisational aspects of structure 
and agency, and the extent to which one either constrains or enables the other. 
Commonalities in legislation do need to be considered, since this sets up the basic 
structure of the organisational type under discussion and determines how the 
organisation‟s participants interact, thus highlighting the tension in the structure 
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and agency debate. To understand this tension in the context of this study requires 
a familiarity with the owner corporation legislation when assessing governance 
aspects of the organisation.  
The study is concerns the two Australian states of Victoria and Tasmania. Figure 1 
locates the two states within Australia. The two states have much in common. 
Historically there are critical links between the two states. Tasmania acts as a 
regional economy with few companies of any size having their headquarters in 
Tasmania. This includes companies within the development, construction and 
strata industry. Many multinational companies do not operate within Tasmania 
since the economies of scale are not present and there are sometimes difficulties 
in moving material and equipment across Bass Strait. The strata industry, while still 
growing in Victoria, is significantly more mature than in Tasmania. At the start of 
this project, Strata Australia did not have a representative industry body in 
Tasmania. Now it has a Tasmanian Chapter, though it is administratively managed 
from Victoria. Legislation between the two states, although different, is similar in 
key aspects.  
 
Figure 1 Location of study within Australia 
There are a number of valid reasons why the two states are linked in this study and 
these are outlined below. Firstly, while the legislation governing the creation of an 
owner corporation differs between the two states, the commonalities of rule 
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creation, levy collection, building maintenance and insurance apply. Moreover, the 
lead industry body operating within the two states is the Strata Australia (formerly 
the Owner Corporation of Victoria (OCV). In May 2011, Tasmania‟s strata 
managers voted to create a separate chapter of this organisation; doing so with the 
administrative support and assistance of the OCV. Thus there exists a link between 
the two states with a view to the provision of one legislative framework that goes 
beyond industry support for the owner corporation. OCV‟s industry newsletter 
applies to both states. However, at the present moment Victoria‟s legislation is still 
relatively new having been enacted in 2006, while Tasmania‟s legislative 
framework is older with few changes since its inception a decade earlier. At the 
time of this research both states were in the process of legislative change and it 
cannot be determined at which point changes will become open for public 
comment or when the legislation will be enacted.  
1.4 Key Definitions 
The present study makes reference to and relies upon a number of terms, concepts and 
abbreviations. A number of key ones are listed below, while others are introduced at 
appropriate places within the text as part of general discussion.  
 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Apartment A dwelling that has separate title but is situated within a larger building 
complex and has common property attached. In the context of this thesis, and 
unless specified, the separate title has been issued as a strata title. Usually 
within a medium or high density complex or tower building. 
ATO Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is the principal revenue collection agency of 
the Australian Government. The role of the ATO is to ensure the community as 
confidence in the administration of Australia‟s taxation and superannuation 
systems.   
Building manager In this context it is an on-site manager of the building. Different to a concierge 
in that the concierge will attend to administrative duties only whereas the 
building manager may also attend to minor maintenance problems in addition 
to administrative duties. 
By-Laws The rules made by the owner corporation under the Owner Corporation Act 
2006. 
Body Corporate The name other jurisdictions use for the legal entity created under the Owner 
Corporation Act 2006. 
Body Corporate 
Rule 
The laws that regulate the conduct of members of the body corporate. For the 
rules to have meaning within the law, the rules need to be lodged with the 
Recorder of Titles. 
Certification The certification is what a planning authority does to a plan of subdivision 
when it is satisfied that the plan complies with all of its requirements and those 
of the referring authorities. When certification is complete the plan of 
subdivision can be lodged with the Recorder of Titles. 
CID Common Interest Development (CID) is an American term that has the same 
meaning as an owner corporation. 
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Condominium An American term for an apartment. 
Contract A legally binding obligation between two people or organisation in which there 
is an exchange of goods or services and sealed with the exchange of funds. 
Committee of 
management 
The elected body that represents all owners within a strata titled development 
and created under the Owner Corporation Act or other state based legislation. 
Common property The area on a plan of subdivision which is not included in one of the lots but is 
owned and used in common by those lot owners who are members of the 
owner corporation. 
Common Seal The stamp that an owner corporation uses to indicate its agreement to 
something. The stamp needs to show the owner corporation distinctive 
number. The number is allocated at the time the Recorder of Titles agrees to 
register the plan of subdivision.  
Consolidation A number of separate lots or pieces of land that are amalgamated into one 
single lot. 
Community 
Housing 
A form of housing that allows multiple ownership property in common. A key 
feature of this type of housing is that interviews are often held with prospective 
owners and tenants. The governing body has a right to refuse to sell or rent to 
an applicant is deemed unsuitable.  
Co-housing A different term for community housing. 
Developer The person or company responsible for creating the subdivision of land and 
subsequent building complex containing apartments. 
Domestic building 
work 
The construction of residential premises and any renovation, alterations or 
extensions carried out to the residential premises. 
Dual occupancy Where a house block is subdivided to enable an additional dwelling to be built 
on it. It requires a two lot subdivision. 
Flat A lot that has separate title but is situated within a larger building complex and 
has common property attached.  
Gated community A strata titled community that is exclusive in nature and has walls and gates to 
keep non owners out of the community. 
Governance Refers to a structure, processes and procedures that determine how decisions 
are made in a system and what actions are taken within that system. In this 
instance, the system is the owner corporation. Definition taken from Easthope 
and Randolph (2009). 
GST Goods and services taxation collected by the Australian Taxation Office. 
HOA Home owner association – an American term that has the same meaning as 
an owner corporation. 
IT 2505 A ruling made by the Australian Taxation Office in relation to the way in which 
tax is apportioned for non-profit organisations. 
Lifestyle community A development in which free-hold title lots have been replaced with strata title 
lots. There is an age or some other limiting clause that prohibits certain types 
of people from purchasing lots within the community. Often they have 
additional features such as golf courses, tennis or riding club rooms attached 
to the common property. 
Lot A name given to the separate pieces of land, airspace or building that come 
into existence when a plan of subdivision is registered. 
Lot entitlement The share of ownership that a lot owner has in the common property. 
Lot liability 
 
The proportion of the owner corporation expenses for which a particular lot 
owner is responsible. 
Master Planned 
Estate (MPE) 
A broad acre development in which free hold title lots have been replaced with 
strata title lots.  
Member of an 
owner corporation 
The owner of a lot that is shown on a plan of subdivision as being affected by 
an owner corporation. 
Mixed use A building complex in which the individually owned lots have different uses 
such as residential, commercial or industrial use. 
Non-profit 
organisation 
An organisation that has sought an exemption from paying taxation based on 
the fact that all funds are used for a common good and no dividends are 
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payable to the owners or shareholders of the organisation. Owner corporation 
are non-profit organisations under this ruling. 
Nesting As defined by Townshend (2006), nesting is the hierarchical layering of 
governance with a strata titled property set up. 
Off the plan This expression used to describe the sale of a yet to be built, or partially built 
apartment or unit. It may be residential or commercial in nature. When 
something is sold off-the-plan there is an obligation on the seller or developer 
to compete the building and register the plan of subdivision. 
Owner The owner of a lot that belongs to an owner corporation. 
Owner Corporation The legal entity automatically created under the Owner Corporation Act 2006 
when the Recorder of Titles agrees to register a plan of subdivision under this 
Act. 
Planning permit The written approval from a planning authority to use land for a particular 
purpose. A planning permit is nearly always required before a subdivision can 
be carried out. 
Plan of subdivision The drawings that show the layout of the lots and provide all necessary 
information about the development. 
Public open space Public open space (POS) is land set aside within a subdivision for recreational 
purposes.  
Proxy The authorisation that a member of the owner corporation gives to someone to 
attend meetings of the owner corporation on their behalf and to speak and vote 
at the meeting on their behalf. The authorisation may be general in nature or 
may give specific instructions on how to vote on a particular matter. 
Quasi gated 
community 
A strata titled community that is exclusive in nature and has partial walls and/ 
or gates to discourage non owners from entering the community. 
Recorder of Titles A statutory position. 
Registration  The final approval of the plan of subdivision by the Recorder of Titles 
3R The three property R‟s. These are property rights, property restrictions and 
property responsibilities. It is the difference in the profile of the 3R that 
determines whether a property is freehold title for strata titled.  
Services apartment An apartment plus furniture that is leased as a short term let and also includes 
a cleaning contract for the premises. 
Short term lease A rental agreement that is less than six months in nature. Often this may be a 
rental agreement of one or two nights or weekly. 
Sourcing Refers to the strategy of how goods, services and expertise are gained through 
contractual mechanism, whether internal or externally. 
Stock Housing An earlier form of multiple ownership under which a company would own a 
block of flats and issue shares which entitle the shareholder to occupy one of 
those flats. The shareholders and company would normally enter into a service 
agreement which regulated the conduct of shareholders and use of common 
areas. 
Strata manager A person appointed by the owner corporation to look after its affairs. The strata 
manager will not, generally be a member of the owner corporation. The strata 
manager may belong to a larger company of strata managers. 
Special resolution A vote of three-quarters of the membership of the body corporate. At a meeting 
such a resolution needs three-quarters of the votes of all lot owners. A poll or 
ballot requires three-quarters of the votes of total lot entitlement. 
Strata title This is a three dimensional title as distinct from a standard land subdivision 
which operates by designating land though X and Y coordinates. Strata title 
has an X, Y and Z dimension or length, width and height coordinates. 
Ownership of a strata title lot is identified by all three dimensions. 
Unanimous 
resolution 
A vote by all members of the owner corporation. Some by-laws or decisions 
made by the owner corporation require a poll or ballot in which total agreement 
is reached. 
Unit A lot that has separate title but is situated within a larger building complex and 
has common property attached. In the context of this thesis, and unless 
specified, the separate title has been issued as a strata title. 
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Vertical gating A strata titled community that is an apartment complex with more than one 
floor. The gating may be by electronic access. In any case the front doors and 
entrance to the building discourage non owners from entering and using the 
building.  
 
This chapter has provided an overview and introduction to the thesis as a whole, 
as well as outlined baseline definitions. The next chapter discusses the substantive 
issues that go to the heart of the research project.   
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2.0 Introduction 
Australia has traditionally been a home owning nation with much of that home 
ownership occurring within a suburban setting dominated by free title land holdings 
as opposed to strata title. Though there has been a shift, it is not so much in terms 
of home ownership rates per se, but in the way bundles of property rights, 
responsibilities and restrictions (3R) are apportioned within the sphere of home 
ownership. Randolph (2006, p. 474) notes that as „the suburban option is 
increasingly curtailed, Australians of all levels will be expected to spend substantial 
proportions of their lives in a form of housing that hitherto has only been a minority 
choice‟. The differentiation is no longer an urban – rural split. It is a suburban – 
urban split with increasingly numbers of high density urban dwellers.  
In 2007, for the first time the global urban population outnumbered the world‟s rural 
population (UNFPA 2007). Within Australia, larger cities, regional towns and some 
coastal regions experienced increasing urban densification. Australia‟s current 
population of approximately 21 million people is primarily collected along the 
eastern sea board with major population centres in Sydney, Brisbane and 
Melbourne. The population of Australia is expected to almost double to 35 million 
people within the next forty years (Rudd 2010) placing pressure on Australia‟s 
infrastructure and increasing urban density. The 2011 Australian census (ABS 
2011) states that one in four Australians live or own interests in strata titled 
developments. The states of Victoria, NSW and Queensland have reached one in 
three people living or owning property within a strata development (ABS 2011). 
The rapid growth in this type of housing creates difficulties for policy makers. Social 
demographers have struggled to make sense of globalised patterns. Market forces 
combine with fiscal constraints to create new centres of power. Prospective 
purchasers need time to adjust to the meaning of joint ownership of space and 
place in their search for home. These forces combine to shift the focus away from 
emergent organisational forms of property ownership and the role they play in 
governance. 
This chapter introduces the reader to the concept of the strata titled property 
mechanism, the form of housing to which Randolph refers. The first section 
outlines the rise of strata titled developments within the Australian context. The 
second section defines the strata mechanism and introduces the reader to key 
definitions used throughout this thesis, including the concept of the owner 
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corporation. It provides a straightforward account of the governance mechanisms 
that operate within the owner corporation along with the structure, process and 
procedures that make up the governance mechanism. I then consider key 
differences in owner corporation law. The final three sections consider the 
relationships between two key players, the owner corporation committee of 
management and the strata manager and the importance of contract mechanisms 
in defining the role of each party. I discuss the drawbacks that academics have 
brought to our attention concerning contractual relationships. I highlight the 
emergence of a new professional association. As part of this review I conclude by 
highlighting the literature gaps that this thesis fulfils. I leave discussion of the 
sociological theories that may apply to these for Chapter 3. 
2.1  Why strata? Why now? 
Australia has much to contribute to research on high density living. There has been 
significant debate as to where and how strata titled properties first originated. 
McKenzie (1996) traces this back to a corrupted version of Ebenezer Howard‟s 
Garden City in Nebraska, USA while Webster and Le Goix (2005) note that Paris 
was a mid-19th century centre for similar types of property. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of the strata title mechanism to the Eastern states of Australia in the 
early 1960s has meant that there is a fifty year period of accumulated experience 
with this property type in Australia. Easthope and Randolph (2008, p. 244) note 
that Australian legislation has formed a basis for jurisdictional reform in other 
countries such as Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Brunei and Malaysia. The take up of Australia‟s legislative framework by so many 
other countries highlights the significance of our urban consolidation policies and 
frameworks to an international audience. 
Yet it is only in the past decade and a half that urban consolidation has become the 
dominant paradigm of planning policy. This paradigm has generated significant 
interest from urban researchers in associated fields. There has been a tendency to 
concentrate planning issues (Dredge & Coiacetto 2011), legislative issues 
(Everton-Moore et al. 2006; Sherry 2009; Blandy 2010), management issues 
(Budgen 2005; Pouder & Clark 2009; Warnken & Guiding 2009), socio-cultural 
issues such as diversity, segregation and security (Brunn 2006; Low 2006; Kern 
2007; Webster & Le Goix 2005), economic issues including housing stock planning, 
price and renewal; life cycle costs and building termination (Easthope & Randolph 
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2009; Johnston & Reid 2013; Warnken & Guilding 2009) and environmental issues 
(Altmann 2013; Randolph 2006; Troy 2002). Issues of governance where 
addressed, concentrate on owner experiences (Goodman & Douglas 2010) or 
developer influence (Bajracharya & Khan 2010). Few give serious attention to the 
place of strata managers or their impact on the committee of management. Where 
mentioned, it is more as a passing glance that acknowledges presence but not the 
impact of governance processes and practice. Guilding et al. (2005) for example 
details a comprehensive list of stakeholders including owner-occupiers, investor 
owners, resident property managers, building or site managers, strata managers, 
maintenance and repair companies, real estate agents, letting agents, 
management rights brokers, legal practitioners, developers, financiers, local, state 
and federal government agencies, local residents, tourist accommodation 
management companies, hotel and motels, insurance industries, energy and 
communication service provides, media and aged care industries. Though strata 
managers are mentioned, committees of management are not. Consequently, the 
relationship between the two groups cannot be identified and explored in terms of 
the structure, processes and procedures that are the focal point of governance. 
Other academics such as McKenzie (1996; Blakely & Snyder 1998) focus on the 
owners and the committee of management, but fail to mention the strata manager‟s 
role or relationship with these stakeholder groups. Easthope and Randolph (2009; 
Everton-Moore et al. 2006) note that recent changes to strata title legislation are 
attempts to mitigate conflict of interest problems that stem from such diverse 
stakeholder groups. Again, the relationship between strata managers and the 
committee of management is not discussed in detail, merely noted and passed 
over.  
Within Australia, there are reasons why this omission has developed. Australia‟s 
housing tenure system is market dominated (Yates & Bradbury 2010). Despite 
significant discussion about Australia‟s declining housing affordability, home 
ownership rates have remained relatively steady at around 70% of total occupancy 
over a sixty year period. Much of that housing has remained within rural and 
suburban freehold title. Other mechanisms were in place to facilitate the repair, 
maintenance, use and safety of adjoining property. Even where row housing was 
previously developed within inner cities, the title remained freehold with little or no 
common property between the two residences. Medium and high density living is a 
result of increasing population pressures felt over the past two to three decades.  
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Housing costs are increasingly dominated by market outcomes. Hence there has 
been an increased focus on housing affordability and it was upon this platform of 
increasing housing affordability that strata titled housing was first introduced to 
Australia. The introduction of strata titled housing coincided with the post World 
War II housing demand. Historians Butler-Bowden and Pickett (2007) note that the 
introduction was developer driven and cite archival documents to show that 
building development company Lend Lease Pty Ltd paid private solicitors to draft 
the first Australian legislation allowing separate title to co-joined dwellings as part 
of the strata title mechanism.  
While co-joined housing was built previous to this time, the form of legislation was 
different, and referred to as either stock housing or community housing. Much of 
New York City for example, is still governed by stock housing. Stock housing is 
based in the trading of intangible shares (McKenzie  2006b). In stock housing, the 
company owns the total property with shareholders merely purchasing a block of 
shares and the right to occupy within a company structure.  Also present prior to 
the introduction of strata title legislation, were various forms of co-operative or 
community housing. In co-operative or community housing, there is a deliberate 
intention to build a community through consensus which is maximised prior to 
purchase. In the Australian context, this possibility still exists through other forms of 
legislation. For Beito, Gordon and Tabarrock (2002) the „voluntary city‟ most 
closely equates with this type of consensus built community housing. Both stock 
housing and community housing are excluded from this thesis. I mention them here 
merely to situate and provide context to the discussion of strata titled forms of 
property ownership since many older cities have large numbers of apartments 
created without the strata title mechanism. 
Australia‟s industry figures show a story of growth: 
 There are around 250,000 owner corporation comprising two million lots . 
 There are approximately 2,500 owner corporation managers in Australia 
(OCV, 2010). 
 Property worth more than $500 billion is strata titled.  
 An estimated 20,000 Australians work in and derive their income from the 
strata title industry.  
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 Urban planning policies around Australia are targeting annual growth of 
more than 10% for the next 15-25 years; the prevalence and importance of 
this sector is increasing (OCV website, accessed 12 July 2011). 
For Victoria, the following figures reflect the increase in population and the shift to 
a more dense city, but also one that is investor driven: 
 Approximately 65,650 owner corporation and 483,590 lots.  
 $1 billion per year is collected in fees and levies representing the 
management of property worth $48 billion or approximately 7% of the total 
value of all property in Victoria. 
 An estimated 20,000 new apartment dwellings will be completed over the 
next ten years in the City of Melbourne.  
 In 2009 -2010 year, 91% of new strata titled property in Victoria was sold to 
investors. 
 Medium sized strata developments (20 to 100 lots) reaped 46% profitability 
for strata managers. 
 1.2 % of existing units are compelled by legislation to have a 10 year 
maintenance plan with the majority not required to pre plan at all (Strata 
Australia accessed 12 July 2011). 
 
The concern of this thesis, then, is on the form of home ownership that relates to 
the strata title mechanism, the different governance arrangements that result from 
that legislation and the interaction of two key player groups, that of the strata 
manager and the committee of management. To create a better understanding of 
this relationship, a description of the mechanism and key players is required at this 
point. 
2.2 Governance arrangements and the strata 
title mechanism 
Khublall (1995) concluded that in Australia, along with several other countries, 
property rights and responsibilities of the parties are governed through legislation. 
However Khablall‟s statement does not go far enough. Wallace (2012, p. 26) 
rounds out this statement by commenting on the rights, restrictions and 
responsibilities:  
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„Rights are the familiar territory of the land markets, ownership 
and tenures and gain their strength when strangers to the rights 
(including government) are required to respect them. Rights are 
therefore conceptually related to duties owed to an owner by 
everyone else… Restrictions are a growth area as governments 
increase regulatory frameworks to meet the imperatives of 
climate change, comfortable neighbourhoods, funding for 
essential services and more. Australian laws place hundreds of 
restrictions on land activities and uses. Restrictions can be 
seen as duties owned by a landowner to civil society and 
government managed by multiple regulating agencies. 
Responsibilities are vaguer: they are familiar to those who live 
in condominium titles, where use of an apartment must be 
proscribed by considered mutuality.‟  
Because rights, restrictions and responsibility (3R) rely on regulatory mechanisms, 
many see strata title as a legal mechanism rather than the creation of a governing 
organisation. For example Rajabifard and Williamson (2012) note that land 
information infrastructure and the way that land is divided and governed is driven 
by economic, environmental, social, governance and technological management 
considerations. Within the Australian context, strata developments encompass not 
just condominium developments, but planned and gated suburban communities, 
low rise single dwellings and tower apartments. They may be residential or 
commercial. Freestanding homes, apartments, retirement villages, retail outlets, 
offices, motel rooms, storage units and car parks have all been strata titled and on-
sold. 
Strata titled property occurs when a real property, whether a building or land estate 
is divided and sold to more than one owner, with each owner retaining sole 
ownership over his or her private real property, at the same time retaining an 
interest in elements common to more than one owner (Blandy 2010). A strata 
scheme comes into operation with the ratification of strata titled surveyed plans to 
build a property complex (DPIWE 2008). Within Australia, the ratification of the 
plans by permit authorities (councils) and state governments automatically creates 
an organisation to manage the assets that are common to each title holder (Libbis 
& Leshinsky 2008). 
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Almost a decade ago, Everton-Moore et al. (2006) provided a jurisdictional 
stocktake of Australian strata title legislation outlining key similarities and 
differences in legislation between the states and territories. Since that time, all 
states have undertaken a review of their legislation and at least half of the states, 
including Victoria and Tasmania, have made changes. However as Sherry (2009) 
points out, there are still a sufficient amount of similarities in legislation for the 
major points to remain applicable to all states. 
Though the legislation may be similar there is a significant amount of variety in the 
legislative terminology between the Australian states and territories. Both Everton-
Moore et al. (2006) and Johnston and Reid (2013) provide comparative analysis of 
the jurisdictional terminology used to describe the strata title mechanism within 
Australia. However within this research the more descriptive term „owner 
corporation‟ is used instead of „body corporate‟, „HOA‟, „CID‟ or „condominium‟. It is 
the term used in the Owners Corporation Act 2006 (Victoria) which came into 
operation in December 2007. Within the strata title schemes created under this 
legislation, all lot owners make up the owner corporation and have shared rights 
and responsibilities over the common property within the scheme while retaining 
individual title to a separate lot, often an apartment. McKenzie‟s (2006b, p. 11) 
definition states that the main elements to this type of housing are „common 
ownership of real property, private land use controls, private governance, master 
planning and, with increasing prevalence, the use of various security measures‟ 
covering many of the key points encompassed within Australian legislation. His 
definition fails to focus on the restrictions placed on owners within these schemes. 
Sherry (2009, p. 133) on the other hand describes the three major components 
within owner corporation as:  
 The collective ownership of common property; 
 The creation of rules that govern behaviour within the complexes and 
 The creation of a governing body to control administration of the common 
property and rules for behaviour. 
Thus Sherry raises the profile of restrictions by reference to the creation of „rules‟. 
These three components remain universal across jurisdictions and it is from the 
collective holding of property in common that „owner corporation‟ are named. 
Sherry (2010) considers the owner corporation to be a fourth layer of governance. 
However though created through a legislative imperative, the owner corporation is 
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not always seriously considered by local council, state and federal departments as 
a significant governance structure. Rajabifard, Williamson and Kalantari (2012), for 
example, refer to the need for harmonised governance structures between local, 
state and federal governments in relation to land information sharing mechanisms. 
They remain silent on the exclusion of owner corporation from this need though it is 
a land based property sharing mechanism. Sharing of information is essential in 
relation to determination of lot entitlement and liability. For example where a strata 
scheme is in effect, the title documents will also designate a lot entitlement. The lot 
entitlement is the share of ownership that the lot owner has in the common 
property. This is different to a lot liability. The lot liability is the proportion of the 
owner corporation expenses for which a particular lot owner is responsible (Libbis 
& Leshinski 2008). The expenses incurred in maintaining the common property are 
proportionate among the owners and most often relates to the lot liability 
percentage. This is particularly important information sharing issue since where 
landlords are absent from the building and information is not kept up to date, there 
are few other ways of contacting the landlord, finding addresses or serving notices 
on absent owners.  
At this point there is a need to identify what constitutes the common property. Here 
there is a problem. In earlier schemes common property was named within the 
legislation. However as market product differentiation between various types of 
strata schemes (gated enclaves, lifestyle villages and apartment complexes) have 
increased there has been a move away from prescribing what constitutes common 
property within the legislation. Hence Christudason‟s (2004) view that consensus 
on definitions of what constitutes common property may be difficult to reach, 
despite being defined in legislation. The Owner Corporation of Victoria 2006 for 
example defines common property as „land shown as common property on a plan 
of subdivision or a plan of strata or cluster subdivision‟ (Victoria 69/2006). Such 
descriptions, leave the determination of common property with the strata scheme 
creator (the property developer), while future owners may struggle to make sense 
of survey plans. In practice, areas between and separating each strata titled unit, 
such as wall cavities, roof, roof space and air above the roof, and the building 
facade itself may be included within the definition of common property. Other 
common areas may include gardens, gymnasiums, car spaces and driveways, 
stairwells, lifts, security and air conditioning systems, as well as water, sewerage, 
electrical and fire connections. In master planned or gated communities the 
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common property may include golf courses, marinas, parkland and roads. As 
common property, the administration of such systems will fall within the powers of 
the owner corporation‟s committee of management, making the owner corporation 
reliant on professional plan readers and intermediaries such as strata managers. 
At an international level, this inconsistency of terminology creates difficulties for 
comparison between schemes (Hyatt & French 2008; McKenzie 1996). Moreover 
the complex nature of title documents and the developer mandated restrictions 
they contain „running into many hundreds of pages‟ (McKenzie, 2006a, p. 15) 
creates a complex system that is difficult for owners to negotiate. 
Accompanying the title documents are a set of rules that govern behaviour within 
the common property. Where no rules have been made by previous owners or by 
the developer, a set of model rules apply (Libbis & Leshinsky 2008). However 
variances between the different forms of planned communities and strata 
developments include the nature of by-laws that can be created.  Whereas local 
authorities in conjunction with the developer may mandate conditions for the 
development at the scheme‟s inception, by-laws created by the owners corporation 
are unable to limit the conditions of sale, re-sale or rental of the unit. Thus a local 
authority or council may mandate that a short term rental is unacceptable within a 
complex whereas the owner corporation cannot impose similar restrictions at 
present in Australia without the agreement of the majority of owners. Likewise, a 
local council may mandate that a planned estate is only for the 55+ age group or 
student accommodation, whereas the owner corporation is unable to discriminate 
on these terms.  Indeed the limitation of such rights by owner corporations within 
the USA has been seen as a negative experience creating legal and social 
difficulties (Hyatt & Stubblefield 1992). This concern goes to the heart of who uses 
the common property, how often and why. Certainly Easthope, Hudson and 
Randolph (2013) note that there has been little focus on the restrictive nature of 
strata title living particularly at the purchase stage, thus giving prospective 
purchasers and unrealistic view of their future living and ownership arrangements 
(Goodman & Douglas 2010; Blandy & Lister 2006). This lack of understanding 
does not bode well for collective living arrangements. 
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2.3  Owner corporation and organisational 
form 
The lodgement of strata title documents creates „a set of legal constraints and the 
formation of a group of people within a specific purpose‟ thus fulfilling Clegg et al.‟s 
(2006, p. 1) definition of an organisation as „the collective bending of individual wills 
to a common purpose‟. Within Victoria, the Owner Corporation Act 2006 defines 
the organisational structure with reference to: committees of management; 
subcommittee formation; who can sit on the committee; who may chair it and who 
has the authority to outsource duties to other commercial operators or 
organisations. Within the committee structure owners generally have one vote per 
property (Sherry 2009). Owners may be elected to the „committee of management‟. 
The committee of management acts as the elected governing board, and is 
responsible for governance within the organisation. As Easthope & Randolph 
(2009, p. 247) note, „governance refers to structure, processes and practices that 
determine how decisions are made in a system and what actions are taken within 
that system‟. The decision making power sits largely with this group of owners 
though all owners have voting rights along with the ability to nominate for a position 
on the committee of management.  
Legislative mechanisms create a hierarchical structure. Figure 2 indicates the legal 
organisational structure in the Australian context, one that is designed to provide 
agency to the property owners. It should be noted however that sub committees 
may exist either at the behest of owners, or be mandatory as a result of the 
schedules lodged with the property title by the developer.  
 
Figure 2 Legal Structure of the Owner Corporation providing Agency 
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Viewing the organisational structure in this way, it is possible to see the political 
aspects of the organisation. At the local level micro politics exist within private 
neighbourhoods (Glasze 2006a). McKenzie (1996, p. 2; see also Silverman & 
Barton 1994, p. 144) notes that within western constitutions, democratic principles 
that exist at national, state and municipal levels are violated at the organisational 
level of the owner corporation including principles of public and pluralistic decision 
making, and principles of equity and sovereignty. Competing interests and the 
absence of democratic institutions are out of balance within the owner corporation, 
bypassing basic democratic principles (Glasze 2006a, p. 41; see also Scott 1999, p. 
20).  For example meetings may be closed, and proxy votes may be exercised. 
Sherry (2010) has written about purchasers ceding proxy votes to the strata 
manager or developer as part of the initial purchase contracts. 
Glasze (2006a, p. 41) makes the following points in relation to the way democratic 
principles may be violated by private governments such as owner corporation: 
 At higher levels of government, directors of boards are not bound to 
property ownership or place of residence. Tenants have a voice in the 
functioning of society. Voting rights vary in different countries.  
 There is no opposition to “keep the bastards honest” (Chipp, 1977) as there 
are with higher levels of government. Board members determine the 
agenda through privileged access to information. Detractors and minorities 
risk being dominated, or else need to make their own bid for leadership 
under „coup‟ like circumstances. 
 Dictatorial and oligarchic structures exist in which developers may dominate 
the decision making by retaining ownership and voting rights to a portion of 
the properties. The complex nature of the governing documents is such that 
the developer may be the only person on the committee of management 
that understands the full impact of a given decision.  
Foldvary (1994) nominally agrees, stating that in devolved democracies the 
standards of equality and transparency are less rigid than other levels of 
government. There is a duality of interests between the individual owners‟ interest 
and that of collective action in the organisation‟s interest. These competing 
interests create an appropriate climate for micro politics to develop. This may be 
between owners, the owners and the governing corporation, the corporation and 
the management company, the governing organisation and the developer, or a 
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combination of these as depicted in Figure 2 above.  Chen and Webster (2006a) 
report low participation rates by owners in their organisations, and refer to Guo 
(1999) who found that owners drew lots to serve on their committees since no-one 
volunteered to serve willingly. Chan and Chui (1997) found that several factors 
affect participation in voluntary organisations, leading to poor outcomes. 
Volunteers donated around nine hours per month with those in lower socio 
economic communities unable to afford the time or lost income required to 
participate. Bush and Gamage (2001) found that the provision of governance was 
a volunteer activity with no extrinsic rewards, resulting in difficulty attracting 
suitable candidates. The number of volunteers rarely exceeded the number of 
vacancies (Gamage 1996). Parker (2007) reported that finding voluntary board 
members with appropriate expertise was difficult and there is a tendency for them 
to operate without all members. Filling positions becomes not so much a matter of 
„who the best person for the role is‟ but „who is available to fill the role‟. Owners 
may lack interest in volunteering their time and services to the organisation, or due 
to family and work obligations be unable to attend meetings, thus creating a 
microclimate in which egocentric behaviour flourishes. The checks and balances 
that participative governance relies on, becomes jeopardised.  
Chen and Webster (2006a) found that when levels of trust decreased among 
owner corporation, the level of engagement decreased leading to fewer 
participants, leading to increasing amounts of conflict among members. McKenzie 
(2006a) has commented on this extensively through many publications. However it 
is best illustrated in his 2006 study into Las Vegas‟s “Bonanza Village” in which 
local council negotiated with an organisation that was not representative of the 
residents and held no legitimate power. The fact that these negotiations occurred 
raised the power status of the illegitimately formed owner corporation. Negotiating 
with a break off group of residents met the council‟s agenda of privatisation of 
neighbourhoods. When transparency and accountability are diminished in an 
organisation, conflict sets in. Emotions are heightened due to the „rootedness‟ 
(Giddens 1984) and sanctity of home being jeopardised. It is difficult to form habits 
that facilitate the sanctity of home under such conflict and ontological security is 
threatened.1 
                                                          
1
 This concept of emotional attachment and rootedness is explored further in in the Part 3 of this 
thesis. 
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Figure 3 reflects a multi-story strata building precinct in Melbourne showing a 
„nested‟ structure. „Nesting‟ is a tiered structure that occurs when several smaller 
owner corporation are governed by a larger, overarching one (Townshend 2006) 
and may entail designated mixed use property within the one strata scheme. 
Melbourne‟s inner city apartment sector has several nested developments. These 
title documents were obtained from the original developer as part of the 
background research.  The developer designated organisation shows a complex 
organisational structure with a number of sub committees to assist in the 
functioning of the organisation, all requiring volunteers with a minimum quorum of 
volunteers in order to operate. The structure shows a multitude of reporting 
requirements with a formal, bureaucratic structure, with several committees and 
direct lines of reporting. Because the structure is linked to title documents by the 
developer, the structure cannot easily be altered to meet the changing needs of the 
owners, including a deficit of volunteers.  
 
Figure 3 Developer influence on the detailed structure of management 
Evans et al. (2005) indicate that governance regulates interaction between 
partnerships, assisting interactions, debate and conflict between local citizens, 
organisations and local government. Good governance expresses itself through 
attributes such as accountability, transparency, efficiency, participation and 
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empowerment, equity, justice, and sustainability (Hye 2000). Langlands (2004) 
defined good governance as good management which underpins performance and 
use of public money, engagement and good outcomes. Mumpower (2001) asserts 
that greater levels of participation will improve decision and implementation 
strategies. Rahmin (1992) adds that people engagement also increases levels of 
transparency and accountability thus increasing governance outcomes. 
Participation therefore is seen as a key area of governance by several authors. 
Cole et al. (1998, p. 58) found that the essential ingredient for success within 
owner corporation was an active residents group and that satisfaction was 
generally high even in larger strata developments. Bounds (2010) in his Pyrmont 
studies found that satisfaction with strata living could be high where residents were 
active. Altermann (2010) and Bounds (2010) both found that participation was 
greatest in medium density housing where people were more likely to be on 
nodding terms with each other, thus engendering a sense of trust and increasing 
participation.  
Trust and control can be viewed as structures of interrelated practices that 
influence the development of different forms of expert power within particular 
organisational contexts (Clegg 2006, p. 87). Trust is based on predictability of 
behaviour. Predictability relates to internal or external control mechanisms. Trust 
and control are closely related (Reed 2001). Not only do residents groups and 
owner corporation need to be active, they need to perform in a way that engenders 
trust. Accountability is acknowledged as a key aspect of governance of an 
organisation and has been linked with governance legitimacy (Aguilera 2005; see 
also Frankel 1989; Judge & Zeithanal 1992; Malboy & Agarwal 2001) where this is 
seen as a means of enhancing legitimacy. Legitimacy is also valued as a 
stabilising concept within organisations (Deephouse & Carter 2005; see also 
Goddard & Assard 2006). Board level inclusion is an important and pressing issue 
in the governance of modern organisations (Kesner et al.1986). Problems tend to 
arise when participation levels are low and lack of participation infers lower 
legitimacy of board structures (Spear 2004, p. 43). Jacobs (2002, p. 103) phrases 
this more positively stating that „a bottom up approach requires the capacity of 
individuals to embrace collective action and initiate organisational change‟. It is to 
facilitate this bottom up approach that owner corporation are formed and owners 
given agency.  
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However facilitating the bottom up approach is not easy when so few owners 
understand the differences between this organisation and other organisational 
forms or the myriad of influences and relationships that the owner corporation has 
with other stakeholders. The relationship between owners and how the committee 
of management functions, or in McKenzie‟s (2006a) view, malfunctions is 
influenced by both structure and agency between a multitude of players. Several 
attempts have been made to map these relationships. Guilding et al (2005) applied 
a „principal and agency‟ approach to the owner corporation and separated out 
resident owners from investor owners as principals, whereas the agent was 
represented as the onsite resident unit manager responsible for letting and 
subletting2. Guilding et al.‟s (2005) study concentrated on the mechanisms that 
bound residential building managers as agents to a disparate group of owners as 
principals. It failed to probe relationships more commonly found such as the strata 
manager relationship. Warnken et al.‟s (2005) process map came closer, but again 
was predicated on a Queensland model complicated by resident managers, and 
comparisons to hotel trusts. It did however show some of the possible relationships 
between developers, real estate agents and strata managers and resident 
managers. However it fails to mention some of the actors or allow the reader to 
reference the actors to their key functions. Nor does it clearly show the actors in 
relation to the key duties associated with governance. 
Figure 4 maps participant interaction within the owner corporation, providing a 
visual representation of the flow of power, conflict, interaction and knowledge 
within the owner corporation along with the key duties performed by each actor. It 
clearly shows a variety of owners making up the owner corporation. The committee 
of management as outlined earlier is the functioning board within the owner 
corporation. Unlike Warnken et al.‟s (2005) work, residential building managers 
and real estate agents are depicted as one rental agent looking after both short 
and long term rentals. As with residential building managers, they may be located 
on site or elsewhere. The focus is on the owner corporation duties and their choice 
of how they fulfil those duties. On whether they use an outsourced contract based 
                                                          
2
 The approach was based on positivist agency research and similar to Jensen’s (1983; Fama & 
Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976) work in which principal-agent relationships are identified 
and mapped using conflicting interest groupings leading to self-interested governance mechanisms. 
The agency referenced costs include the costs of monitoring where the principal attempts to 
monitor an agent’s behaviour. When the costs of monitoring becomes too high, then focus shifts to 
metering the outcomes of the agent’s action, as in outcome based contractual mechanisms 
(Sharma 1997). 
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mechanism to employ a strata manager, or self-manage those duties, as entitled to 
do under legislation. Indeed Strata Australia (2011) report that approximately 70% 
of all strata titled property complexes are smaller self-managed ones, an issue not 
previously discussed within Australian literature. 
Figure 4 depicts some of the other external relationships, such as the developer 
who closely influences structure. The place of banks and insurance agents is 
shown in relation to the strata manager. Banks and insurance agencies provide 
kickbacks to strata management companies for using their services. These issues 
are discussed in detail at industry conventions. The strata manager is there to 
assist the committee of management to function. This is a similar relationship 
reported by other non-profit organisations where the expertise of a contracted in 
CEO is there to support the board‟s effective functioning. I have not delved deeply 
into the relationship between real estate agents and strata managers. These are 
discussed in other literature. Foldvary (2006) for example discusses agency within 
real estate industry. Sherry (2009; 2010) discusses possible real estate-developer 
relationships in the Australian context. Figure 4 shows a dense arrangement of 
contractual obligations carried out between the committee of management, the 
strata manager where engaged and the duties performed by both parties. Yet it is 
this relationship that the literature is most 
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Figure 4 How the owner corporation interacts with stakeholders 
silent about. Again I question how do stakeholders interact to impact governance 
with the particular emphasis on the interaction between strata managers and the 
committee of management?  
Of course there are limitations to Figure 4. It does not, for example, provide a full 
picture of all stakeholders. There needs to be a balance between the wider picture 
and the detail. It does not provide detail about particular processes. For example 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), a key stakeholder is not shown in Figure 4 
whereas Warken and Guilding (2005) refer to the ATO as a stakeholder, but do not 
explain their relationship to the owner corporation. The ATO, as Australia‟s 
principal revenue collection agency determines whether owner corporation 
finances are exempt. 
2.4  Corporation differences 
Corporations holding non-profit status for Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
registration purposes with the ATO, are eligible for the higher $150,000 threshold 
where they do not intend to distribute any non-mutual income. ATO ruling IT 2505 
was provided in 1989 to clarify the tax treatment of income of owner corporations 
as constituted under the various state and territory laws (ATO 1986) This ruling 
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took the view that owner corporation income from its members (typically strata 
levies) was mutual income and therefore not taxable in the hands of the owner 
corporation. However income derived from common property (e.g. parking, gym 
hire) was a taxable event though it was used solely for the upkeep of common 
areas. The ruling applied the principles of mutuality and determined that non-
mutual income is taxable in the hands of individual members or lot owners rather 
than the owner corporation itself, creating a tax burden for many owners who may 
remain unaware of the ATO‟s reportable requirements.  
The ruling essentially means that even though profits may never be distributed to 
the owners, the owners are still required to declare non mutual income generated 
from belonging to the owner corporation. This inconsistency comes about because 
„relevant state and territory legislation provides that a body corporate can make 
distributions to its proprietors in certain circumstances‟ contrary to TD 93/73 
(www.ato.gov.au/rulings accessed 11/4/2011).  
The effect of the ruling is to require larger owner corporations to provide an annual 
income statement to each member for their use in end of year financial statements. 
The owner is then required to declare their share of the net income for taxation 
purposes, regardless of whether there has been any actual distribution. The ruling 
is of particular concern to those owners who have bought into owner corporations 
such as retirement villages and who are on fixed incomes and reliant on pensions, 
as they need to declare this income, even though it remains within the sinking 
funds of the owner corporation. It provides an intricate set of reporting 
requirements for the owner corporation, and a considerable impost on both the 
time and expertise of the organisation. 
The ruling in relation to tax declaration are complex and because of the distribution 
of funds requirements may act to limit the amount of income sought by owner 
corporations through rental of common property to outside agents. The key 
element here is the distribution of non-mutual income. This may occur from time to 
time, when funds have been raised for a specific upgrade that does not eventuate, 
or when the owner corporation scheme is being wound up. The funds distributed in 
this way are not considered exempt from non-profit status and remain taxable 
against each owner‟s income. It is increasingly a worry for owners of strata titled 
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property nearing the end of its' useful life3. This is because as Easthope et al. 
(2013) note, the proposed introduction of demolition4 clauses into the legislation 
where enacted, will trigger the distribution of commonly held funds amongst all 
owners. Larger, declarable lump sum payments to individual owners will be the 
result. 
Other factors arising out of, and affecting, the income for owners include the 
inability to access various low income subsidies. This situation is bought about 
because many invoices, such as water and electricity, are not in the individual 
owner‟s name, but remain in the name of the owner corporation with each owner 
paying a percentage of the quarterly statement. Though Altmann (2013) also notes 
that owner corporation have been excluded from key federal government subsidies 
for environmental sustainability upgrades. 
Company law and the concept of corporation are anomalies for the owner 
corporation. Owner corporations do not wholly fall within the non-profit sector either, 
since the tax exemptions are only partial. The effect of these exemptions from 
normative corporation, tax law and government funding, is that effectively no 
requirement exists for external auditing of the organisation either in terms of 
financial rigorousness, operational systems or procedural fairness, despite holding 
increasingly large sums of community funds and being responsible for significant 
assets. Without this oversight how does governance work within owner corporation?  
Strata managers where appointed, have a role to play as they undertake the 
administrative, secretarial and financial duties on behalf of all owners. The 
complexity of financial relations differs in company and non-profit law. Taxation 
issues create a complex system that strata managers may be asked to advise on 
and administer. The myriad relations between the many different stakeholders 
create complex relationships for both the strata manager and the committee of 
management leading to the question of how owner corporations govern within such 
complex systems? 
The role of the strata manager under such circumstances should become a key 
stabilising factor for committees of management, not only because of their 
                                                          
3
 See Johnston and Reid (2013) for a full discussion of life cycle costing relevant to the strata 
industry. 
4
 Demolition clauses are currently under consideration in New South Wales. The introduction would 
allow owners to vote to demolish their building rather than continue to maintain it once it had 
reached the end of its’ useful life. The attached owner corporation would be extinguished at the 
time the building was demolished. 
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specialised knowledge but also because their role may provide continuity within 
which history of the owner corporation resides. Johnson and Scolley (2001) state 
that personnel changes concurrent with council elections means that the entire 
council membership can change from one year to the next. As a result many 
voluntary organisations experience little growth towards maturity or fully functioning 
teams (Weiss 1993). External pressure can be bought to bear on some non-profit 
boards to function effectively through the withholding of government funding. This 
type of external pressure is missing from the owner corporation environment at 
present.  
Saidel and Harlan (1998, p. 224) report that most non-profit organisations apply 
patterns of governance in which  governance challenges are met by the 
organisation‟s executive staff as well as the board. Leading the board is a central 
role for non-profit executive officers and the CEO (Drucker 1990; see also Fletcher 
1992). The executive or manager‟s role then is to guide the board into appropriate 
decision making where boards lack expertise (Miller 2002). Within the owner 
corporation environment, the committee of management consisting of real property 
owners acts as the board, whereas the strata manger takes the role of top 
management or executive through an outsourced, contract based mechanism.  
Muetzelfeldt (1998) reported that contract mechanisms within the non-profit sector 
had had considerable impact for Australian organisations. Adversarial tendering 
processes are commonplace within the non-profit sector as is increasing reliance 
on outside „specialist knowledge‟.  
It remains the duty of the committee of management to monitor the strata manager 
to ensure that the interests of the owners are protected. Members or owners are 
more vigilant in monitoring their interests and the interests of the organisation 
(Mwenja & Lewis 2009). However, the literature relevant to owner corporations 
suggests that boards are plagued by conflict between individual needs and 
collective action for the good of all owners. These findings fit with Green and 
Griesinger‟s (1996) view that non-profit board members have difficulty in clearly 
identifying who they are accountable to and sometimes suggest that they are 
accountable to themselves. The outcome is poor trust levels and lower 
participation rates leading to lower governance outcomes. Low levels of trust and 
participation leading to lower governance outcomes have been identified within 
owner corporation (Blandy 2010; Goodman & Douglas 2010; McKenzie 1996). 
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Bebbington and Gray (2005) find it difficult to define measures of accountability 
and transparency within non-profit organisations though they play an important part.  
2.5  Complex relationship systems - Social 
cohesion and gaining consensus 
Scholars of urban life have generally agreed on the need for social ties in 
producing viable communities and organisational forms (Browning et al. 2000). 
This is in line with Lefebvre‟s (2000, p. 40) belief that engagement with the physical 
urban space is understood through subjective experiences. Many neighbourhood 
renewal projects, whether organic or government sponsored, rely on these ties to 
facilitate shared aims and outcomes (Robertson et al. 2008). Within co-ownership 
schemes, people with like-minded ideology are more likely to come together to 
create a built community with agreed values. Gated communities, including 
vertically gated apartments, are bound together by fear of external forces (Brunn 
2006) and characterised physically by separation barriers such as walls, fences 
and or other intimidating barriers from adjacent freehold property. Access is limited 
not only to the residences, but to the streetscape and neighbourhood amenities 
(Vesselinov & Le Goix 2009).  In both instances, behavioural differences between 
owners may be much less visible to begin with. However, ownership is reliant on 
agreed transfer of purchase funds. Therefore the only bond between owners is that 
of financial capacity. Thus differences between owners may be greater, leading to 
situations of conflict between owners where common property is concerned.  This 
in turn gives rise to the idea that „all organisations are crucibles of political life‟ 
(Clegg et al. 2006, p. 3) in which members struggle to impose their own views. 
The dual nature of owner roles (individual and collective) in developments is 
inherently problematic (Blandy 2010). Conflict may occur between residents, 
management companies and individual owners, caused by lack of engagement or 
by the heavy handed enforcement of covenants (McKenzie 2010). There is no 
guarantee of fairness, equity or transparency in relation to the election of members 
to the committee of management, thus jeopardising accountability. The failure of 
legal systems and disinterest of owners can have a direct bearing on the physical 
condition of strata complexes.  Where there is no active or informed management 
in place, Robertson (2010) reports that management by crisis may occur and be 
activated by leaking roofs or structural collapse leading to sudden financial issues 
 
 Page    44 
  
 
for the corporation and thus the owners. Resident involvement in the owner 
corporation is necessary to ensure residents do not feel „impotent, anomic and 
isolated‟ within their neighbourhoods (Bounds 2010, p. 151). 
Likewise, gaining consensus to implement rules of behaviour within the complex 
may be onerous and lead to opposing factions and conflict. In commenting on 
suburban life, Baumgartner (1988, p. 153) observes how tensions are minimised 
when people are able to avoid each other. „Barking dogs, disorderly children, 
untended yards and perceived insults and encroachments are a part of life‟ he 
states. These matters are mundane and trivial yet are consequential to the people 
involved. Within the closer confines of strata titled dwellings, these issues may well 
manifest and fester due to the lack of physical distance. 
The building of social cohesion may form a key, yet unidentified, concept within the 
owner corporation arsenal of organisational tools. Bounds (2010, p. 147) asserts 
that social bonds and trust amongst residents within apartment buildings may be 
strong despite deteriorating physical structures. This is in line with Gan‟s (1962) 
study of urban villagers where apartment or flat living was described in some depth. 
However Baumgartner‟s (1988) study of suburban life found that class structure 
impacted on the way people behaved during periods of conflict and how they 
settled disputes. In essence, individuals from low socio economic backgrounds and 
youths tended to be more open and aggressive in situations of conflict whereas 
middle class individuals tended to move away rather than face open conflict with 
neighbours. The middle class tended to engage in payback at a later date, 
Baumgartner asserts. Committee members engaging in pay back mechanisms 
make decision making difficult. Such actions may also limit the number of people 
willing to stand for volunteer positions within the owner corporation. Wilson (1996) 
recognised that urban social networks impact on local problem behaviour, 
depending upon the level of neighbourhood cohesion and informal social control. 
Collective management by residents may be simpler in smaller developments but 
can lead to extremely bitter and personal disputes between owners who continue 
to live in close proximity. Regardless of the development type, disputes over the 
implementation of rules, which seem petty to some owners and tenants, may 
impact severely on the enjoyment of space. Butler-Bowden and Pickett‟s (2007, p. 
69) historical research of apartment dwellings in the Australian context capture this 
sentiment succinctly in quoting a resident‟s experience „as like living with a nasty 
old lady, not allowed to sunbathe in the garden or wear bathers‟.   
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McKenzie (1996) reports that government has turned a blind eye to the high level 
of conflict and litigation emanating from strata title conflicts. Within Victoria, the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) has now set up a separate strata 
hearing list to hear and adjudicate issues arising between the various players. 
While individual owners cannot afford the high legal costs of representation, 
associations can tap into the common purse and raise levies among owners to 
cover costs.  This may see an owner paying a proportion of a legal defence in 
which they are the appellant in addition to their own costs, creating a higher 
financial burden for owners, and increasing the amount of stress associated with 
unresolved disputes.  
The collectivist style of living may be at odds with a western culture based on 
individualism. For instance, Holt (1971, p. 28) found that 
„when four or five hundred people and some animals live on 3 – 10 
acres the area becomes congested. If there were no rules then the 
area would soon become a slum, with each person contributing.  
Soon discriminating people would refuse to live there, the property 
would deteriorate and affect sale price‟.   
The levels of density outlined by Holt have increasingly been surpassed with the 
flow of time creating a greater propensity for conflict. Skifter Andersen (2011) 
reports that renters have greater flexibility than owners in moving when they are 
unhappy with their accommodation. Industry professionals report high investor 
components for strata complexes. Absentee landlords tend to do business at arm‟s 
length, through real estate agents and professionals.  
Blandy (2010; see also Manzi & Smith-Blowers 2006; McKenzie 1998) notes high 
levels of conflict within the organisation. This is not surprising after considering the 
infringement of democratic rights noted by Glasze (2006b), the effects of place 
marketing to consumers without mentioning that they are joining an organisation, 
or the costs associated with maintaining private communal assets. These findings 
are relevant to this research project in several respects. First, collectivist 
management styles rely on social cohesion built on similar values. I note that 
Bagaeen and Uduku (2010) find that there is a long history of collective living in 
non-western countries that does not appear problematic. Where it is lacking there 
is the possibility for greater conflict within the owner corporation and organisational 
goals are less likely to be achieved. Second, the failure of collectivist management 
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may lead to significantly poorer building outcomes as physical building issues are 
not actioned. Third, the lack of social cohesion may extend beyond the owner 
corporation and into the wider community. There is a need for neighbourhood 
communities to have settled residents willing to take part in local activities. Yet the 
literature reports that there is a tendency for people, particularly middle class 
people and tenants to move away where situations of conflict exist.  
Gated communities in particular are considered exclusionary with Gottdiener and 
Hutchinson (2000) stating that security measures increase privacy while at the 
same time destroy ties to neighbours and therefore community cohesion. This lack 
of community cohesion is noted by a number of authors (Blandy & Lister 2006; see 
also Manzi & Smith-Blowers 2006). The advent of public-partnerships as described 
by Blandy and Lister (2006) and government implementation of „affordable housing‟ 
strategies may create situations in which owner corporations are terrorised by 
social housing within private complexes.  
Gating can be seen as segregating not only along economic lines of the “haves 
and have-nots”, but also in terms of age or generational segregation. For example 
Cardew (1970) reported on the inclusion of children‟s playgrounds and roof 
gardens as necessary to attract families. The inclusion of specific services such as 
play grounds and movie theatres create the need for greater expertise in running 
strata complexes and are therefore more likely to lead to outsourced management. 
Moreover, Webster and Glaze (2006) raises the issue of place marketing, which 
may lead to racial segregation. Certainly Low (2003) believes that those earmarked 
as not „belonging‟ are easily visible and monitored closely connecting these 
aspects to Baumgartner‟s (1988) suburban work.  
Growing feelings of insecurity can be met through gated communities. Such 
feelings of insecurity have grown since the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA, while in 
many countries experiencing high levels of migration and refugee influx, fear of 
„other‟ has grown. This fear has been spurred on by media scandalisation (Brunn 
2006). The unease created by these fears, combined with a lack of democratic 
oversight normally found within government organisations, creates opportunities for 
individuals to engage in self-seeking behaviour rather than in collective action for 
the good of all owners and the organisation (Glasze 2006a).  
Conversely Bounds (2010, p. 145) states that satisfaction can be high among 
residents in multi-owned developments, and is dependent on the residents‟ needs 
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for different forms of housing at different times throughout a person‟s life. This 
suggests that if a mismatch between needs and dwelling type arises then 
dissatisfaction will occur. Other academics disagree. Feng‟s (2008) research 
indicates that it is not unusual for new resident committees to face multiple serious 
problems involving developers, local government, property firms and home owners 
stating that the overall amenity of the building and how well it its run, is a crucial 
point in resident satisfaction, rather than housing mismatch. Feng‟s research 
focuses attention on organisational and maintenance issues. Cheshire et al. (2009) 
indicate that in master planned communities, the developers‟ privatised forms of 
governance may require local residents to voluntarily maintain aesthetic standards. 
Over time, this too may become a source of increased dissatisfaction since owners 
are likely to want to make and re-make their homes (Leonard, Perkins & Thorn 
2004).  The ability for owners to personalise their homes is a key element of home 
ownership (Skifter Andersen, 2011). McKenzie (2006a), in particular, sees the high 
conflict incidence between owners, residents and owner corporation boards as a 
central aspect of untrained, unpaid volunteer boards carrying out what are in effect 
local government functions of finance and asset maintenance. 
Bounds (2010) observes that many residents experience failure with their first 
encounter at strata living, discouraging them from further attempts. Skifter 
Andersen (2011) reported similar findings in relation to community housing 
schemes in Denmark. Baldassare‟s (1982) study found that resident satisfaction 
within strata developments relates to a resident‟s sense of control over the 
management of their dwelling. Yet the nature of belonging to an organisation 
makes individual control difficult, and may be why control over maintenance and 
repairs, and the ability to save on costs by undertaking work oneself was an 
important factor in the desire to own a detached dwelling in Skifter Andersen‟s 
(2011) study. These resources are curtailed for strata property owners.  
2.6 The emergence of property or strata 
managers 
While much of the discussion in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America centres around issues of democracy, governance, collective action and 
citizens‟ rights, in other cultural contexts the issues vary.  For instance, in the 
Chinese context, Webster, Wu and Zhao (2006, p. 158) recognise that „most 
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estate-based housing is therefore contractually managed rather than politically 
governed … (and) renders the distinction between high end gated communities 
and median income housing estates less fundamental than in many countries‟. Wu 
(2005) for example, comments that in China, neighbourhoods organised by non-
state agencies have been a norm. Many of the factories and other work 
organisations were formed with housing attached, facilitating collective local 
management (Webster et al. 2006). Pie (1998) asserted almost two decades ago 
that governance and managerial functions associated with property owner 
corporations are contracted to entrepreneurial management firms within free 
market economies. This observation illustrates the early emergence of a new 
profession, that of the property or strata manager. Property managers (called strata 
managers or building managers in different jurisdictions) may assist the 
organisation to function and meet legislated duties. According to Lei and Van der 
Merwe (2009) the strata manager fulfils three key functions: administrative; 
secretarial; and financial. They are employed to oversee various aspects of the 
organisation, without actually taking on the role of building manager, or in Gilding‟s 
(2010) Queensland sense, property manager.  
Lin (2002 in Chen & Webster 2006a) commenting on Taiwan‟s approach, notes 
that strata management companies have primarily been associated with larger 
commercial property management companies and real estate agencies. Chen and 
Webster (2006a, pp. 26-28) see a parallel growth between property management 
companies and number of owner corporation, noting that strata management 
companies have become a multi-product industry overseeing a range of private 
governance functions. As the industry has developed, Chen and Webster (2006a) 
note that property managers are moving into new territories of community role, a 
role not solely limited to the provision of property maintenance, but one that offers 
a holistic approach to organisational needs. Guo (1999 in Chen & Webster 2006a) 
note that around 70% of Taiwan‟s complexes are administered by property agents. 
As Blandy (2010) comments, developers may appoint property management 
companies to assist owner corporations. Blandy‟s point is that this places the 
developer in a privileged position where there is a predefined association between 
the developer and the property management company. In addition, it also places 
the property manager in a privileged position where the appointment of additional 
service contracts are required (Sherry, 2010; Chen & Webster 2006b). The 
establishment of service contracts with suppliers that provide trailing fees, as with 
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insurance products, means that conflict of interest situations may also occur at 
both property manager and developer level. In countries where payoffs are 
required in order to manage the complex, these transaction types may be 
considered a cost of doing business. However within western societies, conflict of 
interest situations are considered to lack accountability, particularly where under-
the-counter payoffs take place.   
It is timely to comment on Lin‟s (2002 in Chen & Webster 2006a) statement that 
property management companies may also provide risk mitigation in the form of 
hazard migration from natural disasters. Between 2011 and 2012 sections of 
northern Australia were battered by a series of natural disasters. Those areas most 
devastated were also areas of high population and numerous strata developments 
in the form of apartments. While early government enquires were announced into 
disaster management and insurance issues, the enquiry has been extended to 
explore an 800% hike in insurance premiums for strata titled property (Shaw n.d). 
This would not have occurred without persistent lobbying from organised property 
management associations (Strata Australia 2011).  
The emergence of industry associations specific to property management 
professionals has not been seen as an integral part of the strata property system to 
date. Douglas et al. (2008) and Sherry (2009) comment from a legislative viewpoint 
within the Australian context. Randolph and Easthope (2011) provide quantitative 
research into the growth of the strata industry within the New South Wales context. 
Property management companies and their professional associations are keen to 
extend their sphere of influence with owner corporations. As Shui (2001 in Chen & 
Webster 2006a) notes, the use of external property managers may lower the costs 
of governance for owner corporations because they are able to access, for 
example, legal advice through economies of scale. However such advice is rarely 
given impartially. It puts the property manager‟s needs first. McKenzie (1996) and 
Forrest et al. (2002) note that lawyers engaged directly by owner corporations may 
be just as self-serving. The range of personal and contractual relationships that 
owner corporations administer are complex, increasing situations where conflict, 
and conflict-of-interest may occur. With low participation rates within owner 
corporations, considerable power is given to building and strata managers and 
their professional associations. 
Owner corporations then are at the mercy of rent-seeking behaviour from building 
and strata management companies as well as developers. The organisation that is 
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supposed to assist home owners to interact smoothly may be constrained by those 
who are engaged to assist them to manage. In addition to the four types of 
developer‟s influence outlined by Glasze‟s (2006a) and Clarke‟s (2006) research, 
owner corporations may be adversely affected by two types of strata manager 
influence: (1) that of self-seeking opportunism in contractual relationships; or (2) 
where property managers own caretaker property within complexes and have a 
legitimate role as owner. The range of influences at so many different levels may 
have significant impact on the lived experience of home within strata titled property 
environments. Guilding et al. (2005; see also Warnken & Guilding 2009; Warnken 
et al. 2005) has written extensively in this area. The experience they describe is 
Queensland based, and an indication of the mature tourism industry along the Gold 
and Sunshine coasts which is heavily reliant on on-site residential managers, who 
purchase the right to on-site management. The ability of the residential building 
manager to influence letting and sub-letting practices within a particular building is 
therefore not a significant feature of other jurisdictions, though highly relevant to 
the Queensland context and its impact on governance issues generally. It is also 
feature of that market not seen in other jurisdictions to the same extent. Building 
managers do not take the place of strata managers in terms of administrative, 
secretarial and financial duties in any case. In Queensland, though a residential 
building manager is engaged, a strata manager is also engaged because the 
duties that each party performs are different.  
Increasingly it is the strata manager, an outsourced position, that becomes 
responsible for maintaining cohesion between owners and tenants within the 
governance framework. There is a link between the provision of otherwise 
unconnected residents to the vital role of a „the strata manager as actor‟, able to 
bridge diverse groups of stakeholders to provide the development basis for broad-
based trust and solidarity (Granovetter 1973; Suttles 1968). Given the propensity 
for some sections of society to fail in negotiating an outcome, the ability to appeal 
to a strata manager to enforce rules and act as a champion is enticing for both 
large and small complexes. Butcher and Clarke (2006) maintain that behaviour is 
central in balancing both diversity and cohesion of agenda and self-interest and 
civic virtue.  Leadership involves the exercise of power in the pursuit of direction 
that is meaningful for others to follow (Horner-Long & Schoenberg 2002; see also 
Leach & Wilson 2000).  
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Neighbourhood disputes within the environment over usage, noise, and the like are 
often left to the strata manager to adjudicate. Often these disputes rely on case law 
or owner corporation rulings. Moreover it is the strata manager, a contracted expert, 
who is most likely to understand where the boundaries exist between private strata 
unit and communal land. Engaging a strata manager places considerable power 
(through the contracted right to manage) in the hands of an expert who may have 
his or her own agenda. The engagement of an external strata manager constitutes 
a key area of outsourcing with its attendant contractual risks. In engaging a strata 
manager, there is an assumption of contracted-in expertise and professionalism, 
which may not necessarily exist in practice. Professionalism implies appropriate 
credentials often seen as a prerequisite for such recognition (Gale & Austin 2003; 
see also Lait & Wallace 2002; Prasad & Prasad 1994). Yet the appointment of 
strata managers is unregulated in most states. New South Wales and Victoria have 
introduced voluntary Certificate IV qualifications (Strata Australia 2012) as a 
minimum standard for strata managers. Belonging to industry networking groups 
may create a formidable lobbying group. However it is not necessarily a guarantee 
of professionalism or appropriate leadership for an owner corporation.  
Davis (1995) reports that despite the many virtues of the single family home it is 
environmentally unsustainable. The push for infill housing and higher density living 
has its roots in the 1970‟s (Goldberg & Smith 1989). Bardsley-Smith and Smith 
(1988) indicate that there would be a change to our neighbourhoods with the cost 
of lifts and fire installations not effective in 4-7 story buildings. Therefore buildings 
of less than 3 stories or more than 8 would more likely be built, leading to 
significant change to the character of neighbourhoods, and the type of developer 
attracted to inner city housing construction. It also moves the focus of housing 
construction from single story, domestic construction to more complex commercial 
construction. Within the Building Code of Australia, this manifests as a change 
from a Class 1a construction to a Class 6 construction. There are significant 
differences in the capabilities required to manage physical aspects of building 
maintenance that result from the change in building code classification. For 
example annual inspections by certified engineers are required in relation to 
Electronic Warning Information Systems (EWIS) within Class 6 buildings whereas 
there is no inspection regime for domestic Class 1a buildings. There are also 
significant differences between the domestic and commercial lifespans of the 
buildings, with commercial buildings generally demolished within a 30 to 50 year 
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time frame. Local councils and state governments have long championed the 
medium to high density development of suburbs, and have a significant power 
base in shaping the city through planning schemes. The increase in dwelling 
density provides additional sources of income for councils. Denser populations 
mean more funding at state and federal levels, though councils also reap 
significant income from development application fees and increased rates volume. 
Councils and developers therefore have much in common with the construction 
industry in lobbying for a more compact, higher density city. Together they form a 
considerable power base. 
Indeed the Master Builders Association (MBA 2011) states that it liaises regularly 
with Treasury, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Taxation Office as 
part of its advocacy for members. This is in line with Clegg et al.‟s (2006) view that 
economics and politics combine to form a key basis of legitimate power with history 
being written by the victors. Jacobs (2002, p. 102) sees „urban environments as 
sites of contestation in which powerful interest groups compete to impose a policy 
agenda broadly commensurate with their interests‟. The strata industry, with a 
growing economic profile also lobbies on behalf of its members who are limited to 
professional strata managers (Strata Australia July 2011).  While McKenzie (1998) 
reports that developers with their significant financial power, through (permit) fees, 
are able to shape policy at local government level, it is clear that in Australia the 
strata industry also has a presence at a national level. The power of developers as 
a lobby group can be demonstrated through the increased National Broadband 
Network (NBN) spend escalating from an estimated $43 billion over eight years in 
2009 (9 April 2009) to a further increase in July 2010 of $38 billion as part of the 
Broadband Network Guarantee (DBCDE, May 2010) in order to pay for the 
additional costs associated with retrofitting strata titled residential buildings for 
broadband connection. Strata Australia (2011) reports that strata managers have 
facilitated access to specific building complexes for the NBN rollout.  
There is synchronicity of works performed by the construction and strata industry. 
By this I mean developers employ architects, engineers and surveyors to design 
strata titled complexes, builders construct the complexes for the developer and to 
his or her specifications. Owners purchase into strata complexes and acquire an 
interest in the common property, and strata managers assist owners to manage 
and maintain the common property by engaging construction workers, engineers 
and building surveyors to monitor, repair and upgrade those properties. Where 
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properties are poorly constructed, monitored, maintained and upgraded, they lose 
appeal for the owner and become ripe for redevelopment, once again playing into 
the hands of the developer. „As power shifts so do the truths that are held to be 
self-evident‟ (Clegg et al. 2006, p. 231). Thus structure influences owner 
governance. There may be a conflict of interest between the strata manager and 
the owners of the property who employ them and both these groups and the 
broader construction industry‟s needs. 
Research undertaken by academics based at the University of New South Wales 
City Futures (2011) indicates that a large proportion of Strata Managers believe 
that some existing complexes have reached the end of their useful life and are 
ready for demolition. Strata managers also suggested that acceptable terms for 
demolition of strata buildings should occur on an 80% owner agreement basis. This 
view is in line with the Owner Corporation of Victoria (OCV 2010) policy statement. 
Demolition of strata titled buildings without all owners‟ consent, leaving a building 
site suitable for future re-development, has already been enacted in Hong Kong 
(Nissim 2008; Yip 2010) though with more stringent vote allocation and stringent 
appeal processes. Commercial buildings such as strata titled complexes have 
defined life spans. Developers, the construction industry and strata managers all 
have a vested interest in the demolition and redevelopment of existing smaller 
strata titled complexes since it creates higher yields and profits for these groups. It 
remains to be seen whether owner-occupiers, owner-landlords and tenants will 
benefit. The combined power of the construction and strata industries represents a 
formidable political lobbying group with direct impact on the economy. Their 
political manoeuvring and power plays may also impact on how legislation is 
framed. 
I have already argued that there is minimal research into the relationship between 
strata managers and the owner corporation and their managing committee. The 
research undertaken has largely been confined to Queensland and to a lesser 
extent New South Wales. However no examination of the relationship between 
strata managers and the committee of management has occurred within the 
Australian setting. As such there is a dearth of academic literature in this area, 
particularly qualitative research that relates to other states such as Victoria. 
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2.7 Contract management for owner 
corporation 
The ties between owners within an owner corporation are normally seen within the 
bounds of contractual relationships. „The expansion of contractual relations 
presupposes the development of norms which govern contract; all contracts are 
regulated by definite prescriptions‟ (Durkheim 1982 in Giddens, 1971, p. 7). 
However, when a prospective purchaser buys into a strata title complex it is not 
always made immediately obvious that he or she is entering into any type of 
relationship with other owners through the owner corporation. Because of the 
contractual nature of this organisation and the fact that it is seen as a fourth layer 
of governance, both public and private sector outsourcing becomes relevant to the 
owner corporation environment. Certainly, as noted earlier, owners are 
contractually bound to each other when they first purchase into a strata complex. 
Key to the success of the contracts is the organisational type that owner 
corporations belong to.  Owner corporations are selective. Only property owners 
within the complex belong to the organisation and for them it is mandatory. Yet the 
time and expertise they bring to the organisation is of a voluntary nature. In 
particular their understanding of contractual mechanisms, conflict of interest, 
transparency and accountability becomes crucial to the wellbeing of the owners 
and the owner corporation. 
Throughout this thesis, the term „sourcing‟ refers to the strategy of how goods, 
services and expertise are gained through contractual mechanisms, whether 
internal or external.  Beaumont and Sohal‟s (2004, p. 689-690) definition appears 
to be applicable across a number of disciplines and is the one used in this thesis: 
„applying outsourcing‟s discipline to internal suppliers, often 
having them compete with external suppliers‟. 
For the purposes of this thesis, engaging a strata manager is an act of outsourcing 
or contracting out, whereas when the committee of management undertakes their 
duties without the assistance of a strata manager, the organisation has insourced 
the administrative, secretarial and financial duties. 
Hodge (1996, p. 32) notes that „politically, there is no doubt that contracting-out 
can represent an opportunity to reduce the level of services offered to the 
community‟. He also suggests that „contracts had the possibility of corruption 
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affecting democratic processes‟ (Hodge, 1996, p. 33). Kobrak (1995; Schneider 
1992) concurs with this view stating that corruption was almost inevitable in 
outsourced environments and that contract mechanisms had the potential to affect 
economic, social, democratic, political and legal performance. Economic gains 
diminished over time in any case, since most contracts failed to protect the client 
from rising costs through the term of the contract (Holcombe 1991). Moreover 
Hodge (1996; Paddon 1991) found that cost savings were often diminished through 
the creation of internal departments designed to administer tendering and contract 
oversight. Sherry (2010) alludes to this as a form of corruption in relation to 
building maintenance services but does not apply such thinking to the 
administrative services supplied by strata managers. These are key issues for 
smaller organisations such as owner corporations that engage in outsourced 
contract based mechanisms because although they are unable to undertake all the 
work themselves as volunteers, they are still responsible in law for the functioning 
of the owner corporation. The contractual soundness, issues of efficiency and 
effectiveness of contracts and their contractual relationship with their strata 
manager are important issues for the owner corporation to consider. 
De Souza (OCV 2011) states that there is an increasing tendency for strata 
managers to create efficiencies by devolving work-types to departments designed 
to administer specific aspects of strata management. For Paddon (1991) efficiency 
gains of outsourcing are smaller than those claimed when additional costs such as 
managing the tendering, appointment and monitoring of contracts are taken into 
account. Clegg et al. (2006, p. 7), on the other hand, define efficiency as „achieving 
some predetermined end at the highest output in terms of the least input of 
resources. The concept of efficiency, defined in this way is constructed to slice off 
the value dimension‟. Effectiveness is often diminished as a result and it is the 
effectiveness of contractual outcomes that the owners witness and live with on a 
daily basis. Devolving work types into specific segments exhibits elements of 
Taylorist5 time and motion studies, founded on increasing profit or the power of 
money at the expense of humanised workforces, and does not necessarily lead to 
                                                          
5
 Time and motion is the scientific study of the efficient use of resources.  Frederick W. Taylor is regarded as 
the “father of scientific management.” It consists of a wide variety of procedures for determining the amount 
of time required, under certain standard conditions of measurement, for tasks involving some human activity.  
Motion study were developed by Frank B. Gilbreth and Lillian M. Gilbreth and consist of a wide variety of 
procedures for the description, systematic analysis, and means of improving work methods. It is difficult to 
separate these two aspects completely. Therefore, the combined term usually refers to all three phases of the 
activity: method determination, time appraisal, and development of material for the application of these data.  
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effective management for the contractual partners. In this context effectiveness can 
be defined as „doing the right things, or completing activities so that organisational 
goals are attained‟ (Robbins et al. 2009, p. 10). This definition of effectiveness 
places the emphasis on the organisational goal to be achieved whereas efficiency 
may be achieved without the end goal of providing service to the owner corporation 
being reached. Moreover Canez, Platt and Probert (2000) in their case studies 
found that failing to understand core competencies could result in greater costs. 
Paddon and Thanki (1995; Walker & Walker 2002) believe that costs savings occur 
at the expense of quality reductions as corners are cut and conditions deteriorate. 
However  Clegg et al. (2005, pp. 47-48) counteracted this statement and found that 
while short term costs increased during the transition period, contracting out led to 
cost efficiencies within property maintenance services, and increased service 
levels in reliability and quality, indicating that effectiveness was achieved. This is 
important since many of the contracts set up by the strata managers on behalf of 
the committee of management include maintenance, gardening and cleaning 
services. 
Domberger (1993) concluded that most contracts include financial penalties to 
assist in ensuring that contract specifications are met. However, for owner 
corporations reliant on untrained volunteer labour there is little evidence of 
capability when negotiating or supervising contracts. Moreover, the current power 
plays within industry allow for the strata industry to devise and mandate use of 
contracts designed for the protection of strata management companies. This is 
akin to the pre 1996 construction industry, and prior to the introduction of major 
and minor works (AS 4305-1996) contracts in which consumer rights were 
recognised through penalty clauses. However since the introduction of Australian 
standard contracts for construction and maintenance, the law has since swung 
back to favour building and construction interests, in the form of „security of 
payment‟ legislation enacted in some states. The power, centred in contractual 
conflict of interest  
„cannot become treated as a problematic component of divergent 
group interests embodied in social action since conflict of interest 
relates to the purposes of individual actors  and the interest of the 
collectivity‟ (Giddens 1993, p. 104).  
In essence, contracts need to be supervised throughout their life rather than relying 
on the profit driven motives of one party to do the right thing. Blandy (2010) cites 
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the case of Eltham Properties Limited v Kenny (LRX/161/2006) (England) which 
showed the cavalier attitudes of some managing agents to their owners in making 
elderly residents inspect the estimates for work to their apartment blocks at the 
managing agents address some 10 miles away. Blandy states that this ploy is 
common and rarely challenged by owners or their committees of management. 
What these ploys ensure is that minimal oversight of contracts is enacted by the 
owner corporation. 
In referring to facilities management, an area often outsourced by owner 
corporations, Clegg, Burdon and Nikolova (2005) state that outsourcing produces 
much better data and management of that data, leading to better preventative 
maintenance for property. The technical aspects of ongoing property maintenance 
and upgrade should not be underestimated as it can have key repercussions for 
owners seeking to maintain the value of their property over time, with failure to 
manage maintenance, upgrades and funding playing into the hands of developers 
seeking demolition opportunities.  
Easthope, Hudson and Tice (2013) talk up the need for demolition of older tower 
configurations in order to make way for larger housing estates needed to alleviate 
a lack of affordable housing. Kenna and Stevenson (2010) provide detailed 
accounts of the high cost of maintenance and how owners and committees of 
management negotiate high future maintenance costs through sinking funds, with 
the possibility raised that many community based assets such as roads and parks 
may revert back to council in the long term because of lack of planned 
maintenance funds (sinking fund deficits). However it is Johnston and Reid (2013) 
that provide a model for decision making around the trigger points for major 
upgrades, demolition and total life cycle costing which may be jeopardised by poor 
maintenance and financial planning regimes early in the building‟s life cycle. While 
it is ultimately the owner corporation through the committee of management that 
has responsibility for such matters, the strata manager has a role to play as an 
expert in the field. 
In viewing property ownership strategically within the Dutch social housing sector, 
Van Moussel and Staub (2007) report that „a closer connection is needed between 
the function of procuring of technical management services and the strategic level 
of the organisation‟. Canez et al. (2000, p. 1323) found that all decision making 
was enhanced when strategic decision methods were applied. In their study, 
company A achieved cost savings of 30% by insourcing. Company C also 
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achieved cost savings by applying the same strategies to their decision making 
process, even though it was not the primary trigger for their decision. The main 
trigger was the need to focus on core competencies and the decision was to 
outsource non-core competencies (Canez et al. 2000). This work complements 
Drejer and Sorensen (2002, pp. 289 & 405) who recommend that competencies 
that are of high strategic importance, or that the organisation is strong are located 
in-house, while those that are of low strategic importance or weak organisational 
strengths are outsourced. Were an organisation to undergo assessment according 
to this criteria, then there may be a need to change sourcing arrangements and 
this is akin to Pouder and Clarke‟s (2009) strategic outsourcing of contracts within 
a gated community. Pouder and Clark‟s (2009) case study of „Bushwood‟, a gated 
community in North Carolina, identified the need for long range action on issues 
affecting its future success including building maintenance and attracting new 
owners to the complex. Bushwood used strategic planning with vision and mission 
statements to drive change over a significant period, and drew upon the business 
background of several owners and external consultants to ensure a rigorous and 
accountable process in forming strategic direction and implementing goals. 
Bajracharya and Khan‟s (2010) research on Varsity Lakes in Queensland, Australia 
focused on transference of governance from the developer‟s realm to the 
organisation, based on the developer‟s ability to engender trust, community 
activism and support, within a new master planned community. Through 
engagement of this type, the developer obliquely acknowledges the high cost of 
infrastructure upkeep required by the ongoing community. The focus of strategic 
management is on a systematic analysis of the internal and external environment 
(Porter 1980). To build capacity and knowledge, organisations must be able to look 
objectively at their strengths and weaknesses. It is significant that so few owner 
corporation appear to place emphasis on long range strategic planning. This may 
be a reflection on the participation rates, transience rates, sense of belonging, 
training, knowledge and volunteer nature of the organisation. Brown and Harvey 
(2006) see capacity building and strategic direction as essential management tools, 
as do others. 
Drejer and Sorensen (2002, p. 405) recommend that competencies that are of high 
strategic importance or that the organisation is strong in are located in-house, while 
those that are of low strategic importance or weak organisational strengths are 
contracted out. Accessing the correct competencies is therefore more important 
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than where they are sourced from. As the composition of owner corporation 
membership changes, new skill-sets are accessed, and capacity may grow 
(Beaumont & Sohal 2004, p. 697). Beaumont and Sohal rated fourteen possible 
reasons for retaining internal sourcing arrangements and found that among those 
listed the highest concerns were around levels of control, cost and confidentiality 
issues. Moreover, when contracting from internal sources, there is a lower risk of 
litigation. Depending on the organisational culture and the contracts, key 
performance indicators may be either easier or harder to enforce. The literature in 
this area stems mainly from building capacity within the commercial environment 
which may be difficult for voluntary organisations to grasp. Roberts (2000) 
suggests that trust is a necessary precondition for sharing and mutual 
understanding as well as for the transfer of knowledge whereas previously it was 
noted that trust is often lacking in the owner corporation environment. 
For owner corporations, increasing capacity may be as simple as providing 
relevant information. Holt (1971, p. 29) recommended a newsletter for residents, 
and programming monthly or bimonthly meetings to bring interesting and 
worthwhile information to the group, advice that has largely been ignored until 
recently. He states that in a rising market with high occupancy rate and few 
vacancies, companies tend to be more negligent in their public relations. In setting 
their strategic direction, Pouder and Clark (2009) also touched on this form of 
communication but went further, organising surveys of owners and community 
meetings to gather ideas from all stakeholders, not just owners. Part of the 
outcome for the „Bushwood‟ example stated above was to set up a website to 
disseminate information about their vision for the community. It also lifted the public 
profile of the complex to attract commercial opportunities for the complex, as well 
as lift the sale price per unit. 
Organisations have the potential to manage knowledge through collaborative 
activity (Wenger et al. 2002). Davenport and Prusak (1998; Eisenhardt & Santos 
2002) see knowledge as a source of competitive advantage. This is in line with 
Grant (1996) who suggests that knowledge may be integrated externally through 
relational networks spanning organisational boundaries. The capacity to move 
knowledge between strata management companies and the organisation therefore 
becomes important in strengthening governance within the organisation. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
It is clear from the review of literature that developers play a major role at multiple 
stages of the design, construction, formation and management of the owner 
corporation. The structure has the power to influence the rights, responsibilities 
and restrictions that pertain to the property. There is a paucity of knowledge as to 
how an imposition of structure affects the owner corporation in terms of 
governance processes and procedures, or how agency is enacted by the owner 
corporation to achieve governance within this contractually based environment. 
Though there is significant knowledge about issues of governance within non-profit 
organisations, they have not been addressed adequately within the owner 
corporation environment. This is because the relationship between the decision 
making arm of the owner corporation (the committee of management) and the 
strata manager has yet to be investigated. It raises two of the three questions 
suggested in the introduction: 
 How does the governance of organisations (owner corporations) work?  
 Within owner corporations, how do strata managers and committees of 
management interact to impact governance?  
The particular emphasis is on the interaction between strata managers and the 
committee of management. How this interaction might be studied and interpreted in 
theoretical terms is the focus of the next chapter.  
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Part C - Theoretical 
Framework 
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Chapter 3 - Structure, agency or both 
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3.0 Introduction 
Part B highlighted a physical and social phenomena in the densification of our 
cities through a review of urban and organisational academic literature and 
document analysis. It focussed on how global influences combine with centres of 
economic and political influence to centralise power within the building and 
construction industries. This highlighted structural considerations at the societal 
level. The literature review also considered issues of agency within a community of 
actors. In doing so, it shifted the concept of strata development from a legal 
mechanism to that of an organisation. Through examination of Rule IT 2505, 
evidence was presented that the newly created owner corporation is a non-profit 
organisation. The creation of a new field of experts in the form of strata managers 
was also discussed. The strata managers provide the knowledge base for owners 
within an outsourced, contract-based environment. The organisational governance 
structure, processes and procedures give rise to issues of collective action, board 
participation, and economic and political power plays. The owner corporation is 
formed to give owners agency within a contractual community. Yet contracts are, 
by their very nature an instrument of control and an exercise in power. 
Within Part C of this thesis, assumptions pertaining to the constructs of power, 
conflict and control are addressed. An ontological approach is outlined in relation to 
the research questions that accounts for these constructs. While many social 
approaches consider structure and/or agency and reflexivity, I draw upon Gidden‟s 
(1984; 1993) theory of structuration to situate both structure and agency within a 
framework that allows exploration of both enabling and constraining aspects across 
time and space. This chapter begins by outlining the ontological framework 
underpinning subsequent empirical analysis. Next an appropriate epistemology is 
developed. The pros and cons of a realist epistemology are investigated, with the 
consequence that a constructivist stance is adopted for the purposes of the present 
study. 
Following on from this, a suitable methodological stance is identified which 
addresses key aspects of the issues noted throughout the present review.  
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3.1  Ontology - Structure and agency 
3.1.1 Power and conflict 
Significant emphasis has been placed on issues of structure and agency, power 
and how power and conflict are contested within the field of housing studies, 
particularly at the nexus of policy and tenant participation (Cooper & Burrell 1988; 
Davenport & Prusak 1998; Jacobs 1999). Low (2006; see also McKenzie 1996; 
Yau 2011) considered power and conflict from within the owner corporation. For 
Yau it is a problem of collective action as outlined by Olson (1965) and related to a 
rational decision making processes.  Olson (1965; see also Yau 2011) suggests 
that owners will act when there is economic imperative to act. Both for McKenzie 
(1996) and Low (2003) the miniature of daily life, the conflict over small scale 
issues, and a less rational system of decision making is important.  They tap into 
the emotion of home as a place of ontological security.6 Low (2006) in particular 
uses Baumgartner‟s (1988) work to highlight systems of payback that flourish 
throughout smaller communities and local governance structures. These 
applications of power co-exist side by side within the owner corporation.  However 
a further view is required, that of the language of contract, for owner corporations 
are founded upon contractual relationships between owners at the building‟s 
inception. 
Bourdieu‟s (1990) view of power is important here since both the written contracts 
between individuals and companies, and unwritten contracts between those living 
within the strata environment are subject to power dynamics. The different uses of 
language confirm the respective positions of power between individual actors. 
Those „in the know‟ are therefore able to readily decode the norms associated with 
the contract environment. However for Bourdieu language is performative; it is the 
practical social action that links past to future and for which he coined the term 
„habitus‟ to denote the tacit knowledge of how to continue or „go on‟. Therefore 
habitus becomes the internalisation of reality as well as the external moment of 
practice (Haugaard 2002, p. 225). 
The practice of power requires dominant symbols and meaning, creating status 
layers within society. Language is one of the symbols incorporated and used in 
conjunction with „tastes, deportment, education, residence, sports, life interests and 
                                                          
6
See Dupuis and Thorns (1998) work for further details of the link between ontological security and 
home. 
 
 Page    65 
  
 
so on, all denoting  membership in a particular strata of life‟ (Clegg 2006, p. 252). 
Bourdieu considers that these symbols will simultaneously impress one group 
while being used to suppress another group of actors as the space for power is 
negotiated between them. Thus power within social relations is not a fixture, but 
something more fluid in nature as Caincross, Clapham and Goodlad (1994) 
indicate in their tenant participation studies. Yet Bourdieu‟s work is not sufficient to 
explain the full range of power plays within the owner corporation. This is because 
for the owner corporation, many of the contractual terms are imposed within a 
structured setting and mandated prior to the prospective purchaser becoming 
involved. As Goodman and Douglas (2008) assert, developers within Victoria, 
downplay the role of the owner corporation during the sales process. Thus many of 
the contractual relations remain implicit rather than explicit to the purchaser. The 
contract then becomes a symbol of power that defines the rule of future 
engagement. Policy regimes that allow the creation of owner corporation and on-
sale of individually titled units therefore become structural influences upon the 
owner corporation. There is a need to see power and conflict within the give and 
take of a structure and agency debate. 
Giddens (1984, p. 257) provides a theoretical view of power as the:  
„capacity to achieve outcomes… and whether or not these outcomes are 
connected to purely sectional interests is not germane to its definition. Power is 
not, as such, an obstacle to freedom or emancipation but is their very medium  
- although it would be foolish, of course, to ignore its constraining properties. … 
The existence of power presumes structures of domination whereby power 
„flows smoothly‟ in processes of social reproduction‟. 
Further, Giddens recognises that in an era of generalised reflexivity, the state 
should play a facilitating role, providing opportunities and conditions for people to 
do things for themselves (Giddens 1993, pp. 93-94). The enabling state empowers 
its citizens to act by providing the conditions and resources for action but does not 
act for them or tell them how to act. The concept of the enabling state recognises 
that reflexivity requires people to become active in their own lives but that the state 
should retain a role by means of an overall steering function, enabling people to 
„make things happen‟. The state does this by working with appropriate bodies, 
creating appropriate conditions and making resources available so that these 
bodies can participate in service delivery. In his later works Giddens argues that 
the enabling state should not be discarded, but supplemented with the notion of the 
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„ensuring‟ state (Giddens 2003, p. 13). This concept of state recognises that the 
state also has obligations of care and protection for citizens and some of these 
obligations should be provided as guarantees. Responsibilities should be shared 
between the state, non-government agencies and the private sector including 
businesses and individual citizens. Thus the role of the state, local governments, 
planners and industry is to provide a regulatory framework that is empowering and 
through which individuals act.  
Giddens argues that his view of power is different to that of Parson‟s normative 
consensus and different from Foucault‟s positioning of power as „prior to truth‟ 
(Clegg et al. 2006, pp. 197-201). For Giddens, power is a more ubiquitous and 
subtle phenomenon. Domination involves controlling and using both allocative and 
authorative resources, along with power over other people‟s resources. The rightful 
exercise of power and other social actions requires legitimation by human beings 
as knowledgeable agents. Therefore individuals are seen as knowledgeable 
agents who have power to intervene and influence their surroundings and events. 
Thus human acts are able to contribute to the flows of power. For Giddens, all 
social actors have some sort of power since they have some sort of resource under 
their control. Otherwise they cease to be social agents.  
„There is an interlacing of meaning, normative elements and power … 
Awareness of such contestation, of divergent and overlapping 
characteristics, is an essential part of the knowing of life (Giddens 
1984, pp. 28-29).  
It is this central notion of the ubiquitous presence of power as a social 
phenomenon and its contestation that differentiates structuration theory‟s approach 
to domination and power from others. Giddens‟ does not believe that power is 
intrinsically connected to the achievement of sectional interests.   
The intense period of change and economic insecurity aligned with globalisation 
and outsourcing is central to Giddens theories. His work therefore establishes a 
framework that sees an interplay between public and private institutions and 
individual citizens. However the „reflexive monitoring‟ that exists between these 
groups of actors sets the scene for the contestation of power as each actor group 
jockeys for a position of advantage and deploys resources to their best advantage. 
For each group of actors, the area of contestation differs since the resources and 
legitimisation processes differ. Investigating the power paradigm within the owner 
corporation framework, then, requires a focus on the interplay between actors, the 
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resources that they are able to muster and areas of contested space, which may 
give rise to resistance. Moreover the literature review established that the owner 
corporation is an organisation. Llewellyn‟s (2007) view of power is one in which 
human agents exercise power through organisations. She further extends this view 
by considering that associating and acting with others creates an aggregate of 
power that is greater than the sum of each of the individual actors. In this way, 
sectional interests are compounded within power structures: „an organization has 
powers that exist at a higher stratum from that of an individual‟ (Llewellyn 2007, p. 
134).  
While Giddens (1993) believes in the duality of structure as both enabling and 
constraining, the compounding of sectional interests makes for a different power 
paradigm. Individual agents may exercise power, but they are more likely to 
succeed in achieving their outcome where their resources are linked into larger 
organisational situations and resources greater. Thus there are differences in the 
scale of power and conflict that Clegg et al. (2006) allude to. The owner 
corporation is designed to distribute power evenly (one vote per property). 
However the structural forces that create the organisation (developer, planning 
authorities and state agencies) provide the framework in which those actors are 
able to exercise agency throughout the life cycle of the organisation. Moreover 
factional interests between owners means that power relations will not always be of 
equal standing. Power is therefore reliant on the ability to access resources and 
one of those resources must remain the ability to persuade others to one point of 
view. 
According to Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997), both Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu 
(1990) provide links between old and new institutionalism. That is, in considering 
„habitus‟, Bourdieu is able to bridge the gap between new and old institutionalism, 
since his grand theory contains elements of both. For Bourdieu, the social work is 
structured around the opposing form of cultural and economic power. Giddens 
(1984, p. 2) on the other hand, blurs the boundaries between epistemology and 
ontology by linking functionalism and structuralism. His view is that in social 
sciences, action, meaning and subjectivity relate to ontological concerns.   
Within a structure and agency view, the owner corporation exhibits both enabling 
and constraining forces depending on mutual knowledge, social relations and time 
span. Power and conflict plays erupt as reflexive monitoring of action occurs. 
Meaning is interpreted by different actors creating differing dynamics within the 
 
 Page    68 
  
 
organisation. Integrated practices and mutual knowledge create a playing field 
where everyone knows the rules. I move now to a discussion of specific practices 
and the differences and overlap between structure and agency. 
3.1.2 Structure and agency 
Sociological approaches are concerned with structure and agency. Giddens (1993) 
makes this explicit. Structural approaches place less importance on the observable 
phenomena and focus on the underlying economic and political forces as structure.  
Because this research is seeking to establish knowledge at the organisational level 
as well as the participant level, an ontology that reflects issues of both structure 
and agency accounts for the breadth of discussion. Neither Weberian research 
paradigms (Weber 1978) nor the Marxist structural framework used by Ball (1983), 
Harloe (1995) and Dunleavy (1981) for housing policy extends across the breadth 
of this topic. Pahl‟s (1975) urban managerialism perspective comes close, arguing 
that social and spatial constraints affect resource distribution.  However, there is a 
need to look further afield to Bourdieu (1990) or Giddens (1984) whose theories 
see less tension between structure and agency. Bourdieu‟s (1990) theories are 
centred in research practice. However, Giddens (1984) structuration theory goes 
further, viewing structure as both enabling and constraining within time and space. 
Within this framework, both structure and agency retain centrality though social 
interaction, and this provides an opportunity to focus on the different „leaves‟ of 
time (as Giddens calls them) that contain the formation of the organisation as well 
as the functioning of the organisation. 
It is important to note that the global, economic and political concepts as they 
appear in the social world are social constructs. However the concepts of legal, 
organisation capacity and governance are also social constructs formed at 
Giddens‟ „legitimation‟ stage. There is hesitation in invoking the words „macro‟ and 
„micro‟ to show the differentiation between levels at which these constructs function 
since Giddens (1984, p. 139) finds the terms limiting and often used at opposing 
ends of a spectrum in which conflicting points of view override each other.   
This is a key differentiation from Durkheim‟s work which considers that „social facts‟ 
exist separate from a person‟s consciousness and place restraint upon them as 
they undertake daily activities (Burrell & Morgan 1979)
7
. Instead Giddens refers to 
                                                          
7
 For Durkheim, understanding the nature of regulated order, held together by social cement was 
the key focus of sociology.  This is a functionalist view of reality in which the social world is 
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„social and system‟ interaction, and takes the view that one has the ability to 
influence the other „structure is not to be equated as constraint but is always both 
constraining and enabling‟ (Giddens 1984, p. 25). It is not sufficient for human 
beings to be viewed as predicable social systems; they do not act with complete 
knowledge of a situation, and situations change over space and time.  
Structure and institutions may provide a framework for our interaction, but they do 
not explain or determine our actions, interactions and experiences. There are times 
when individual and collective actions and reactions do collectively force change to 
structure. Ostrom (1990) provides some excellent examples of collective action 
forcing structural change. In taking this stance of less tension between structure 
and agency, Bourdieu‟s (1979; 1990) work may equally apply to this situation as 
Giddens does. 8  Bourdieu (1990) views us acting with freewill within given 
structures. His belief is that „habitus‟ or rituals embodied in everyday life enable us 
to produce and maintain a system of beliefs that assists us to behave appropriately 
within cultural confines. The „habitus‟ is influenced by the structure of society, 
influencing behaviour, reproducing society. Where normative behaviour is 
disrupted there is the possibility of conflict with the new order. This conflict may be 
internal or external to the actor, depending on the circumstances that bought about 
the change in circumstances. For Bourdieu, neither structure nor agency is 
sufficient to explain the action of humans. Both Bourdieu and Giddens see less 
tension between structure and agency. Organisations are formed from a macro 
structural framework as well as being structures within which actors participate at 
the micro level and have agency within. It remains therefore important to provide 
reasons for selecting one theoretical framework over the other‟.9  
Bourdieu‟s (1990) view of capital as anything that holds value, both material and 
symbolic requires further consideration. Concepts of „home‟ outlined earlier are 
relevant here.  Home as a structure that provides shelter is physical - we can touch 
it. It takes up space, is place bound and located in time. It also has economic 
capital. We can sell and resell our home, and this is the foundation of the owner 
                                                                                                                                                                  
composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relationships which can be identified, 
studied and measured through scientific approaches. Unlike other functionalists however, 
Durkheim’s work went beyond functional analysis of societies, and stipulated that causal analysis 
was also required to explain how artefacts originated. His earlier work therefore concerned 
structure, whereas his later work focussed on agency. Unlike Giddens work however, the two were 
not married into one cohesive theory. 
8
 See previous section in this chapter. 
9
 Parsons is a functionalist. He relates action and structure within a theoretical framework. 
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corporation from the developer‟s view.  The developer wishes to participate in the 
economy and raise profit through the sale of individual units.  But the concept of 
home also has emotional connotations. For instance, Giuliani (1991) sees home as 
a psychological state of wellbeing that is attached to a place.  Home is the place in 
which we are most ourselves (Dupuis & Thorns 1998). Home, therefore is a form of 
capital for Bourdieu, since it holds material and economic value.  
Place is often defined in scholarly literature as a local setting that has significance 
through an individual‟s attachment (Murphy 1991). The term „locale‟ which Giddens 
(1984) uses, is seen as a physical setting (or place) for interaction which takes on 
social significance because of the way that individuals move across that setting in 
time and space. Region is used by Giddens in a variety of ways to denote special 
compartments of formal, functional and perceptual significance. It is often 
understood to be an umbrella term that subsumes locale and place. Giddens 
defines it as an institutional construction reflecting the collective history of that area 
and infusing the everyday lives of inhabitants. Following Giddens (1984) line of 
thought, owner corporations are organizations and their bureaucratic traits both 
influence and are influenced by the regions that they contain. The boundary is 
denoted by survey pegs or the physical shell of a building and cuts the organisation 
off in a geographic sense from the constructs of globalised forces. Within the 
physical shell, however, each apartment or unit becomes a small unit of 
regionalisation within which actors participate across time, space and context 
continuums. As boundaries loosen across the time and space continuum, the 
interaction between this organisation and other constructed entities loosens. 
Aspects of legislation limit the time-frame for set interactions, through annual 
general meetings in some instances. The contract mechanisms in place between 
the owner corporation and strata manager add a disciplinary element which further 
regulates „face engagement‟ or interaction. The meetings held by the organisation 
have significance in ordering the activities performed by the actors. 
This experience of agency is relevant to the owner-occupier and the renter, though 
for the landlord the psychological attachment may be centred more in economic 
concerns and social standing rather than place attachment and emotions 
associated with home. This issue of capital as value is important. However the 
value of the physical object of home is time dependent. That is, home has different 
economic value over time to the owner, as mortgages are paid down and physical 
shelter becomes home. It also has different psychological attachment for the actors 
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over time. For the developer, once he has relinquished ownership, there may be 
little emotional attachment. For a renter or owner occupier who has experience of 
the lived place, psychological attachment may continue to have power well after 
ownership is relinquished through thoughts and memories.   
Both Bourdieu‟s (1979) and Giddens‟ (1993) theories have been the subject of 
intense criticism by some. Sack (2001) for example is critical of such theories.  He 
argues that Giddens theory of structuration does not provide a distinction between 
the agents as forces and agents as the vehicle for other forces. Urry (2000, p. 15) 
goes further, stating that the structure-agency debate is not useful given the: 
„intersecting sensuous relations of humans with diverse objects; the 
timed and spaced quality of relations stretching across societal 
borders; and the complex and unpredictable intersections of many 'regions, 
networks and flows'. 
Urry „s (2000) argument is that societies are in relation to each other and therefore 
can only be fully understood in relation to each other. He states that society‟s 
borders are porous and changeable and therefore societies are no longer 
„functionally integrated‟ with static borders. For Urry, sociological theories based on 
the assumption of bounded societies are no longer relevant. Hannerz (1992) also 
sees a need to study flows between cultures and societies. If owner corporation 
are bounded groups as it would appear - since they are limited in their ability to 
seek new membership - this aspect of flow becomes important, particularly in the 
need to shape and reshape the internal organisation culture. However Friedman 
(1992) uses the ideas of „centre‟ and „periphery‟ to explain the interrelationship 
between economic systems and exchange, the relative positions of, and 
interactions between different cultures and groups of people. The passing of 
knowledge between renters, owners, their committees of management and strata 
managers (as different groups) would appear to adhere to this view where 
exchange of knowledge is enacted. 
These arguments, however, do not override either Bourdieu‟s (1979) or Giddens‟ 
(1993) attempt to reconcile the structure-agency debate. Neither Bourdieu nor 
Giddens believe that society is static. Though some would argue that Bourdieu‟s 
theories are more relevant because they are based in empirical work, it is the time 
and space continuum that Giddens offers in addition to the lessening of tension 
within the structure-agency debate that provides the most scope for exploring 
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owner corporations. This is because they come about through being physically 
located in time and space as well as being bounded groups which meet the edge 
of other societal groups through their placement in time and space, and through 
the formation of defined groups. 
3.1.2 Applying structuration theory 
The importance of structure as it applies to the concept of densification cannot be 
denied. It is necessary therefore to draw upon fields of sociological theory to cover 
the full gamut of the owner corporation and its creation as part of a social 
phenomenon. That is, the interaction between time and space, structure and 
agency must be addressed.  
„Time-geography provides an important mode of notation of the intersection of 
time-space trajectories in day-to-day activity. But it has to be inserted within a 
more adequate theorization both of the agent and the organization of the 
settings of interaction‟ (Giddens 1984, p. 132). 
The rise of the organisation is a general feature of modernity (Giddens 1990). 
Modern organisations are constituted by, and make up the capacity for „reflexive 
surveillance‟ of actions over time and space continuums. Surveillance in 
organisations is associated with management control practices. Whereas time for 
Giddens, is a component of space, diced into quantifiable periods that stretch into 
eternity.  
Briand (2001, p. 91 in Briand & Bellemare 2006) provides a valuable starting point 
for considering the application of Giddens‟ work to the owner corporation.  She 
suggests that, in Giddens‟ view, the social system is made up of two key areas. On 
the one hand, there is knowledge in its various forms. On the other hand, there is 
the interpretation of integrated practices mediated through reflexive monitoring. 
Specifically, Giddens considers rules and resources implicated in the reproduction 
of social systems as the basis of all structure. The rules and resources exist as an 
instinctive or learned knowledge that forms the basis of integrated action. They 
exist as memory trace, representing the organic basis of human knowledge that is 
manifested in action (Giddens 1984, pp. 374-377). This is the area of structuration 
most often cited by scholars, for it is in this context that Giddens discusses 
structure comprising of structural forms of power and social action bought about 
through the enactment of agency. 
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However to build upon this an examination of structural types must first occur. 
Giddens (1993) proposed three types of inter-related structural positions - 
signification, legitimation and domination. Signification structures provide meaning 
and facilitate communication. They are symbolic representations of interactions 
between agents. In Giddens‟ view, communication can be action (he gives the 
example of chopping wood as an act of communication) or verbal as in the 
interview process or narration. In either case, the significance of the action remains 
with the doer rather than the receiver of the information. The information received 
has meaning to both the doer and the receiver, though the meaning may become 
distorted. In a functionalist view of communication, the significance is created by 
the doer and the receiver (Burrell & Morgan 1979). Legitimation relates to norms 
and values that are present within the structure. It contains the rituals that are 
performed throughout time that provide rigidity to the structure. Finally the ability to 
control and mobilise rules and resources requires the power to control or dominate. 
To this end, Giddens considers the role of rules and resources in constituting 
society‟s structural element. The rules that assist society to function are 
predominantly considered to be legislated edicts and their interpretation by the 
legal fraternity (Travers 2010). Clegg (1989) contends that power involves 
reciprocity because it is constituted within a relational universe that has meaning 
for the actors involved. The articulated interests of power groups occur before 
existing power structures are reconstituted. This reproduction process is part of the 
recursive process of institutionalization that represents a significant component of 
power necessary to understand institutional changes (Dillard et al. 2004). Briand 
and Bellemere (2006) consider that in modern organisations surveillance 
associated with management control practices take the form of direct supervision 
of subordinates‟ work and the gathering of information in order to govern, control 
and co-ordinate actions. They place more importance on the gathering of 
information citing Dandeker (1990) because it is this activity that creates the ability 
to reproduce systems of governance at both the small group level and within wider 
society.  
This view of power is similar to Foucault‟s (1977) view of government and power 
relations. For Foucault, government is conceptualised as the „conduct of conduct‟ 
rather than the activities of political institutions (Dean 1999, p. 11). In this view, 
power is exercised from innumerable points in the interplay of non-egalitarian and 
mobile relationships. Relations of power are not external to other types of 
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relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations) but 
are implicit in the latter. Power is multi-directional and exercised as dominant as 
well as over the dominated. Power relations are both intentional and non-subjective 
in that actors make calculated decisions. However, local actions are not 
necessarily coordinated and the consequences of such actions are not necessarily 
anticipated by the actors themselves. In short, Foucault (1977) describes a world in 
which there are multiple circuits of power connecting a diversity of authorities and 
forces within a whole variety of complex assemblages (Rose 1995). The shift is 
from sovereign power to disciplinary power and in understanding what instruments 
and techniques are used to manage the population, as seen in Foucault‟s prisoner 
and educational work. Here is where the strata mechanism and this thesis moves 
away from Foucault.   
Bureaucracy in the Foucauldian sense has allowed the creation of a system of land 
management in one sense yet it is unaligned to any disciplinary considerations. 
Similarly, within the owner corporation a system of dispute management is outlined 
and retained within the legislation. However within the owner corporation 
environment, no penalties apply for noncompliance with the legislation, for failing to 
undertake the legislated duties. As previously stated, no external auditing is 
required to force compliance. This includes auditing not just of the duties of the 
owners and the owner corporation, but also to the duties of other bureaucratic 
players such as the keepers of land title, planners, developers and strata 
managers. Foucault‟s view therefore cannot be said to apply to the strata industry. 
Therefore, Foucault‟s view of power as disciplinary cannot be held as valid within 
this thesis. 
While there are many resources and many ways to control resources, Clegg et al. 
(2006) consider money to be the ultimate resource, because with money one can 
control or buy all other resources including knowledge, labour and physical 
resources. This is seen within the political realm particularly where retired 
politicians often become paid lobbyists, and large strata projects proceed, based 
on influence exerted by them as „paid resources‟. Giddens (1993) however 
considers two types of resources: allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources 
in organisations include financial and human resources; expertise and knowledge 
or the capacity to define the service or good being produced and identification of 
the client base. Authoritative resources within an organisation relate to control and 
capacity. Giddens considers that control relates to the divisions and units within 
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organisations or industries and the agency that various players may have within 
the confines of their physical or authoritative domain. Capacity relates to the ability 
of actors or groups to organise and influence within that domain. Thus owners may 
come together to create lobby groups and exert pressure within the owner 
corporation at the local level, while still using their position at higher levels to exert 
legislative change. The capacity to influence may be self-serving or for the good of 
the group as a whole.  However, there are drawbacks to Giddens discussion. For 
example capacity to influence others may be reliant not on the authoritative 
resources that one holds, but on the allocative resources that one is able to muster 
such as physical, human and financial assets. This is where larger industry bodies, 
such as the construction, real estate and strata industries are seen to wield greater 
power since they are able to access greater allocative resources from their 
membership bodies. The reflexive surveillance of „other‟ through rules and 
resources constitute a means of control and domination. However Clegg et al. 
(2006) contend that power is not static. There is a time dimension to power which 
sees the centre of power move between different players over time. The rituals and 
artefacts of organisations are often seen as a way of using power to control 
populations so that conflict is limited. 
3.1.3 Time, space and owner corporations 
For Giddens (1984), time is a number of momentary segments reaching to infinity, 
or space. He suggests that integration of social systems occurs within time and 
thus space:  
„All social life occurs in, and is constituted by, intersections of 
presence and absence in the “fading away” of time and the “shading 
off” of space‟ (Giddens, 1984, p. 132) 
In this thesis, however, I am concerned not with an infinite number of subdivisions 
of time and the way those resources are allocated within time divisions, but rather 
with three distinct time periods. First, there is the distinct time lag between when 
the developer creates the organisation and when the new purchasers take control 
of the owner corporation. Within this thesis, the time period in which the developer 
has control is referred to as „past‟. The literature review found that during the „past‟ 
time period, the developer uses legislation (rules) to create the organisation and is 
able to control both allocative and authoritative resources within that time period. In 
doing so, the integrated practices for future time periods are set. Town planners 
and permit authorities may be concerned with the physical structure of the building 
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and where it is sited in relation to other buildings. However, they do not have the 
authority or power to determine the bureaucratic structure of the organisation, the 
allocation of voting shares, or the by-laws that are applicable to the organisation. 
The developer has structural power and there is little or no opposing agent. The 
developer is able to create the authoritative structure of the owner corporation 
which is appended to each real property title as it is issued by the relevant 
authorities. The developer is able to create a uniformity of complexes through 
master plans and the banning of various activities. The developer‟s „domination‟ 
power is complete through adhering to the structural rules or legislation that society 
dictates, and is legitimised through ritual practices and artefacts. The purchaser‟s 
agency is limited solely to acceptance or rejection of the purchase contract. The 
purchaser is unable to negotiate the contracted terms relevant to the owner 
corporation, since the scheme must apply equally to all would-be owners within the 
past timeframe.  
Research, by its very nature takes place in the past, the time of interview having 
faded into space by the time the researcher begins writing. However these 
interviews took place at a time during which prospective purchasers had moved 
into ownership of their property, the organisation had been handed over to the new 
owners, and there had been sufficient time for the owner corporation to begin 
functioning. In order to differentiate this time space from the developer‟s 
domination period referred to above, the term „present‟ is used.  Within the present 
time period, different groups of stakeholders interact exerting the power of agency 
or structure as reflexive monitoring of action occurs. In particular, the enabling 
legislation within each state provides a framework within which individual owners 
are able to take collective action. Yet the rules created by the owner corporation 
have meaning and exert change that limits the action of individual owners.  In this 
way, the owners and owner corporation are both enabled and constrained. 
Likewise, the owner corporation and strata manager relationship has both enabling 
and constraining consequences. This relationship occurs in order to enable the 
organisation to meet structural reporting requirements and strengthen governance. 
Yet the contractual mechanism and owner disinterest reported in the literature 
review indicate that the owner corporation (and hence the owners) may be 
constrained through these same mechanisms. The norms, values and meaning 
attached to the contract determine the power play between structure and agency 
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and this is enhanced through the specialised knowledge of contracts and the 
expert knowledge of strata.  
The future period is focussed on a time space period that has not yet arrived, or if it 
has arrived, had not arrived when the interviews were taking place. The term 
„future‟ is used to denote the period of time stretching to infinity. The future is 
therefore concerned with events that are yet to take place. Society may predict the 
both intended and unintended consequences of actions, and move to adjust either 
agency or structure as a result. The future then, is the realm of policy implications 
drawn from interpretation of the data. Discussion of the future then is confined to 
the final part of this thesis.  
3.2 Epistemology 
Giddens‟ (1984) structuration theory is most often used alongside a realist 
epistemology to link levels of analysis. Realist methodologies involve theoretical 
identification of causal powers in addition to empirical identification of contingent 
conditions which are capable of restraining and enabling change. For realists, 
neither capitalist nor economic views are capable of fully explaining change.  
However others, including Jacobs (1999, p. 22), reject the realist approach 
because there is no way of knowing how necessary mechanisms become explicit 
or what these mechanism are. Consequently they are difficult to measure.  
On the other hand, positivist theories do not fit easily with an agency approach 
either.  This is because positivist approaches are based on an objective knowledge 
that is independent of human experience. The „knowledge‟ is capable of discovery 
through scientific methods with laws governing human behaviour that are 
observable and measurable in their adherence. Hodge‟s (1996) positivist approach 
to measuring outsourced contract states has a similar basis. He can tell how much 
and how often, but not why or how these states come to exist. Muezelfeldt (2003, 
2006) is better at explaining the why and how of the contract state. Each 
organisation justifies a state that Hodge considers may merely be „fad like‟ through 
divestment of non-core activities to others. Contracting out must be good for the 
organisation because everyone else is doing it, he suggests. At first glance this 
would seem an appropriate epistemology for this thesis since the question of 
external contractual relationships has been raised in the literature review as being 
relevant to the owner corporation. However such an approach could not measure 
outcome over time in either efficiency or more importantly effectiveness, or shed 
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light on key benefits or drawbacks to the contract state, other than in monetary 
terms. Moreover, the view that knowledge is an independent entity separate from 
our own perceptions does not fit with Giddens‟ approach of structure as both 
enabling and constraining. On these grounds, Hodge‟s (1996) positivist approach 
is therefore rejected in this thesis. 
3.2.1 Giddens and constructivism   
In the context of the literature, I have discussed knowledge in the light of 
something that is acquired, rather than a static state to be discovered. Giddens 
acknowledges that the social system interacts with knowledge in a variety of ways. 
For example, ritual and norms within society are formed from mutual knowledge 
that has shared or specialist meaning. Both structure and agency are influenced by 
mutual or specialised knowledge which may assist in underpinning the competence 
to act. In applying structuration theory to organisational settings Briand and 
Bellemare (2006) consider that mutual knowledge refers to integrated practices 
such as corporate strategy, organisational structure and performance indicators 
that ensure governance is institutionalised, coordinated and monitored. They cite 
the example of an annual budget which although mainly monitored for expected 
results:  
„can also be conceptualised as a governance mechanism because it 
constitutes the monetary expression of the enterprise‟s strategic 
directions.  It is also a tool, which facilitates the coordination of the 
activity of several actors. The budget is a practice through which 
reciprocal relations can be established among the actors; as such it is 
an integration practice‟ (Briand & Bellemare 2006, p. 67). 
Yet Briand and Bellemare (2006, p. 73) concede that where a budget is 
implemented without reciprocal relations, it remains merely a structural element of 
domination and expression of power likely to give rise to various forms of conflict 
including resentment. In a post-modern era the conception of knowledge is 
replaced by knowledge as a social construction of reality the pace of which 
globalisation has quickened (Giddens 2000; 2002). Truth is constituted through 
dialogue. Valid knowledge claims emerge as conflicting interpretations and actions 
are discussed and negotiated among the members of a community (Kvale 1996). A 
postmodern approach focuses on interrelations in an interview on the social 
construction of reality in an interview, on its linguistic and interactional aspects 
including the differences between oral inflections. Dialogue and written text 
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emphasize the narratives constructed by the interview. In an organisational sense 
„the human agent is faced with a condition of irreducible indeterminacy and it is this 
endless and unstoppable demurrage which post-modern thought explicitly 
recognises‟ (Cooper & Burrell 1988, p. 98). 
Jacobs (1999, p. 23) traces constructionism to Strauss‟s (1978) ethnographic 
studies, theories of phenomenology (Schulz 1962) and linguistic philosophy. These 
constructionist frameworks place more emphasis on action. A constructivist 
approach treats reality as the outcome of processes in which actors negotiate the 
meaning of both situation and action. A social construct is therefore a concept or 
practice of a ritual or artefact of a particular group. Berger and Luckmann (1984) 
argue that all knowledge, including common sense knowledge of everyday reality, 
is derived from and maintained through social interaction. This is more akin to 
Giddens‟ (1993) views since action enables and constrains structure, and structure 
is related to rules and resources that govern behaviour. Knowledge is constructed 
from individual conceptualisation as well as through shared meaning. Giddens 
(1993) provides a place for specialised knowledge while acknowledging that no 
one person is able to have all knowledge. That is, the strata manager may have 
specialist „professional‟ knowledge while lacking the ability to know firsthand what it 
is like to actually live within the complex. Likewise, the owners and committee 
members conceptualise their knowledge from their experience of the lived 
environment, rather than the point of view of an expert strata manager. They may 
lack specialist knowledge unless the „strata manager‟ is also the owner‟s 
employment profession. Over time, owners may acquire a great deal of specialist 
knowledge from their contracted „experts‟. This shared knowledge becomes mutual 
knowledge that is agreed upon and integrated through legitimation and signification 
processes. Language as a way to construct reality becomes important. Since 
structuration theory emphasises the significance of meanings in facilitating action, 
a constructivist epistemology is relevant to this research. In discussing 
organisations, their sourcing strategy, and governance capacity, a constructivist 
perspective places emphasis on definitions and interpretations put forward by 
developers, owners, their committees of management, strata managers and the 
associated professionals who interact with them.  
3.2.2 Structuration, constructivist views and institutionalism 
Institutionalism developed from the fields of sociology, organisational studies and 
management both of which have their roots in sociology, psychology and political 
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science.  The difference between institutionalism and new institutionalism lies in 
the way the relationship between society and the individual is viewed (Di Maggio & 
Powell 1991). Institutionalism suggests that formal organizational structure reflects 
technical demands and resource dependencies shaped by institutional forces. 
Institutions matter because laws, customs and established practices play powerful 
roles in shaping individual behaviour. Institutions have been defined as „the formal 
rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units in the polity and economy‟ (Hall 
1986, p. 19). New institutionalism places greater emphasis on the way that 
organisations and individuals respond to their environment, as opposed to being 
shaped by the institutional arrangements that they work within (Travers 2010, p. 
56).  Thus institutions shape the behaviour, power and policy preferences of actors. 
For example within the owner corporation environment, the views of the strata 
manager are shaped through the interaction of professional industry bodies.  
Pontussen (1995) considers that institutions stand above actors but below political 
power sources.  This view is contrary to Giddens‟ (1993) view of institutions as both 
enabling and constraining. Giddens sees actors enabled across different time, 
space and levels (individual, organisational and institutional though not necessarily 
within the same time-space frame). North (1990a) and Zald (1987) both conclude 
that among other things, economic institutions assist by monitoring and enforcing 
contractual relationships between organisations and institutions. Since society has 
embarked upon a period of economic rationalism and the contract society has 
become the norm, the power that economic institutions such as banks have to 
force change is immense.  
Both formal and informal customs and practices are capable of shaping behaviour 
within institutions and organisations. Organisational practices and structures may 
be responses to or reflections of rules and conventions or belief systems created 
from within the community.  North (1990b, p. 36), for instance, argues that: 
In our daily interaction with others, whether within the family, in 
external social relations, or in business activities, the governing 
structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of 
behaviour and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are 
formal rules, but these are seldom the obvious and immediate source 
of choice in daily interactions. 
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North (1990a, p. 396) further argues that „organisations are a response to the 
institutional structure of societies‟. The actions of organisations have the ability to 
affect and change institutional structure. By considering the shaping forces on the 
owner corporation, I demonstrated that the owner corporation was a non-profit 
organisation under Australian law. Structuration theory considers that institutional 
forces in the form of rules, including resources, and legitimised conventions are 
given significance through belief systems and the ritualised enactment of these. 
These structural forces both produce and reproduce institutional environments 
cementing into place those rules of engagement that favour the most powerful 
actors or groups of actors. As the rules, practices and belief systems become more 
rigid, greater resistance to change occurs at the institutional level as institutional 
actors seek to maintain the status quo, and rules are legitimised through law and 
other regulatory mechanisms. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) state, to heighten 
legitimacy, organisations are likely to construct stories about their actions and roles 
that correspond to what the organisation did or should do rather than what actually 
happens. Thus organisational myths are constructed as fact. These stories are 
used as a „symbolic reassurance to mollify potentially influential publics‟ (Mizruchi 
& Fein 1999, p. 656).    
Bourdieu (1990) considers that these symbols simultaneously impress one group 
while being used to suppress another group of actors as the space for power is 
negotiated between them. Thus power within social relations is not a fixture, but 
something more fluid in nature. According to Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) both 
Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1990) provide links between old and new 
institutionalism. Further, they state that in considering „habitus‟, Bourdieu is able to 
bridge the gap between new and old institutionalism, since his grand theory 
contains elements of both. For Bourdieu, the social work is structured around the 
opposing form of cultural and economic power. Bourdieu‟s view of power is 
important here since both the written contracts between individuals and companies, 
and unwritten contracts between those living within the strata environment are 
subject to power dynamics. The different uses of language confirm the respective 
positions of power between the individual actors.  Those „in the know‟ are therefore 
able to readily decode the norms associated with the contract environment. 
However for Bourdieu language is performative. For him, it is the practical social 
action that links past to future and for which he coined the term „habitus‟ to denote 
the tacit knowledge of how to continue or „go on‟. Therefore habitus becomes the 
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internalisation of reality as well as the external moment of practice (Haugaard 2002, 
p. 225).  
Sociologists Di Maggio and Powell (1991), on the other hand, emphasise 
conventions and practices that influence behaviour. Within organisational studies 
the view is that organisational practices and structures are responses to rules, 
beliefs and conventions embedded in social and political environments. So 
between sociologists and organisational theorists there is a chicken and egg 
scenario – which comes first, the rules and practices or the behaviour that led to 
them? Constructivism considers that the reality of the outcome or lived experience 
is what matters most. Structure, our interpretation of structure and our response to 
rules, beliefs and conventions create reality. Structuration theory fits this scenario 
well, since it treads the line between sociologists and organisational theorists. 
Moreover contractual relationships and norms are seen as legitimised practices 
within Giddens‟ (1993) framework. 
Structuration theory allows for the movement of power between the two views. 
That is, with different time spaces, the power relationship is able to evolve. The 
same players may exist, but the power relationship between institutions and actors 
alters as some of the actors take up positions of power within the institutions or are 
ousted by other players.  Di Maggio and Powell (1983) identify three different forms 
of power - coercive, normative, and mimetic processes of reproduction. These 
three forms of power relate to their concept of institutional isomorphism rather than 
competitive isomorphism. Competitive isomorphism relates to market pressures for 
similarity between organisations and institutions. There have been instances of 
competitive isomorphism noted throughout the narrative. However I chose to focus 
on institutional isomorphism as the dominant power paradigm. Consideration is 
next focused on coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism as three forms of 
power relevant to the explanation of strata manager and owner corporation 
relationship.  
3.2.2.1 Coercive isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism as defined by Di Maggio and Powell (1983) is created by 
formal and informal pressure being exerted upon an organisation by other 
institutions, organisations or society at large. Coercive factors include political 
pressures and state forces, providing regulatory oversight and control. The 
literature noted that in the past time space, significant coercive power rested with a 
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variety of actors. It considered four major groups and four minor groups of actors 
that hold institutional power relevant to the strata industry. Major players include 
the banking, construction and insurance industries and political and legislative 
players. Minor players include developers, councils, real estate agents and strata 
industry professionals as indicated in the following diagram.  
The position of privilege and attendant power that these actor groups collectively 
hold legitimises and confirms institutional form within which new strata 
developments are approved. That is, construction professionals and developers 
create the physical form of the building which is approved by planners. In 
approving the physical structure of the building, planners also „give the nod‟ to the 
creation of the organisation, though there is little or no recognition from planners 
that they have stepped outside the realm of their expertise, or that other 
professional groups are vetting the soundness of the organisation as such. Yet the 
legitimised norms allow this to occur as a matter of course. In Figure 5 the key 
players at an institutional level are noted. 
 
 
Figure 5 Structural influences and the strata environment 
The trading of strata real estate through contract mechanisms cements and 
legitimises the planner‟s decision. Further, the developer creates the organisational 
structure and rules of engagement for future owners and enforces them through 
the ritualised trading of contracts and the terms contained within it. This situation 
can be contrasted with other organisational norms. For example were I to set up 
almost any other organisation, I would need to assess the soundness of the 
proposed organisation in terms of legal, financial and governance viability as well 
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as have a clear understanding of purpose. The purpose in the case of owner 
corporation is provided through legislation and summarised adequately by Sherry 
(2009). However this is jeopardised through the marketing techniques of 
developers and failure of the media to alert prospective owners to their chosen 
community obligations towards all other owners. 
3.2.2.2 Mimetic isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs as an organisation‟s response to uncertainty. It occurs 
when one organisation mimics the practices of another similar organisation 
perceived as more successful. Mimicking may act to stabilise an organisation in 
times of crisis, or may assist an organisation to increase its power and status. 
Choosing the right organisation to mimic remains the crux. The literature review 
drew upon new institutionalism‟s mimetic isomorphic view outlined by Di Maggio 
and Powell (1983), first identifying the owner corporation as a non-profit 
organisation, then by comparing organisational traits of the owner corporation to 
those found within other non-profit organisations such as schools and charitable 
institutions. It is through understanding the similarities and differences between 
organisations that new ways of understanding behaviour are elicited. Likewise, 
comparison between the strata industry and the construction industry enables the 
observer to better understand the actions and motives of strata mangers, and 
contract force used between the strata managers and owner corporation. Much of 
the work undertaken by strata managers is administrative and involves working 
with facility maintenance groups linked to the construction industry. Strata 
Managers may also have links to the construction industry through the developer. 
Issues of trust were identified in the literature review as important aspects of the 
power relationship. A lack of trust may produce disinterest in an organisation‟s 
affairs. It may also lead to a heightened sense of what awareness and increased 
vigilance.  
3.2.2.3 Normative isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs as an organisation‟s response to uncertainty. It occurs 
when one organisation mimics the practices of another similar organisation 
perceived as more successful. Mimicking may act to stabilise an organisation in 
times of crisis, or may assist an organisation to increase its power and status. 
Choosing the right organisation to mimic remains the crux. The literature review 
drew upon new institutionalism‟s mimetic isomorphic view outlined by Di Maggio 
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and Powell (1983), first identifying the owner corporation as a non-profit 
organisation, then by comparing organisational traits of the owner corporation to 
those found within other non-profit organisations such as schools and charitable 
institutions. It is through understanding the similarities and differences between 
organisations that new ways of understanding behaviour are elicited. Likewise, 
comparison between the strata industry and the construction industry enables the 
observer to better understand the actions and motives of strata mangers, and 
contract force used between the strata managers and owner corporation. Much of 
the work undertaken by strata managers is administrative and involves working 
with facility maintenance groups linked to the construction industry. Strata 
Managers may also have links to the construction industry through the developer. 
Key to the literature review was an understanding that issues of trust and non-
participation were endemic within other non-profit organisations such as school 
parent and friend associations and charitable organisations. This is consistent with 
the lack of participation and trust identified by McKenzie (2006b) within home 
owner associations and condominiums throughout the United States of America. 
The lack of trust identified by McKenzie, however, was between owners and 
relates back to the ability of owners to put group good before personal gain.  
3.3 Methodology 
Studies of urban spatial patterns, social housing, tenant participation models and 
organisation life have been linked to power and conflict paradigms.  Low (2006) 
and Foldvary (2002; 2006), for instance, discussed power though economic 
considerations. Jacobs (1999) viewed housing policy through a power and conflict 
perspective. Throughout the literature review competing interests have been noted 
in relation to the dual nature of participants attempting to balance self-interest with 
that of the common good. Olson (1965; 2000) and Ostrom‟s (1990) are relevant 
here to power issues implicit in the need for collective action within the owner 
corporation. Ostrom found that where livelihoods were threatened, collective 
resources were shared. However Olson (1965) considered that the larger the 
group, the greater the likelihood of free riders or non-contributory members. 
McKenzie (2006a; 2006b) in particular has noted competing interests within owner 
corporations and the tendency for individuals to free-ride. Where free-riding occurs, 
the vacant space left by free-riders becomes available for others to fill. Structural 
power was also taken into consideration particularly in relation to the formation of 
 
 Page    86 
  
 
the owner corporation by people who may have little on-going interest in the 
organisation. Clegg et al. (2006) also consider a framework within which decisions, 
failure to make decisions and determination of issues as worthy of discussion is 
power-based within organisational settings. A number of different paradigms need 
to be explored to best fit for the owner corporation. 
3.3.1  Managerial rationalism 
Managerial rationalism, a paradigm often associated with organisations, assumes 
that the behaviour of members can be controlled and predicted using rational 
management techniques during process implementation and change. Effective 
implementation requires a combination of (good) rational--management and 
technical competence. This perspective is an important aspect in light of the owner 
corporation‟s ability to make and implement governing laws. Implicit in the 
managerial rationalism construct is the notion that implementation is linear, 
involving logical stages based on strategic intent, pre-planned and implemented in 
a logical sequential way. According to Campbell (1996) personal aspirations are 
assumed to be synonymous with those of the organization, an assumption that fits 
with collective action assumptions at the cost of individual need. In this paradigm, 
changes are implemented as a consequence of the strategies laid down by 
managers. However change is rarely linear within organisational contexts (Lewin 
1951). Lewin‟s discussion of force field analysis considers that for any change to 
occur, force or power needs to be applied to effect a change in equilibrium and 
therefore resistance to change or conflict may follow. Good management combined 
with technical expertise may contribute to the smooth running of an owner 
organisation. However, it is reliant on synonymous aspirations of contractually 
bound owners, and does not address the emotional attachment to the idea of 
„home‟ and considerations of ontological security that reside there10. The resistance, 
depicted as conflict in the literature review, therefore conforms to the linear 
structure of managerial rationalism.  
3.3.2 Social interaction 
Organisations, including owner corporations, are made up from collections of 
individuals who interact with each other. The social interactionist paradigm sees 
organizations as social systems or cultures that socialize individuals to conform to 
sets of norms, beliefs and values (Handy 1997). Because individuals possess 
                                                          
10
 See Dupius and Thorns (1998) for an excellent discussion of ontological security and home. 
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diverse goals and motivations, disputes over objectives and priorities may arise.  
Here the conflict paradigm raises its head again. In social interactionism, the 
behaviour of members is perceived as unpredictable, while being influenced by the 
organization's underlying culture. Values and norms are not specified but 
embodied in procedures, rituals, and exercise of power. Hirschheim (1983, p. 279) 
asserts that organizations „... are not rational and manifestly rule following, they are 
social arenas where power, ritual and myth predominate‟. The key assumption of 
the social interactionist perspective is that procedures and by-laws, and implied 
states of being do not function independently of their environments but gain 
meaning in the cultural and organizational context. 
Barth (1989) suggests that since societies and cultures are not static, bounded 
units, the presumption of disorder should be the starting point, and then goes on to 
explain any order that occurs. Osborn and Van Loon (2004, p. 95) ask „why should 
we view society as a whole‟; and „why should we assume a tendency towards 
conformity and integration‟. Barth (1989, p. 132-134) argues instead that we should 
start with the presumption of disorder and then try to explain „the trend towards 
some partial order‟. In attempting to explain trends of order and disorder, Barth 
identifies „streams‟ of discourse. Within the literature review streams of discourse 
are centred around contracted ideas of governance, contractual mechanisms, 
stakeholder relationships and organisational capacity. Thus the approach taken is 
a constructivist approach and Giddens‟ work of a contractually governed society in 
which actors are both enabled and constrained becomes a fitting approach for this 
thesis. 
3.3.3 Applying an interpretive approach 
An interpretative approach allows investigation of power and conflict within the 
owner corporation. Clegg et al. (2006) has stated that power is embedded in 
human action. It becomes „the means of getting things done‟ (Giddens 1993, p. 
272). Owner corporations have a legislated mandate for „getting things done‟.  
The negotiated meanings of Giddens‟ (1984) space and time can also be framed 
within the interpretative approach. Within the organisational confines of the owner 
corporation, each person is time bound in relation to their influence at either the 
scheme set up stage or the ownership stage, with notions of owned locales to be 
negotiated. Structuration theory provides an explanation for the clash of integration 
practices enacted between the groups of players shown in Figure 5. Figure 5 
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provides a visual view of the key elements of „structuration‟ as discussed to date.  
The relatedness of structuration theory and the power and conflict paradigm 
relevant to the strata industry can be explained through though Figure 6.  
In Figure 6, „structuration and strata‟, the power and conflict paradigm is over laid 
on the key components of Giddens‟ (1993; 2000) structuration theory, discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Because interaction is mediated over different time periods, 
the actor‟s position may move between structure and agency depending on 
individual situations over time. That is, at the buy-in stage, the developer has the 
enabling legislation on side. The rituals associated with real estate purchase 
contracts favour the developer rather than the owner. The contractual power 
relationship between the developer and the prospective purchaser is therefore on 
the side of the developer and real estate agent. Negotiation over contract terms is 
limited to price. The owner corporation structure has already been set up by the 
developer, and the prospective owner has no say over who the other governing 
body participants are. The arrow is therefore one directional since the purchaser is 
constrained by the developer‟s terms. 
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Once the owner has title to the real property within the scheme, the owner 
corporation becomes a member of the governing organisation defined in the 
governing legislation. The owner corporation is set up to give the power of 
determination (within the developer specified confines) to the individual owner. The 
owner retains the ability to influence the owner corporation as an act of agency, but 
may also stand for a position on the committee of management. Here there are 
both enabling and constraining influences at work. Power plays are possible as 
rules are negotiated, so the arrow is multi directional. The strata manager is 
appointed by the owner corporation and therefore retains the ability to endorse or 
reject his contracted position. However the owner corporation is reliant on the 
strata manager as an expert in the industry. Both the strata manager and the 
owner corporation have the ability to both enable and constrain. Within legislation, 
the committee hold the power, yet power is a negotiated ground and the contracts 
signed between the two will outline the rules of engagement and thus positions of 
power. Therefore the arrow is multi-dimensional.   
The literature review uncovered structural influences through the Australian Tax 
Office Ruling IT 2505, linking the owner corporation (and hence their employed 
experts) to the non-profit sector. Creating owner corporations as non-profit 
participants establishes their place of power within the taxation and grants systems. 
Therefore the next arrow indicates a one directional structural influence. Lastly, 
policy makers at state and federal levels have the ability to create legislation and 
regulation that both enables and constrains the owner corporation and therefore 
the individual owners. At the same time, individual owners, owner corporations and 
strata managers have the ability to lobby policy makers to ensure appropriate 
legislation and policies are enacted. There is a drive towards consensus, yet the 
ground is contested. Therefore the arrow is multidirectional, indicating both an 
enabling and constraining influence.  
In Figure 6, Structuration and Strata power is exercised across the full range of 
action and interaction. Whereas Figure 5 Structural Influences and the Strata 
Environment depicts direct influences between two or more players, Figure 6 
shows the coercive influences on legislation and policy makers in greater detail. 
These industries are represented by professional bodies that advocate positions 
with government and to whom government may offer concessions. Each player‟s 
decision cements the decisions by others to exert power over the individual owners.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the ontological and epistemological aspects of the 
research. Power and the contestation of power are critical to understanding 
organisations. Within the strata development, much of the power relationship lies 
within the contract terms and legislation at various stages throughout the past, 
present and future phases of the organisation. The exploration of power dynamics 
in this thesis are considered through two key actor groups, that of the owner 
corporation committee, and that of the strata manager, where there is a strata 
manager contracted to the organisation. I have provided a diagrammatic 
representation of the role that power plays within the owner corporation. This 
diagram illustrates how power plays differ between the „leaves of time‟. In the past 
phase of the organisation, the power rests with the developer - the prospective 
purchaser has limited ability to negotiate terms.  In the present, a range of power 
plays exist between owners and the owner corporation; between the owner 
corporation and the contractual relationship with the strata manager; between the 
owner corporation and the non-profit sector; and between policy makers and the 
owner, owner corporation, strata manager and their associated industries.  
What is missing in academic literature is an appreciation of structure and agency 
as it applies to the strata environment11. The Foucauldian view of power was 
rejected as too limiting. An agency view on its own did not apply to the owner 
corporation. Structuralist views likewise did not explain the legislation designed to 
provide agency to owners. Both enabling and constraining forces were observable 
within the owner corporation. I argue that both structure and agency have a role to 
play for owner corporations. Thus structuration theory fits well within housing and 
organisational contexts. The concepts of organisation, governance, participation, 
expertise and the contract environment are constructed realities that can be placed 
within Giddens‟ (1993) theoretical framework.  
The rules, integrated practices and reflexive monitoring of action all have their role 
to play. This thesis provides a framework for contextualising the owner corporation 
within the structure and agency debate.  It provides an explanation of the agency 
employed by various actors and how they are also constrained by structural forces. 
                                                          
11
 As highlighted in the literature review, a number of people have applied structuration theory to 
the real estate industry with Foldvary (2006) incorporating the strata environment via 
‘condominiums’ into the overall real estate framework. As such, his work is focussed on sale of 
property rather than the lived experience resultant from the real estate market.   
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This thesis addresses the problem of strata title on two levels. First, it identifies a 
practical problem and then provides an explanation of what is occurring and why. 
In doing so, linkages between various organisational aspects are highlighted. 
Second, it represents an attempt to apply sociological theory to the strata 
environment. 
An epistemology based on constructed reality was identified and viewed through a 
power and conflict paradigm. The power and conflict paradigm has been central to 
several streams of housing literature. Shifts in power were seen as useful in 
explaining structuration theory within this chapter. The next part of this thesis 
considers the actual methods taken to locate material and participants. It provides 
the framework for the thematic analysis of transcripts.  
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Chapter 4 – Research Methods 
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4.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methods used in this study, in particular the 
use of interviews. It sets out the framework for the thematic analysis of transcripts 
and discusses the reasons for selecting this approach, the challenges involved and 
how these were overcome. 
I also discuss problems encountered in identifying research participants and how 
these were addressed. The composition of the research participants who were 
interviewed is also described. 
4.1 Research methods 
The major methods utilized in this research were: 
 A review of reports, media and websites; 
 The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, conducted and analysed 
using a thematic approach; 
 Review of relevant academic literature from a sociological and management 
perspective. 
 
Finding an appropriate place to begin this research proved problematic. In part this 
is because of the power that the developer holds over the organisation, even 
though he or she has relinquished ownership of all property. In other words, the 
structural influences across time meant that there was no clear place to begin the 
research. The contractual norms involved in the purchase of real property have 
significant meaning for would-be purchasers. Understanding the competence of 
purchasers, seeking to change their ownership status is necessary. Yet the 
literature on strata title held few clues to this. Blandy and Lister (2006) prove the 
exception, publishing research indicating that owners may be unaware that they 
have purchased anything other than freehold property several months after title 
has issued and the new owners have moved into a gated complex. When this 
research project was first conceived, research on owner corporation was virtually 
non-existent within the Australian context. Since then, Goodman and Douglas 
(2008) have provided clues on the issue of purchaser knowledge. Their research 
considered the sale of off-the-plan units through developer web sites and provided 
important clues for this research as to how apartments were marketed to 
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prospective buyers. Not all apartments are purchased off- the-plan, however, and 
even those that are may be sold through real estate companies.   
I was interested in the question of do stakeholders interact to impact governance? 
In response to this, I initially sought to understand the interface between strata 
managers and owners within their complexes. Yet this relationship appeared to 
increasingly be entangled with the previous timeframe of purchaser – real estate – 
developer. An understanding of both „leaves of time‟ became necessary to tease 
out the social relations between the two groups and understand the impact of 
enabling and constraining forces. The literature review allowed me to identify 
relational aspects between governance (structural domination), organisational 
structure and the contract environment (legitimation), stakeholder cohesion 
(reflexive monitoring of social relations) and capacity (competence) which 
prompted the question: How does the governance of organisations (owner 
corporations) work? 
With this question in mind, I sought to understand the role of the strata manager in 
relation to the owner corporation. Thus there is a practical element to this research 
in addition to the theoretical overlay of structuration theory which has proved so 
useful in identifying structure and agency considerations. Clearly prior knowledge 
of the way in which strata schemes work would benefit potential owners in their 
interaction with other owners and the strata manager. This mutual knowledge 
would enable integrated practices to be enacted to greatest benefit. The starting 
point for shared rituals, norms and meaning between the two groups of actors is 
knowledge prior to purchase. Yet it is also discussion on this type of shared 
knowledge that is missing in the academic literature. For instance, as noted earlier, 
not all owner corporations engage a strata manager. In the present time space, 
where there is no strata manager appointed and therefore no contract to create 
structural tension between the strata manager and the owner corporation, then we 
would expect a different dynamic to exist between structure and agency. To find a 
way forward I sought guidance from a range of qualitative researchers by reading 
widely. 
Epistemological considerations provide useful frameworks within which to identify 
the most appropriate techniques for the research. Consideration was given to 
various approaches within which to contextualise the data. Consideration was 
given to two primary, but related methods - document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. This approach of document analysis and semi-structured interviews 
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represents a relational framework that has meaning both in terms of the 
organisational structure and participant viewpoint, as it applies to the organisational 
context. The voice of various actors can be heard by employing either interview 
(dialogue) or through analysis of the written word, allowing the researcher to 
address the different time spaces of various actors.  
The following discussion takes the reader though the steps that informed the 
research within a constructionist, qualitative framework. 
4.1.1 Considering grounded theory  
Grounded theory as advocated by Glaser (1978, p. 3) argues that „the first step in 
gaining theoretical sensitivity is to enter the research setting with as few 
predetermined ideas as possible‟. Ezzy (2002, p. 10), citing Glaser (1978), appears 
to suggest that „researchers shouldn't read the literature or develop hypotheses 
before entering the field‟. Strauss and Corbin (1990) revised the grounded theory 
approach to dilute the blind approach to research. Ezzy (2002) considers it 
necessary to have some preconceived ideas of the research prior to beginning, 
and certainly any researcher reliant on grants would need to develop ideas, simply 
to facilitate the grants process. In this way, I have taken my key approach from 
Kvale (1996), Ezzy (2002) and Stake (2010) who consider that it is necessary for 
the researcher to have some familiarity with the subject prior to undertaking 
interviews. In taking this approach it became necessary for me to acknowledge my 
preconceived ideas and bias.  One way to enter into the research project with as 
little bias as possible was to consider research entry points other than the interview 
process to inform and round out preconceptions.  There were assumptions that I 
had made in relation to the context of the industry which needed verification or 
rejection; that is I had assumed that the owner corporation was more than a legal 
mechanism.   
Moreover Bringer, Johnston and Brackenridge (2004; see also Charmaz, 2003) 
have noted significant difficulties when applying grounded theory to this type of 
project. Notwithstanding the quality control issues identified, grounded theory is an 
iterative approach required primarily for objective theory generation. Whilst theory 
generation is important, seeking an explanation for the current state of affairs is 
equally important. Applying structuration theory helps with understanding the effect 
of power plays previously taken for granted. However further consideration of 
frameworks was required in conjunction with structuration theory. 
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4.1.2  Considering Pels, Cresswell and Mills 
The approach I undertook to become aware of these preconceived ideas and strive 
to enmesh my ideas in mutual knowledge of the actors themselves relied to a large 
extent on Pels‟ (2000, p. 17) work. Pels takes a middle path to knowledge through 
the collection of data. For him, language is a constitutive force in which meaning is 
imbued and reconstituted through repetition. Popular discourse asserts that urban 
densification and the walkable city will make our lives easier, yet there are few 
clues as to what this means for property owners. Leonard, Perkins and Thorns 
(2004) consider print media as one way that home-related popular taste is 
conveyed and reinforced. It is not unreasonable then to assume that Australia‟s 
taste for the walkable city is also shaped by media. Hauge et al. (2012) consider 
that the external appearance of our dwellings has considerable ability to influence 
self-image. Normative notions of how homeowners should live are displayed in 
print media, and as Mills (1959) states, print media often presents structural 
considerations as policy, normative and the dominant discourse to which the 
masses must adhere. 
A targeted search to determine what was being written about in relation to owner 
corporations appeared one way to test this prior to interview.  Creswell (1998, pp. 
36-37, 63) offers the following advice for qualitative researchers seeking to 
undertake a case study approach: 
 Identification of a particular case or cases bounded by time and place; 
 Use of multiple sources of information in data collection, including 
observations, interviews, audio-visual material, and documents and reports; 
 Extensive considerations and description for the (physical, social, historical 
and economic) context and setting of the case where appropriate; 
 (and if appropriate) description of chronology of major events followed up 
by an up close or detailed perspective about a few incidents. 
Creswell (1998) argues that although the case study might be used to test some 
particular theories or ideas, the analysis is usually derived to a large degree from 
the case itself. Stake (2000) has an even simpler recipe. For him, qualitative 
casework involves simply „placing your best intellect into what is going on‟. 
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4.1.3 A triple approach 
I collected data from a wide variety of sources in order to contextualise interview 
data within a wider debate. Thus the focus is not just a one sided debate but rather 
that agency is placed within an appropriate structural setting.  
Researchers not only need to observe and record the details, but also to reflect 
critically on what they see. From these authors a multiple approach appeared to 
best meet my needs. Engagement with the actors was necessary, along with 
perusal of media, relevant documents and academic literature. This approach 
meant that I could answer the three questions posed: 
 How does the governance of organisations (owner corporations) work?  
 Within owner corporations, how do strata managers and the committee of 
management interact to impact governance?  
 Can structuration theory be used to explain governance within the owner 
corporation? 
I sought to understand the current situation from a „person in the street‟ perspective. 
For this reason I reviewed appropriate policy documents and media articles, since 
this is where much of the layman‟s understanding of world is captured (Mills 1963). 
The following subsection discusses the tools employed in order to limit self-bias. I 
follow this with the results from the print media research in Part D.  
Chapter five introduces the specific measures employed in the qualitative research. 
I discuss the semi structured nature of the interview questions and how I went 
about identifying and seeking participants, but more importantly who I excluded 
from the study. This is followed by an introduction to each participant and their self-
statements of introduction.  
Chapters six and seven contain a detailed analysis of transcripts from the semi 
structured interviews. 
4.1.3.1 Academic literature 
I began this research process by reviewing academic literature relevant to the 
strata environment and then extended it to the wider organisational realm. The 
literature influenced my research design and particularly the questions that I 
choose to ask in the interviews. I was particularly influenced by the commentary on 
strata managers, which for me remained a central part of the current research 
process. Many of the studies that I read relied on interviews with owners. I was 
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particularly interested in the concept of organisation and thus sought the 
committee‟s view on how these people came to be associated with each other and 
the types of issues owners had to address at an organisational level. As I began to 
draw out recurring themes within the transcripts, I was then able to situate these 
within the framework of structuration theory and thus place the strata mechanism 
and its participants within that framework.  
4.1.3.2 Document review 
A large proportion of my research work involved the review of documents of 
various types. The largest proportion of my time was taken up by reviewing 
academic literature relating to the development of my own theories. However, I 
also analysed policy and promotional documents belonging to relevant government 
agencies and the strata industry. I thought this important because these 
documents set the framework and future direction of strata title. The purpose of this 
analysis was to understand how conceptions of strata title in these documents 
differed to that of media and web searches and to draw out these differences in my 
findings.  However, I also considered it important to assess the extent to which the 
academic dialogue of governance, participation and expertise were aligned within 
these documents.  
4.1.3.3 Media and websites 
Accordingly it is considered relevant to undertake a preliminary assessment of 
Australian newspaper articles and websites in relation to strata title, with a view to 
gaining a greater understanding of key issues facing owner corporations and the 
amount of information prospective owners have prior to purchase.  This approach 
is seen as integral to the research stance taken. Not only does this approach 
inform the interview questions, it also fills a key knowledge gap left between 
Goodman and Douglas‟s (2010) research and Blandy and Lister‟s (2006) research. 
It invokes Leonard et al.‟s (2004) material studies research by accessing media as 
a voice that shapes societal needs and wants. Sjorslev (2012) sees home 
ownership as both an asset for future generations and a material object that can be 
traded and borrowed against to meet other material desires. Sjorslev achieves this 
through interpretation of interview transcripts and newspaper articles. My approach 
is not dissimilar. 
Media and website data was collected during the period 1 April 2008 and 30 April 
2008 using a combination of Factiva and Google. Factiva is an electronic data 
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base that collects all published news stories on a worldwide basis. However the 
search was limited to the Australian print media. Google was used to locate 
additional information about industry and government websites that may appeal or 
prove beneficial to the consumer seeking additional information on strata living. 
Google searches were conducted using following search strings: multi-owned 
housing; owner corporation; body corporate; strata title; developer; apartment; 
master planned estate; MPE; gated community; lifestyle village; retirement village; 
community association; strata manager; strata industry; and building manager.  
Factiva provided almost five thousand articles. I modified the search string so that 
articles that used the word „developer‟ in conjunction with other search terms were 
retained.  Duplicate stories were removed. Duplicates appear when an article from 
a major newspaper is syndicated to smaller regional newspapers. Further 
exclusions where relevant were made. For example the word „apartment‟ brought 
up a number of articles relevant to various crime scenes. Other articles referenced 
economic concerns such as a drop in sales or interest rate. Rental stories were 
included only where they were able to shed light on the governance structure 
associated with strata title. A decision was made to exclude all articles under 200 
words that contained the search list terms in conjunction with the word „price‟. 
These were mainly real estate sales too small to contain any reasonable 
explanation of the governance structure. At the end of this exercise 485 articles 
remained for consideration. To this I added four blog sites, five industry sites and 
eleven government web sites from the Google search. The results are summarised 
in Figure 7 below.  
There are over five hundred council and regional planning websites in Australia. A 
search of each state government‟s websites yielded little commentary that was 
relevant to the owner corporation at the functioning stage of the organisation. 
Regional planning and council websites were therefore excluded from the research 
parameters. Other exclusions from the web search included industry websites that 
related to specific businesses, rather than community organisations. These 
exclusions were necessary since there are over 250,000 strata management 
companies currently operating in Australia and many have a web presence. 
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Search Engines Items Found Excluded 
Factiva  4922 removing the word 
developer decreased the 
number of entries to1825 
463 irrelevant 
78 duplicates 
3097  developer  related 
799 sales related less than 200 
words 
Google 4 blogs 
15 industry sites 
11 government sites 
Trade organisations 
Strata management firms 
State and federal government sites 
 Figure 7 Summary of search results 
NVivo software was employed to separate out key themes within each article. The 
articles considered in this section, therefore, represent a range of views across 
Australia and are not limited to investigative journalism. Indeed articles deemed to 
be of journalistic merit were few and far between, and would not present the full 
range of views available to prospective purchasers. The results from this media 
analysis are discussed in the Chapter six. 
While considering print media and websites is helpful in focussing on the way 
Australia conceptualises strata title, it fails to address the interaction between 
strata managers and owner corporations. The most appropriate method for this is 
to conduct interviews with both parties in an interview process.  
4.1.3.4 Participant or observer 
In the second part of the analysis, I conducted a semi structured interview process 
with fourteen participants.  As an observer, my aim was to remain detached from 
the people I was interviewing. At the outset I knew none of them and deliberately 
discounted people who volunteered for interview that I knew. I have stayed in 
contact with some of the participants and see them at strata network events. 
Others I see in passing – it is after all a small world. Three committee chairs sent 
me additional information post-interview.   
The participants revealed quite intimate details about their situation during the 
interview. When entrusted with personal information, it is almost impossible to act 
in a detached manner towards them. I found at times that I was moved to offer 
advice on possible approaches to different problems participants encountered, and 
sought advice as to whether this was desirable before proceeding in this manner. 
In analysing the interview transcripts, I had to constantly remind myself that I must 
not take the things I was being told for granted. I attempted to engage critically with 
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all of the themes that arose during the interviews, constantly trying to find a 
balance between my own knowledge and experience, and a critical academic 
stance towards analysing the data. I discuss the process of interview in more detail 
in the following section. 
4.2 The interviews 
Interpretive studies, whether face to face or in written form, consider a reality of 
perceptions and affirm the status quo based on the individual‟s viewpoint.  
Individuals have the ability to choose what they believe and act accordingly (Burrell 
& Morgan 1979) giving rise to varying accounts of a phenomenon. Utilising this 
interpretive method allows the empirical collection of data based on observations 
(Neuman 2003). Several such studies have been undertaken in the fields of 
organisational theory, sourcing theory and urban planning (Clegg et al. 2005; 
Clegg et al. 2006; Fincher & Gooder 2007; Pouder & Clark 2009; Van Mossel & 
Staub 2007). Taking this interpretive approach is no longer considered unusual 
within the subject areas of organisational studies, housing studies or sociology. It is 
from these bodies of knowledge that the research questions are posed. The 
interpretive approach places limitations on sample size since the data from such 
studies is considered both „rich‟ and „thick‟ (Ezzy 2002). Sandelowski (1995) 
considers that there is fine line in determining sample size within qualitative 
research. She claims that sample sizes may be too small to achieve either 
informational redundancy or theoretical saturation. On the other hand they may be 
too large to permit the deep analysis that is the basis of qualitative inquiry.  
Hughes (1971) on the other hand notes that small size samples can still tell the 
researcher something of value. It is not so much the size of the data sample that is 
questionable, but rather the depth of information that it contains. To combat this 
idea that large sample sizes are a necessity in social research, Hughes (1971, p.ix) 
stated: 
 „One of my basic assumptions is that if one quite clearly sees 
something happen once, it is almost certain to have happened again 
and again.  The burden of proof is on those who claim a thing once 
seen is an exception; if they look hard they may find it everywhere, 
although with some interesting differences in each case‟. 
Whereas, in Sandelowski‟s (1995) view, determining adequate sample size in 
qualitative research is a matter of judgment and experience in evaluating the 
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quality of the information collected, Hughes (1971) considers one detailed interview 
will suffice for obtaining knowledge about the lived experience of humans within an 
institutional setting such as an owner corporation. A case study of just one person, 
providing a depth of information about a given topic is significant research. The 
objective in this thesis, then, is to analyse both media and a small number of 
interviews so that the analysis contributes to knowledge of the governance of the 
owner corporation.  
Interviews are powerful tools for obtaining knowledge about human experience and 
behaviour (Kvale 1996, p. 72). Kvale‟s (1996) discussion of “miners” and “travellers” 
within research noted that whereas „miners‟ brought the interviewees‟ underlying 
nuggets of information to the surface for observation and discussion, “travellers‟ 
went on a journey with the interviewee, observing phenomena in situ. In both 
instances, “the mode of understanding in qualitative research involve(d) alternative 
conceptions of social knowledge, meaning, reality and truth in social research with 
meaningful relationships to be interpreted (in which) the subjects formulate in their 
own dialogue, their own conceptions of the lived world” (Kvale 1996, p. 11).  In line 
with Kvale‟s views, semi structured interviews were considered appropriate. That is, 
the questions are probing for information, with few limitations placed on the type or 
amount of information that is gained. Topics of governance, stakeholder relations, 
and contractual arrangements are investigated without necessarily reverting to a 
set questionnaire. This approach allows the empirical collection of data based on 
observations (Neuman 2003, p. 86). The approach is similar to Pouder and Clark‟s 
(2009) strategic study of a gated community, Van Mossel and Staub‟s (2007) 
discussion of contract management within community housing facilities 
management, and Hauge et al.‟s (2012) consideration of stakeholder participation 
in multi-story rehabilitation.  
4.2.1 Participant selection 
The general approach to seeking participants from the strata industry was through 
professional organisations such as the Owner Corporation of Victoria (OCV). The 
strata industry has been supportive of this research, providing a „letter of support‟. 
They were also instrumental in promoting this study in the early stages through 
website and newsletters and some of the participants contacted me as a result of 
reading about the study through this medium. However this process on its own did 
not identify all the study participants because strata industry newsletters are 
circulated solely to strata managers.  
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Apart from the cost of advertising in major newspapers, it was not seen as the 
most effective way to find participants. Two sampling approaches were considered 
viable. Ezzy (2002) considers that „snowballing‟ is not sufficiently rigorous. It was 
therefore seen as a position of last resort.  Other ways of seeking committee chairs 
as participants were sought. The first involved advertising through university web 
sites. The number of part-time undergraduates who juggle study with work seemed 
to indicate that owners may come forward in this way, and there was a possibility 
that some staff, living in strata complexes, may come forward. One participant was 
identified though this method.  
To overcome this problem of a lack of owner corporation participants, I sought 
access to two government databases, TheList and Landata. These databases are 
government specific land information systems (GIS) websites containing Certificate 
of Title details for all property within the states of Tasmania and Victoria. The 
databases were used in a number of ways. Lands Information Systems Tasmania 
(TheList) was accessed to identify strata developments along with individual 
owners, and to confirm that the participant was in fact an owner. A random set of 
fifty strata complexes were identified and a mail-out sought participants from these 
complexes for interview. A similar set of letters was generated from the Landata 
database for the Melbourne area. Information from TheList and Landata is public 
access on a fee for use basis. The databases were also used for checking property 
ownership details and confirming the status of participants as belonging to an 
owner corporation. 
Melbourne City Council organised a number of forums from 2009 onwards that 
provided possible networking opportunities for both strata managers and owners. 
One of these focused specifically on issues affecting owner corporations. I 
attended with fliers and handed these out in the before and after sessions and at 
the interval break, introducing myself and the research opportunity to as many 
people as possible. For specific types of owner corporation, such as those with low 
stakeholder connectedness, governance structures and professional bodies 
corporate, a snowball approach become necessary to identify participants. One 
participant was recruited using this approach. 
I conducted six interviews with strata managers and seven interviews with 
committee chairs. A fourteenth interview was conducted with an owner from within 
a smaller regional complex that identified as having no strata manager and no 
functioning body corporate. I gave considerable thought to this interview and 
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considered that it might provide a reference point to all other interviews, and 
illuminate what occurred when owners within a strata scheme were left to 
themselves to sort out governance issues. While the actual number of interviews is 
not great in terms of volume, they provided both „rich and thick‟ accounts of how 
the owner corporation functions. Combined with the additional information gleaned 
through document and media analysis, I sought to achieve my aim of presenting 
comprehensive, well rounded research. 
In the end, all the strata managers who participated in this research were identified 
and recruited via contacts within the strata industry. Two owner corporation chairs 
contacted me through university websites. Four participants contacted me in 
response to the leaflet drops. One participant was both a small time strata 
manager as well as a committee chair. 
4.2.2 The litmus test 
While several offers of participation occurred through word-of-mouth, selecting 
participants requires a much more considered approach. Litmus tests are applied 
where the participants need to meet specific criteria, or to exclude participants that 
do not meet a desired profile (Babbie 2004). Since the research focus was on the 
organisational aspects of the strata mechanism, a litmus test (see appendix 1) was 
applied to exclude participants who did not fall within the criteria of the test.  
Specifically I excluded owners who were not committee chairs, or were unable to 
speak in an official capacity about the issues relevant to a particular complex. 
Litmus tests are used as a way of pre-screening participants so that only those 
participants who best meet the research criteria are interviewed. The litmus test 
was used to exclude participants in the following categories: 
 Strata complexes that were less than six years old were excluded. This is 
important because the mandatory builder‟s liability insurance expires at the 
end of six years. I felt this would reduce confusion between maintenance 
issues and valid insurance claims when talking to interviewees. 
 Strata complexes that were under builder‟s warranty were excluded. I felt 
that there would be less confusion between maintenance issues and valid 
insurance claims when talking to the interviewees. I wanted any contractual 
information to be at the owner‟s behest where possible and not reliant on 
the builder. 
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 Strata complexes where legal disputes were evidenced or likely to occur 
were excluded. These were excluded to ensure privacy of the participants. I 
did not want any information from the interviews to be used in court at a 
later date and nor did I want participants to be identified through court 
documents. 
 Owner participants who had a functioning owner corporation were required 
to be on the committee of management, and preferably the chairman. This 
is because I wanted the committees‟ view, not individual owners. 
 Strata complexes that were 100% commercial in orientation were excluded, 
that is they needed to have some residential occupation. The issue of 
commercial strata while interesting is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 Community title schemes in which owners with shared values come 
together with the specific purpose of creating shared lived space were 
excluded. Community title schemes are outside the scope of this thesis. 
For these reasons then, only building complexes that have been in existence for at 
least 6 years have been included. This time frame excludes complexes that are still 
under builder‟s warranty and provide time for the owners to exit the forming stage 
of an organisation and move into the performing stage. Moreover it allows time for 
developers to relinquish any interest in the building complex through on-sale of 
strata units. Owner corporations that were involved in legal disputes were also 
excluded. While this may have been seen as an indication of a low performing type 
of organisation, I took the view that becoming involved in an area of legal dispute 
was in itself problematic, given that  were it to be published and come into the 
public domain, this information could be easily traced back to the participating 
organisations. I could not guarantee anonymity and thus I may eventually harm 
those who sort to assist me. It was also important to me to select those 
organisations where the main focus was on residential ownership.  
There has been a recent spate of advertisements for the sale of commercial strata 
titled properties. These fall across a continuum including offices, warehousing, 
hotel rooms, short stay apartments, and self-storage space. It was considered that 
the owners of these complexes are more likely to operate from a business 
perspective. At a minimum, I sought mixed-use complexes that included residential 
strata property or solely residential complexes for this research. Community 
complexes presented a difficulty because many are strata titled. Community 
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complexes were excluded on the basis that these owners come together with the 
specific intention of forming a community that meets their needs. This is in keeping 
with McKenzie‟s (2006a) view that these complexes are formed by people with 
likeminded ideas, who have means within their by-laws and legislation to exclude 
prospective owners who do not meet the community philosophy. He goes on to 
state that they are generally high functioning with fewer disputes as a result. This 
type of ownership appears to play a minor part in the emerging strata industry 
landscape in Australia. For these reasons, community based strata title 
organisations were excluded from the study. 
4.2.3 The interview process 
Strata managers are busy people. While I was advised to find a neutral place to 
interview in, strata managers were less than enthusiastic about attending. Some 
were based in the suburbs or regional areas. Some had offices within high profile 
CBD buildings. One was working from a converted garage at the rear of his house. 
I conducted interviews in all these locations during this research. Some committee 
chairs wanted me to come and see their building. Others were more reticent and 
willing only to meet in a public place of their choosing. Given that all the committee 
chairs were female, this may have been a gender/ safety response. Participants 
were advised they could stop the interview at any time should they choose to do so. 
The most difficult interview was held in a café with attendant noise background 
problems. The participant was well known and there were frequent interjections 
from people passing by.  
All interviews were recorded. Once completed, tapes were transcribed verbatim. 
There was some discussion as to whether this was necessary. I was advised by 
various academics within the university to transcribe „thinking of quotable material 
only‟. However transcribing the interviews myself, and in their completeness, was 
important because it enabled me to immerse myself in the interview data, and to 
reflect on the issues being raised. It also allowed me to hone my interview 
technique between interviews. However the deciding factors were anonymity (for 
the individual) and confidentiality (about who said what). Participants had been 
assured their identity would be protected. My ethics application had identified the 
possibly of commercial-in-confidence matters being breached. For example, should 
an owner corporation raise issues of performance or facility degradation, and this 
information become generally known, a decrease in asset price might follow 
affecting the owners financially. For strata managers, information shared in 
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interviews could potentially result in commercial harm to their business. Thus 
participant information was decoded by assigning an alphabetical suffix to the 
participant. 
The transcripts amounted to over two hundred pages. I was advised to use a 
simple thematic filing system. I began by reading and rereading the transcripts in 
line with Ezzy‟s (2002) advice. I began with piles of quotes cut and placed in a pile 
on the floor. However, I soon discovered this approach was inadequate to the task.  
Instead I coded the electronic word document using four colours within the 
electronic Word document itself to identify each of the four themes. As themes and 
subthemes emerged, I moved the transcripts to NVivo and attended workshops to 
develop new skills. The question that arose was on what basis quotations were 
being assigned? In response to this I used a code book which met the 
requirements for rigorousness in research. I restarted the coding procedure using 
NVivo, ultimately identifying the four key themes noted above as well as three 
emergent themes within the interview transcripts12.  
4.3 Introducing the participants 
It is usual in qualitative studies to provide some context or background information 
about the respondents. Due to ethical considerations attached to „commercial in 
confidence‟ material provided by some respondents, and the possibility of 
commercial harm occurring should respondents or individual complexes be 
identified, descriptive material has been kept to a minimum.  Limited vignettes of 
the participants are included here. 
The fourteen interviews were conducted over a two year period. There was no 
conscious effort to ensure that an equal number of strata managers and committee 
members were interviewed. However, half of the respondents were strata 
managers. One of the strata managers acknowledged owning strata property and 
sitting on two committees of management. None of the strata managers came from 
a real estate background. The strata managers came from a variety of 
backgrounds including finance and banking, construction aligned industries, and 
general business backgrounds. One was a small time developer. Six of the 
                                                          
12 See Parts D and E for a detailed discussion of the study’s findings, new theoretical horizons and future 
directions for research. 
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management companies were licensed within the state of Victoria. One was not 
licensed in that state, but operated within it. The Victorian licensing system is 
designed to ensure that strata managers hold minimum levels of professional 
indemnity insurance. The licensing system is not designed to assess the 
professional capability of licence holders.   
Six respondents (excluding the above mentioned strata manager who was an 
owner-occupier within a strata development), were property owners who sat on the 
committee of management within their strata development. Five respondents 
identified themselves as owner-occupiers. Two respondents were investor-owners, 
though all of the seven committees of management appeared to have a mix of 
owner-occupiers and owner-investors. One respondent identified herself as coming 
from a self-managed complex that did not have a strata manager. 
Two emails were received. While these two emails are from owner corporation 
committees who chose not to participate in the study, their reasons for not doing so 
are interesting and also shed light on issues of governance, participation, 
professionalism, sourcing strategy and capacity to function within the strata 
industry. Permission to use the emails as part of this research was obtained. I now 
turn to introducing the interview participants.  
Strata Manager A 
Strata Manager A is the owner of a medium sized firm of strata managers. He 
employs around ten staff, six in a full time capacity. He is active within various 
industry bodies. He describes a typical complex that he manages as suburban, 
with approximately one hundred residential units.  They are a combination of older 
two and three story walk-ups and newer apartment complexes. Strata Manger A 
has worked in the strata industry for about a decade. He has a varied background 
which he describes as primarily administrative. He has worked as a factory 
manager and small business manager. This is his first foray as a business owner.  
Strata Manager A provides administrative services to the owner corporation and 
arranges facilities management works for them when asked to do so.  
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Figure 8 Typical strata complex managed by Strata Manager A 
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Strata Manager B 
Strata Manager B is the owner of a medium sized firm of strata managers. He 
describes a typical strata complex as about 8 middle ring units or apartments that 
are less than 10 years old. The firm is located within a suburban, commercial strata 
complex, close to the properties that he manages. He has four permanent staff.  
Strata Manager B has a varied background including retail within various family 
businesses, and has worked as a small time developer in conjunction with his 
uncle. He felt that becoming a strata manager was an associated growth industry 
and a natural extension to his previous property development role. His previous 
café work has allowed him to hone his customer service skills which he believes to 
be a crucial part of his work. 
 
Figure 9 Typical strata complex managed by Strata Manager B 
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Chair C 
Chair C has been the committee 
chair of her owner corporation for 
one year. She is an owner-investor 
in a large mixed use development 
in the inner city that is six years old. 
There are several developer 
mandated sub corporations running 
in this complex as well as an 
umbrella one. An external strata 
management company is 
employed. Chair C bought her unit 
„off the plan‟ and she identifies 
governance issues and costs as the 
reason that she stood for a 
committee position. Her 
background is professional and 
allied to the construction industry 
which she sees as a benefit to her 
strata community as she is used to 
the technical jargon and managing 
contracts within that industry. 
 
Figure 10 Typical strata complex that Chair C purchased into 
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Strata Manager D 
 
Strata Manger D works for a large national 
strata corporation. Their Melbourne office 
is located within the central business 
district. Within the Melbourne office, there 
are approximately forty employees. The 
company has identified a number of key 
areas of expertise that strata managers 
need and has arranged their roles 
accordingly. Thus there is a core group of 
technical employees, those with financial 
experience who look after the accounting 
side of the strata corporation, and those 
who act as the „face‟ of the company. 
These are the strata managers whose role 
it is to interact with the „customer‟ base. 
Strata Manager D talks of the future of the 
strata industry and his company‟s role in 
shaping it. The company acts as manager 
for both large and small unit complexes 
across the city including some of the 
central business district buildings. Within 
the company, Strata Manager D‟s role is 
that of the newly created „business 
manager‟. His role is to be the face of the 
company, meet with potential clients and 
discuss the needs of the strata committee 
with them. In conjunction with other in-
house expertise, he then prepares the 
quotations for them to consider. Once 
engaged by the client, the file and duties 
are then passed on to one of the in-house 
strata managers.  
Figure 11 Typical complex managed by Strata Manager D 
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Chair E 
Chair E is a woman who retired to Melbourne from Sydney two years earlier. In 
Sydney, she had also owned an apartment, so this is her second foray into 
apartment ownership. Her apartment is an exquisitely appointed, double story, 
penthouse in an historic building. She is very proud of the history of her complex, 
and seeks to raise the profile of the building. Chair E enjoys the excitement of living 
in the city centre and has a wide circle of friends in other apartment buildings. She 
has lived in the complex for about four years and been a committee member for all 
of that time. She is now the committee chair. Her complex has an external strata 
manager, though this was not always the case.  
 
 
Figure 12 Typical strata complex that Chair E purchased into 
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Strata Manager F 
Strata Manager F is a franchisee strata manager who bought his business within 
the past year. He deals with larger regional towns where most of the complexes 
are low-rise townhouses with less than 20 units. He identifies many of his own 
shortcomings and is reliant on the „network‟ of other franchisees to assist him.  He 
is a sole trader. He needs to provide additional services in order to make „the sale‟. 
 
Figure 13 Typical strata complex managed by Strata Manager F 
Strata Manager G  
Strata Manager G is a strata manager whose professional background is allied to 
the construction industry. He is firm about the benefits of being allied to 
professional bodies and the ethical support that they bring.  Strata Manager G also 
works in a regional township where the focus has shifted from suburban single 
story units to high profile waterfront apartments and strata title retirement villages.  
He describes a typical complex as containing around 30-40 units some of which 
are commercial in nature. 
 
Figure 14 Typical strata complex managed by Strata Manager G 
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Strata Manager and Chair H 
Strata Manager and Chair H is a business person affiliated with the legal 
profession. Strata Manager and Chair H owns both commercial and residential 
strata property across a number of inner city apartment complexes. Strata 
Manager and Chair H sits on the committees of two properties that also have 
external strata managers. Strata Manager and Chair H has recently resigned as 
chair of one committee in order to become the strata manager for the owner 
corporation.  Strata Manager and Chair H admits to being naive about the property 
at the time of purchasing into this last building. Strata Manager and Chair H speaks 
from both the committee chair point of view, but also the strata manager point of 
view.  Strata Manager and Chair H manages only a handful of strata property 
complexes and these are generally small scale suburban complexes for family and 
friends. It is a new area of business that shows future potential for this respondent. 
There are insights gained from legal training. This interview gave me most concern 
over how to use the interview material as much of the material is so specific that it 
would become easy to identify Strata Manager and Chair H.  
 
Figure 15 Typical complex that Strata Manager and Chair H interacts with 
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Chair I 
Chair I is a retired country school teacher. She owned her middle ring suburban 
walk-up for about 12 years before moving into it two years ago. She has been on 
the owner committee of management for about seven years, and has been 
committee chair for the past year. She describes her complex as „settled‟ with not 
too much movement. Her complex has had the same strata manager for seventeen 
years. 
 
Figure 16 Typical strata complex that Chair I has purchased into 
Strata Manager J 
Strata Manager J is the youngest of the strata managers interviewed. He also runs 
an allied facilities management company and employs about forty people. He has 
been active within various professional bodies and considers himself to be a good 
operator who frequently up-skills his staff.  He manages some of the most high 
profile buildings in the city but describes a typically managed strata development 
as a mixed commercial and residential complex of around 100 units. He has a 
preference for managing the newer buildings and likes to get in on the „ground 
floor‟. 
 
Figure 17 Typical strata complex managed by Strata Manager J 
 
 Page    117 
  
 
Chair K 
Chair K was until recently an owner 
occupier within a large multi-story 
complex in the central business district. 
There are a number of sub-committees 
attached to the owner corporation 
structure. These are a combination of 
developer mandated and committee 
appointed sub-committees. She has 
been the committee chair for over five 
years.  As well as her apartment, she 
owns strata property in an industrial 
zone and describes herself as a 
business woman. She has actively 
lobbied for change to the current 
legislation and is interested in creating 
networks of owners. There are strata 
managers appointed for both complexes. 
Due to an insurance issue she has had 
to move into rental accommodation.  
Figure 18 Typical strata complex that Chair K has purchased into 
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Chair L 
Chair L is an inquisitive middle aged advocate and social worker. She lives by 
herself in what is essentially a „Jekyll and Hyde‟ suburb close to the city centre. 
Parts of it are extremely unsavoury, prone to violence, prostitution, and extreme 
disadvantage while the shopping strip and natural attractions are a drawcard to day 
trippers and tourists. She moved into the neighbourhood some 25 years ago, and 
has lived in several houses and flats in that time as a renter. She purchased her 
1970‟s strata titled flat about four years ago and this is her first excursion into home 
ownership. There are two, three story walk up blocks of un-renovated flats in her 
complex. 
 
Figure 19 Typical strata complex that Chair L has purchased into 
 
 Page    119 
  
 
Chair M 
Chair M is an owner occupier in a 
small suburban complex. The strata 
complex is located in an older, 
middle ring suburb. Her background 
is in contract management. 
Originally it was one home built in 
the 1940‟s that has now been 
subdivided through the application 
of the stratum title. She purchased 
into the complex some four years 
ago. Since purchasing and moving 
into the complex, the adjoining 
strata property has been a rental 
property. It changed hands two 
years ago. There is no strata 
manager involved and there are no 
regular meetings. Technically, the 
owner corporation is in breach of its 
legislated duties as there are no 
formal meetings.   
 
Figure 20 Typical strata complex that Chair M has purchased into 
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Chair N 
Chair N is a businesswoman. She is an 
owner-investor with two strata titled 
properties, both in regional townships, 
but in different complexes. They are 
both short to medium term lets, one 
bedroom furnished apartments in 
central locations. She has previously 
lived in one of the apartments, and 
frequently stays in the other between 
tenants as a kind of holiday home. She 
would like to live in it fulltime, but 
finances are a bit stretched.  She is on 
the committee of both complexes and 
Chair of one, even though it means long 
and time-consuming air travel to attend 
meetings often at short notice.  
 
Figure 21 Typical strata complex that Chair N purchased into 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the three methods utilized in this research as: 
 A review of reports, Australian print media and websites. 
 The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, conducted and analysed 
using a thematic approach. 
 Review of relevant academic literature from a sociological and management 
perspective. 
The approach is not unlike that of Pels (2000), Creswell (1998) or Mills (1959). 
These methods were selected as a way of drawing out the four themes of 
governance, participation, sourcing or buying-in and expertise/professionalism, 
identified in the literature review. 
This chapter introduced each participant that was interviewed. It also identified 
specific measures employed in the qualitative section of this research project. I 
discussed the semi structured nature of the interview questions in terms of 
qualitative research techniques drawing on both Ezzy (2002) and Kvale (1996). I 
have described how I identified and recruited participants and how by applying the 
litmus test (Babbie 2004), I identified the criteria for exclusion from the study.  The 
use of Landata and TheList were identified as tools to check property ownership. 
Ultimately NVivo was used as an aid to managing and identifying key themes in the 
transcripts.  
In chapters five, six and seven I analyse the transcript information and begin to 
draw conclusions about structure, processes and procedures within the owner 
corporation environment. 
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Part D - The Study 
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Chapter 5 –Strata title property in print 
media and websites in Australia 
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5.0 Introduction 
Sociologists have viewed housing tenure as critical to shaping a person‟s life 
chances. Lack of stable housing has been associated with poor health and 
educational outcomes resulting in lower work participation rates. The ideology of 
home ownership has been a central component in shaping policies and practices 
within Australian society. Strata titled housing has increasingly become a visible 
form of home ownership.   
The approach taken acknowledges the importance of socio-cultural factors 
impacting on the growth of this type of real estate product. It also acknowledges 
that home has traditionally been a site for the construction of identity and meaning 
(Dupuis & Thorns 1998; Leonard et al. 2004), in this case shared meaning of the 
way in which Australians increasingly live. Feeding into these concepts, home as a 
physical asset has changed in meaning as the ability to access home equity to 
purchase other lifestyle products has increased. Identities are no longer 
constructed around what we own, but rather what we can borrow against what we 
own, to fund lifestyle choices. One of the lifestyle choices that are made is where 
we live. I stress at this point that tenure choice is often a bounded choice. The 
choice is made within the confines of what we can afford, what we are familiar with 
and what our perceived needs are.  
The first section of this chapter sets the background for discussion of two particular 
studies, that of Blandy and Lister (2006) and Goodman and Douglas (2010). I 
provide a brief description of their work and identify the gap left between these two 
articles in terms of purchaser knowledge of the owner corporation environment. I 
then consider what, if anything, may be gleaned through the print media and 
websites by this group of purchasers. As part of this investigation I present a 
thematic analysis of what kind of knowledge is most likely to be made available to 
these prospective purchasers. The final part of the chapter outlines policy 
implications going forward for the strata industry and purchasers 
5.1 The Australian context 
Academic historian Charles Pickett and Powerhouse Museum curator Carolyn 
Butler-Bowden provide a clear picture of Australia‟s love affair with apartment living 
in their 2007 book „Homes in the Sky: Apartment living in Australia‟. I have used 
their research to present a historical snapshot in which to contextualise Australia‟s 
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growth in strata titled property. Australian landed gentry have had a history of 
owning secluded townhouses in blue chip suburbs as a getaway from extended 
country life. During the 1950‟s, the townhouse concept was popularised to become 
a beach getaway for city dwellers. Yet it was not until the 1960‟s that Australia 
embraced the strata title mechanism. In previous eras, town house ownership 
relied on „stock‟ housing in which prospective owners purchased shares in a 
property along with the „right of abode‟. The trading of property shares in town 
houses and apartment dwellings was subject to the approval of the governing 
shareholder board. The shareholder board had the right to veto a purchase where 
the board determined that the new owner would not „fit in‟ with the lifestyle of 
existing owners. In this way, town houses became sites for the generation of 
„exclusivity‟ in which class structure was maintained.  
From the 1960s, freehold housing stock has been replaced by strata titled housing 
in the form of apartments, MPE‟s and gated communities particularly in inner city 
suburbs. Creating a strata scheme allows the developer to increase the number of 
saleable lots in relation to land size. With strata titled property, the developer on-
sells his interest, often at the earliest opportunity to pay down debt accrued during 
the building process. Developers are profit driven. That is, the person who creates 
the organisation has little or no ongoing interest in its ability to function into the 
future. This unusual circumstance creates a unique organisation in which new 
owner members may be unaware that they have joined the organisation, since the 
purchase of real estate does not always draw attention to the compulsory nature of 
belonging. The advantage over stock housing as defined by McKenzie (2006b) is 
that, for strata titled properties, individual titles are issued for each lot and there is 
no reliance on the existing owners to approve the sale of individual properties. 
However it also takes away a means of ensuring that collectively, owners have 
similar values, attitudes and aims for their property, all of which make the 
functioning of the governing body easier. Bagaeen and Uduku‟s (2010) edited work 
considers the history of gated communities in particular. The selection of academic 
papers contained within this work predominately provides a view of settled 
communities in which owners work together for mutual benefit. The view that gated 
communities have existed for long periods in near harmonious circumstances has 
also been noted by other authors. For example Jurgens and Landman (2006) note 
the south American experience as being inclusive, with frequent working parties to 
keep vacant allotments tidy and street parties that extend to those who have opted 
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out of levy payments. The commentary on western style strata communities is 
somewhat different. Stemming from the United States, strata titled communities 
were a bastardised form of Howard‟s utopian city in which the worst aspects were 
kept and lip service only paid to the idea of community (McKenzie 1996). 
Governing bodies have reported significant amounts of conflict within owner 
corporations (Blakely & Snyder 1999; Blandy & Lister 2006; McKenzie 1996). 
Conflict falls within two key realms. One is the adherence to rules and standards of 
behaviour. The other area of conflict is over required maintenance, cost of 
maintenance, and the cost of levies to run the complex generally.  
The amount of interpersonal and intrapersonal conflict experienced within 
complexes has the ability to impact on ontological security within the home realm. 
Dupuis and Thorns (1998) for example link ontological security to the concept of 
home within transitional suburban environments.  They note that home is a site of 
constancy in social and material environment; a spatial context in which routine 
existence is formed; where people most feel in control of their lives and are free 
from surveillance. It is the secure base around which identities are constructed. 
The contractual relationship between owners and joint ownership of  common 
areas such as lifts, lobbies and corridors, services roads or parks, has the ability to 
threaten ontological security as voiced by Dupius and Thorns (1998, p. 27), since 
exercising rights over these areas is no longer in the realm of „close family 
relationships‟. Surveillance by others occurs within the common areas and the 
constancy of social and material environment cannot be guaranteed within the 
common areas. Routine may be disrupted by the needs of others living within 
closer confines. Australians, like Dupuis and Thorns‟ New Zealanders, dream of 
home as a freehold block in which one can be „oneself‟.  Accordingly, the increase 
in living density is at odds with this dream and the ontological security that it 
provides as a place to be oneself. Therefore, the amount of conflict reported within 
strata complexes can be seen as an expression of tension between the dream of 
home ownership and the reality experienced within higher density strata 
environments. It is to probe this tension further the research reported here was 
undertaken. 
I draw now on two particular studies undertaken in recent years to explain the 
research gap that this chapter fills. Blandy and Lister (2006) undertook a pilot study 
of a newly built gated community comprising converted stand-alone housing and 
apartment dwellings in England‟s Sheffield area. A combination of questionnaire 
 
 Page    127 
  
 
and semi structured interview method was used with the majority of residents 
having moved into the estate within the previous six months. The original 
motivation to move into a gated community and their actual lived experience were 
therefore able to be assessed in relation to each other. In Blandy and Lister‟s 
(2006) research, only two residents were aware of the legal structure of the 
community they had bought into prior to purchase. Over half the interviewees were 
confused between the governing resident committee and the professional 
management company employed by the committee of management. Owners were 
unclear about their role within the governing structure, their officers and their roles. 
Some interviewees were unaware of governing rules or did not know they had to 
pay levies in addition to their council rate obligations and mortgage payments.   
Blandy and Lister‟s (2006) research found that maintaining property values and 
security were significantly more important to most purchasers than ideas of 
community. It was noted that contact between residents did not necessarily 
develop into friendship. This confirms the idea that home within this type of 
complex does not always extend to common areas within complexes. Home 
owners do not necessarily feel responsible for the common property. Similarly, in 
an Australian study in the city of Brisbane, Walters and Rosenblatt (2008) found 
that while a nostalgic sense of community was appealing to many purchasers, few 
actively engaged in participative practices. Of greater importance however is the 
way these weak neighbourhood ties translate to the idea of participative 
management. 
Alexander (1994) for instance found that residents may become active in 
deteriorating conditions (where their ontological security is threatened). Blakely and 
Snyder (1999) noted that owners actively volunteered outside their gated 
communities rather than for their home owner associations, thus leaving a small 
group to undertake most of the work. They further noted that these willing workers 
were sometimes ostracized by their community and were subject to threatening 
behaviour by other community members, who were unable to get their own way. 
These studies provide glimpses into some of the root causes of conflict within 
strata communities noted in an increasing number of studies. In particular Maxwell 
(2003) indicates that strangers are often bought together within these communities 
in a way that is not representative of wider society and without the benefit of 
understanding the contractual obligations and ramifications that bind these groups 
of strangers together. 
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This point is elucidated further by Goodman and Douglas (2010) who undertook a 
study of websites promoting MPE‟s in Melbourne Australia. MPE‟s are a form of 
strata titled community often containing mid and low rise detached housing similar 
to that contained in Blandy and Lister‟s (2006) study. However they do not contain 
the physical structure of gated compounds that limit entry into the estate which are 
a key security feature of gated communities. Goodman and Douglas used content 
analysis of publicly available websites noting that websites are often the first point 
of contact for prospective purchasers of off-the-plan property. Their aim was to 
understand how much information about the governing structures was provided to 
prospective purchasers. Their sample included ten developer websites in which 
homes within MPE‟s were being sold off the plan. Participant observation of one 
estate was included since one of the authors had already purchased within the 
targeted MPE. They found that notions of close knit community are often melded 
with luxurious resort lifestyles and promoted through personal recommendations of 
those who have recently purchased within a complex. Goodman and Douglas 
found that of the ten „off the plan‟ developer sale sites, only two developers 
referred to a governing body. In one instance the developer referred to the 
governing body as a glorified social club that residents could join if they wanted to, 
thus advertising a gregarious and close knit group of owners. Six of the websites 
promoted a sense of community as a selling point indicating that luxurious 
surroundings were a greater selling point than belonging to a community. The 
concept of luxurious, community owned facilities were depicted on all websites, 
often in great detail.  The mandatory nature of belonging was mentioned on only 
one web site. The research findings that I have summarised here are important 
because they point to why Blandy and Lister found that so few residents were 
aware of the governing board, community assets that need to be maintained and 
the rules that could be imposed on owners within the complex.   
Failure to understand the complexity of the new governing regime may impact on 
the asset value of the estate and hence individually owned property. The 
maintenance of asset value was seen as a drawcard in Blandy and Lister‟s 
research despite owners failing to understand the nature of the governing body and 
the compulsory nature of belonging (see also Low 2006). Using pooled data, 
Langbein and Spotswood-Bright (2004) found that high levy fees within complexes 
depressed asset value in comparison to similar properties with lower fees. 
However the involvement of professional management somewhat mitigated the 
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effect of higher levies on asset value. The question remains as to how applicable 
this research is in an environment where owners are not aware of the governing 
body, the nature of belonging, the requirement to pay levies or the existence of 
professional management prior to purchase.  
To develop this theme further, I consider the fact that the number of new dwellings 
that come onto the market each year, whilst significant, is outnumbered by the sale 
of previously occupied property. That is, only a portion of prospective housing 
consumers purchase directly from the developer. Moreover, developers of smaller 
complexes are more likely to mediate sales through real estate representatives or 
realtors.  The real estate industry then, along with the developer, becomes a key 
structural influence in creating notions of how Australians view living within a strata 
complex whether MPE, gated community or apartment complex. It is through 
media advertising and infomercials that most real estate is sold.  
5.2 Home and the media 
Media has long been a site for the construction and reconstruction of identity. For 
instance, Mills (1958) considered that the structure of society was created and 
replicated through the media. For Mills, structural forces that shape and confine 
society were able to marshal the media‟s power and present key messages 
repetitively to a relatively unquestioning mass society. Society was therefore 
governed by an elite who were able to set the agenda on any issue. Of course Mills‟ 
(1959) work needs to be updated in view of subsequent research developments. 
The globalised environment allows faster access to information through a variety of 
means. The internet is just one example of the way in which populations are able 
to garner new information to counteract the oppressive views that Mills discussed.  
Print media images and text provide us with a particular way of viewing the world. 
Jacobs (2011) considers that „our knowledge (of the world) is always discursively 
constructed in that what we see in the world and how we see the world is affected 
by ideology and culture‟, that is knowledge is mediated through the views of others. 
Mills‟ (1959) work assumes that consumers are fed messages constructed to 
mould the views of a gullible or non-empowered public. However Hall (1986) 
mediates this view, contending that media reporting reflects existing power 
relations, making it difficult but not impossible for non-empowered groups to 
challenge existing narratives. However, the expanded use of internet sites makes it 
easier for non-empowered groups to challenge existing narratives. The Joseph 
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Kony 2012 campaign (ABC 2012) is an outstanding example of how human 
agency is able to positively influence structural narratives or create new ones.  At a 
local level, the use of „letters to the editor‟ provides a forum for the debate of 
structured media messages and has the capacity to power relationships. However 
letters as well as media stories are always selected and packaged through the lens 
of the editor and what messages will sell.  
Hall (1986) notes that media representations are not pure but the product of human 
agency and therefore deeply embedded in power relations. The stories that are 
told and re-told about housing and home are constructed with various messages in 
mind. Tapping into these messages about strata titled housing and how this 
shapes Australians‟ viewpoints is a key objective of this research. Apart from 
Goodman and Douglas‟s (2010) developer website content analysis, a number of 
themes are evident in current media and have been commented on.  Leonard et al. 
(2004) for example used magazine print media to highlight the messages fed to 
homeowners about the way in which they live and create self-identity though 
material object selection. Leonard et al (2004) argue that a New Zealander‟s sense 
of home is constructed not just between household members but rather though 
print media who become the arbiters of what is „tasteful‟ and „decorative‟ and 
therefore acceptable. Hope and Johnson (2001, p. 131) take this idea further 
arguing that advertising is a form of coercion that „promises hope rather than 
understanding‟. This highlights the emotional elements of home that advertising 
and media stories tap into. As Dupuis and Thorns (1998) assert, home is a place to 
which we are emotionally as well as physically linked. It is no wonder then that 
media has the power to shape and construct our reality. 
5.3 Results 
In line with Leonard et al. (2004) a thematic approach to the articles was developed. 
The majority of articles related to real estate sales. These contained information on 
both new and pre owned apartments for sale as well as new developments.  Figure 
22 provides an overview of the key findings.  
I then select four themes to consider in more depth before focusing on the analysis 
of Google located websites. 
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% of 
included 
articles 
Media & website 
breakdown 
Major themes Minor themes Missing commentary 
43 Real Estate Sales Position, convenience, 
luxury, views 
Affordable, target 
groups 
Governing body or 
structure, levies, 
security, community 
28 Non classified media 
stories 
developer activity, 
investment 
opportunities, 
affordability  
Social housing Governing body or 
structure, levies, 
services  
maintenance, security, 
community 
14 Specific multi owned 
issues 
Governance, 
participation, 
professionalism,  
Pets, children, conflict Contracts, education, 
security community 
8 Development 
applications 
Height, density corruption Governing body or 
structure, levies, 
services  
maintenance, 
community, security 
3 Strata Industry 
Websites 
Professionalism,  Lobbying, 
communication 
Owners, contracts, 
community,  
3 Strata Government 
Websites 
Governing body or 
structure, levies, 
maintenance, 
community 
Rules, conflict 
resolution 
Education, contract 
management 
1 Strata blog sites Governing body or 
structure, levies,  
maintenance, 
community 
Tenant issues education 
Figure 22 Thematic summary of media and websites  
5.3.1 Print media 
In this section I discuss the results from the print media search conducted through 
Factiva and analysed through NVivo. Overlying the following discussions of real 
estate sales and development applications is the interplay between structure and 
agency. Glasze (2006a) provides diagrammatic insight into the way globalisation, 
urban governance and the spread of private „club‟ neighbourhoods interact within a 
structure and agency setting. He considers that, in the regional context, 
governance of private neighbourhoods provides time-space, specific patterns of 
actors and their interactions. Moreover institutions produce path dependency and 
increase or lower the attractiveness of the model of the „private neighbourhood‟, 
whether apartment or gated community. As such private neighbourhoods have the 
ability to „become‟ or „not become‟ a reasonable option for involved actors. 
According to Glasze (2006a), much of this depends on the liberalisation of the 
private real estate market and the diffusion of a successful real estate product to 
the marketplace. I begin with consideration of real estate market in the first 
instance. 
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5.3.1.1 Real estate 
This section contains almost half of the print media stories. Real estate articles 
included information on both individual apartments and new developments. While 
many were sale advertisements, there were also feature articles and infomercials 
common to the real estate sections of daily and weekend newspapers. Few of the 
articles provided any mention of the owner corporation, governing structure or 
strata title mechanism. Only those advertisements published by the Sydney Herald 
Sun consistently noted the annual or quarterly levy payable to the corporation. Two 
units were sold under the banner of „No body corporate fees‟, hinting that fees 
payable to an owner corporation are undesirable to the average consumer of strata 
property.  
The primary themes arising from the real estate commentary are of luxurious 
surroundings and expansive views in central locations where no car is necessary.  
„Cinemas are making their way into high-rise apartments, and luxury 
day spas into what used to be the humble retirement village‟ (Mario 
Xuereb, Home, suite home, all part of the plan, The Sunday Age, 27 
April 2008). 
„The central location meant that few car spaces were required‟ (Ian 
Royall, Residents want inquiry into controversial development, Herald 
Sun, 2 April 2008)  
This commentary is largely consistent with the integration processes associated 
with structural domination of developers and planners. It is a way that meaning is 
applied to the concept of the walkable city and then sold; that is you do not need a 
car because (a) the apartment is so luxurious that it meets all your needs and (b) it 
is so conveniently located that you will not need a car parking space. There were 
emergent themes as well. A small percentage of articles referred to the apartments 
for sale as „affordable‟ and „entry level‟. Given that these articles did not provide 
information on levies, the affordable aspect related only to the purchase price 
range. Housing affordability is a key issue for Australians (Yates & Wuff 2005). The 
theme of affordability is designed to lure young, first time home buyers who are 
unable to raise additional finance for the „luxurious‟ lifestyle. This was identified by 
Leonard et al. (2004) as a significant theme for first home owners in New Zealand. 
A second emergent theme, and one that has been raised in the literature by Low 
(2006), is marketing to specific ethnic groups, in this case those of Chinese 
extraction. Age-specific marketing was also noted: 
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„The Zen Property Group and Usher Powell Developments are 
creating what they say is Australia's first dedicated feng shui 
apartment project, which they have named Harmony Broadwater‟ (NN, 
Aiming For Harmony Development boost for bay, The Gold Coast 
Bulletin, 30 April 2008). 
„Mr Buxton said the concept had worked, and he had more Gen Y 
inner-city developments planned‟ (Mario Xuereb, The Age, 28 April 
2008). 
„The 57-apartment luxury complex for people aged over 55 would 
include a roof top garden, concierge, hairdresser, day spa, gym, 
theatre and pool‟ (Danielle Crowe, Residents say proposed retirement 
complex too big, Manningham Leader, 30 April 2008). 
Three articles were specifically angled at the Gen Y age group with the developers 
of these complexes openly stating that this was their purchaser target, though most 
targeted articles fell within the active aging, over 50‟s, „lifestyle‟ village areas. 
5.3.1.2 Non classified media 
Non classified media articles represented twenty eight of the total articles collected 
from Factiva. A wide range of issues were reported. However few related directly to 
the governing structure, and consequently I do not intend to delve into these 
articles. Themes covered included developer activity, developer and government 
corruption in the building industry generally, investment opportunities for astute 
purchasers, affordability of housing, and announcements of affordable housing 
initiatives including social housing rental schemes. Many of these themes highlight 
the linkages between key players such as developers, planners and political 
players identified as key power brokers at the structural level and as such, able to 
write and apply the rules associated with domination as identified in the literature 
review.  
5.3.1.3 Development applications 
Eight per cent of articles located through Factiva related to development 
applications for planned strata titled complexes. Councils and planning authorities 
have a vested interest in promoting strata titled complexes. When strata complexes 
are built the number of rateable properties increases, while provision of and 
maintenance for infrastructure is outsourced to the developer and governing board 
of owners. The majority of articles reported opposition to higher density 
developments by existing residents of broadacre suburbs. Opposition was primarily 
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based on the imposing height of the proposed building rather than an outright 
rejection of apartment dwelling:   
„The plan provoked more than 5000 submissions to the council, 
thousands of anti-development signatures and plenty of celebrity boos 
and hisses‟ (Peter Barrett, Home Coming, The Melbourne Magazine, 
23 April 2008). 
`It will ruin the character of the area‟ (Danielle Crowe, Residents say 
proposed retirement complex too big, Manningham Leader, 30 April 
2008)  
„Mosman Park resident Colin Percival said residents wanted a 
development on the site but a 50m building towering over their homes 
was unreasonable‟ (Hatch D, The West Australian, 4 April 2008) 
Where reported, councils rarely voted against development applications for high 
density residential complexes, signalling their vested interest in increasing the 
number of rateable properties despite the direct conflict with their constituents 
desires. Councils voiced dissatisfaction with a development usually because the 
developer was not meeting the conditions of the planning permit in some way; that 
is, the developer wanted to change the conditions of planning approval already 
agreed with councils and permit authorities. 
A minor theme was that of perceived corruption within the planning system as 
noted below: 
„When the Labor Party accepts donations from a developer who has a 
major development application being determined by a Labor planning 
minister, there is a blatant conflict of interest‟ ( Matthew Benns, Herald 
Sun, 6 April 2008) [spelling in original text].   
The articles in this section support and extend McKenzie‟s (2006a) and Jurgens 
and Landman‟s (2006) view. They question a council‟s impartiality in relation to 
development applications for higher density strata living to all levels of government. 
The articles also shed light on the legitimation processes that developers and 
planning authorities use in order to mesh their desired outcome for more rateable 
properties within the structural rules and resources available. In this instance, the 
permit condition has significance at the planning stage, but becomes an 
enforceable rule at the building stage. The planning process that includes 
democratic voting by representatives (and hence lobbying by constituents) 
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becomes a means through which agency can be enacted. These issues are 
conducted in the „past‟ time space as discussed in the previous chapter.   
5.4  Specific strata title issues 
This section includes all the Google located websites and some print media articles. 
While this theme related to just fourteen of the included print media articles, they 
provide the most pertinent information. Also included in this section are the 
websites and blogs found through the Google search. Considerable thought went 
into the classification of these articles and websites. One option was to continue 
classifying articles in relation to specific topics such as luxury and affordability.  
However the information brought attention to the committee and focussed on the 
emergence of the strata industry or building managers requiring a different 
approach. This approach was divided into four sub-categories of governance, 
stakeholder connectedness, professionalism, and contract issues. Many of these 
areas were discussed in the context of the developer influence.   
5.4.1 Governance 
Governance as discussed by Briand and Bellemare (2006) is considered to be a 
legitimation process that involves norms, values and rituals. Governance is good 
management underpinned by performance and use of public money, engagement 
and good outcomes. It is a key organisational construct that has been linked to the 
strata environment by Glasze (2006b). Grouped in this selection of articles were 
references to the committee of management‟s role, by-laws, levies and insurance 
issues since these relate to the implementation of legislative requirements, 
systems of accountability and transparency through committee ratification and  
processes in place for establishing by-laws and levies. Examples of articles 
included in this category are an owner who bought into a complex on the condition 
that she be allowed to bring her 13 year old dog with her, only to find that the 
governing body had voted to withdraw approval prior to the sale being completed 
(Allan Lander, Secret ballot over dog, Sunshine Coast Daily, 23 April 2008).  
Other articles highlighted how developers are able to limit the functioning of the 
owner corporation even after practical completion of the building stage. An 
example of developer influence after completion and handover to the new owners 
was seen through the setting up of contracts that bind the owner corporation in 
ways that may not be in their best interest.  
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 „According to Mr Winchester, some contracts give the developer up to 
three years to register the strata plans, which may cause lengthy 
delays‟ (N.N., Anger over two-year wait, Sunday Times (Perth), 27 
April 2008. 
„The developers have also cut out car parking and rented out 
communal space to outside businesses to reduce body corporate fees‟ 
(Mario Xuereb, The Sunday Age, 27 April 2008). 
When developers rent out space that is communal, it limits the organisation‟s ability 
for self-determination in terms of what the owners want to do with that space. In 
this instance, the marketing material for the building complex included allusions to 
an on-site bar, well-being centre including spray tans and massage, outdoor 
cinema and library. However all of these facilities were in fact private businesses 
operating out of the building complex and open to the general public, rather than 
facilities provided for the exclusive use of the owner corporation. In both these 
cases, there is a lack of mutual knowledge between the purchaser and the 
developer or sales representative. The purchaser‟s agency is limited by the way in 
which property is marketed and the attendant lack of information. It was left to 
Australian Property Investor Magazine (13 April 2008) to suggest that due diligence 
prior to purchase should occur. However due diligence was only required for 
investors, not prospective owner occupiers. 
An investigative article provided an industry view of fees: 
„The level of strata fees can vary enormously‟, says David Morris, 
president of the Institute of Strata Title Management. „A lot of people 
complain bitterly about them after they've moved in because they 
didn't look at them before. They can be high with a lot of facilities but 
still some people assume they get all that for nothing‟ (Susan Wellings, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 2008). 
This interview taps into issues raised in Blandy and Lister‟s (2006) study which 
found that some purchasers were unaware of the true cost of strata living. Given 
that the real estate industry rarely alludes to the fee structure at the point of sale, 
and that targeted media articles represent only a small portion of the overall written 
media coverage, it is difficult to know how owners are to gain prior knowledge of 
the ongoing funding structures and need for levy payments associated with strata 
title complexes. Moreover the basis on which fees are apportioned may change 
over time through the application of new legislation or court rulings. In the following 
instance the application of agency by one owner had the potential to affect owners 
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of property across the state rather than being limited to her own apartment 
complex:  
„Penthouse owners throughout the city are taking advantage of a legal 
precedent which now enables them to halve their annual body 
corporate fees. People with smaller units, however, are facing big 
increases‟ (MP tipped strata title fee chaos, Gold Coast Bulletin, 24 
April 2008). 
For owner-occupiers in particular, who have an emotional attachment to home, and 
limited ability to negatively gear property, the inability to anticipate and schedule 
payments for organisational levy payments represents a key challenge to their 
emotional as well as financial and physical security, key aspects of ontological 
security as discussed by Saunders (1984).  
5.4.2 Participation 
This section is closely related to governance issues, since governance relies on 
participation, and participation is higher where levels of trust and cohesion exist. 
Participation within past time-space (legislative and planning processes) and in the 
present time-space (period of ownership) are linked not just in terms of  Giddens‟ 
(1993) time-space continuum but also in terms of the social relation and reflective 
monitoring of action that occurs by individual actors. Bounds (2010) found that the 
essential ingredient for success was an active residents group and that satisfaction 
was generally high even in larger strata developments. Trust is based on 
predictability of behaviour. Predictability relates to internal or external control 
mechanisms.  Not only do residents groups and owner corporations need to be 
active, they need to perform in a way that engenders trust, openness and 
transparency between owners.  
Where organisational participation is low, conflict is generally higher. For this 
reason, stakeholder cohesion among owners, and by extension, between owners 
and tenants, and owners and their strata manager is crucial as indicated below:  
“But when about a third of the residents decided to work hard at 
resolving the accumulated grudges and resentments within the group, 
the change was overwhelming.  „All the tension went out of our 
meetings,‟ he says. „People who weren't talking to each other started 
talking again.‟  Mr Higginbottom is adamant that learning how to 
resolve conflict and deal with people is a crucial part of living in the 
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community” (Michael Green, Pooling resources for a green future, The 
Sunday Age, 6 April 2008). 
„And it can be hard if the two owners don't get on and one has a 
different number of unit entitlements, so can outvote the other. When 
a dispute can't be resolved, a compulsory manager is sometimes 
appointed‟ (Susan Wellings, When size really does matter, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 25 April 2008). 
Having the skills base and the will to work together can bring major changes to the 
functioning of the committee of management, and overall functioning of the 
community. As with Pouder and Clark‟s (2009) research into the setting of strategic 
direction, it is re-assuring to know that some individual owners are able to set aside 
differences to increase the capacity of the organisation through increasing 
stakeholder cohesion. Increased stakeholder cohesion and participation was 
related to issues of governance and had the ability to positively affect transparency 
and accountability. These in turn affect an individual‟s sense of fairness and natural 
justice building confidence in the owner corporation‟s dealings with member 
owners. The community spirit cited above, appeared to be far from the norm as 
Gabriella Woods reported in The Age:  
„Slowdown in economic growth and high prices, may mean better 
neighbourhoods and community spirit lacking in high investment high 
rise housing‟(Gabriella Woods, Real estate is not the real story. It's all 
about neighbourhood, The Age, 4 April 2008). 
Engagement in community events builds trust and reaffirms the status quo through 
integration processes which create mutual understanding of how to behave and 
what is expected. 
Owner cohesion was clearly lacking in a Cottesloe complex where the owners 
appear to be at loggerheads over redevelopment:   
“The units were given a 10-year life expectancy and residents were 
told the body corporate would not vote in favour of major repairs 
because demolition was inevitable. … „This is a strata-titled building 
and we have veto power‟, stated the body corporate chairman. „They 
can make life very difficult for us if they want to, but we will fight this, 
because this is our home‟'' (Glen Cordingly, Beach Battle, Sunday 
Times (Perth) 2 April 2008) 
This article raises issues of organisational importance. First is the issue of 
demolition which occurs in future time-space.  When the time comes for a multi-
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owned building complex to be demolished, how do developers negotiate that 
demolition with individual owners within the building complex? It is no longer a 
case of straight building demolition, but of entering into the decommissioning stage 
of an organisation. The article clearly raises issues of maintenance deficit. The 
owner corporation is tasked under legislation to maintain the common property, yet 
clearly the majority vote within this owner corporation is willing to forgo 
maintenance in order to force demolition. The situation occurred because the 
developer owned some of the units in the block, and other investor owners sided 
with the developer. The owner occupiers that wanted to continue to maintain the 
property despite the high levy costs were out voted. Thus there is a perceived 
breach of contract with the other owners that impacts on trust, predictability and 
control, impacting ontological security. The power plays within this organisation 
indicate that owners need to consider the entrenched interests of owners when 
placing representatives in positions of power and continue to reflexively monitor 
action to ensure that they are adequately represented. The aims of this 
organisation are at odds with the legislated duties to repair and maintain the 
common property within the unit complex. Thus the legislation designed to protect 
the assets of all owners is voided through the democratic voting system. 
5.4.3 Blog sites 
Blog sites present a readily accessible forum for owners of strata property. The 
search identified four Australian Blog sites. One was easily discounted. This 
website referred to an openly fictitious statement about a high-rise building 
complex called „Dardanelle Towers‟.  Other web sites were also noted. These 
relate to an embryonic organisation which at the time of writing had ceased to exist. 
All three websites purported to be for the benefit of providing information to owners 
and those living with the complexes. While McKenzie (2006a) cites the rising use 
of dedicated web and blog sites as a growing form of support to owner 
corporations offering some level of community cohesion and structural input. In 
Australia there appear to be few dedicated sites. Information from these sites was 
confined to the public domain only. It was noted that there were a number of strata 
management company websites with dedicated channels. These blog sites were 
associated with specific owner committee sites and were membership only 
accessible.  
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The website provided information on a broad range of issues affecting the owner 
corporation, though it should be noted that the information on both sites is NSW 
specific and may not be relevant to other jurisdictions. However on neither site is a 
public disclaimer to that effect made, as seen in the following statement: 
„As well as offering practical assistance, we're a reassuring presence 
for apartment owners who have problems because they know they're 
not alone‟, (Stephen Goddard, Chairman of the Owners Corporation 
Network, www.ocn.org.au accessed 4 April 2008). 
Insurance and voting proxies are raised in this forum. Discussion of these issues 
was not detailed in the media articles. The issue of transfer of proxy votes to the 
developer as part of the purchase contract creates a conflict of interest situation 
and highlights the way in which the developer and real estate industry work 
together to keep owners from being able to exercise their right to sound principles 
of governance, including openness and transparency. 
“You can picture it now: your average first-home buyer, empty nester 
or recent immigrant signs the sales contract and shakes hands with 
Dodgy Dave, the developer's go-to sales guy, who then slips a proxy 
form under their noses. „Just sign this, mate,‟ he oozes. „It's standard 
practice; saves you from having to turn up at all those boring 
meetings‟” (Jimmy Thompson, Flat Chat, 12 April 2008). 
At the time of writing, some Australian states had outlawed this practice while other 
jurisdictions, despite recent legislative changes being implemented, had not moved 
to ban the transfer of proxy voting at purchase to the developer, not recognising it 
as a conflict of interest situation.  
The contribution that both these sites make to the owner corporation is real. Both 
are monitored by people with legal expertise and offer advice that is consistent with 
NSW legislation. However there is no reciprocal organisation for other states and 
territories where strata title mechanisms exist. 
5.4.3.1 Professionalism  
The dominant discussion presented by the print media was that committees were 
better off engaging professional strata managers who had knowledge and 
experience of matters that may be alien to volunteer committee members. 
Professionalism is closely linked to areas of specialised knowledge and 
competence. Giddens assures us that expertise and the need for expert knowledge 
are key concepts within the structure and agency debate that assist in the 
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development of mutual knowledge impacting on integration practices of shared 
norms, values and meaning. While Susan Welling‟s article presented a range of 
options, the main focus was on a range of professional help that could be 
purchased: 
„A strata manager's biggest strength is that he's probably seen a 
situation just like yours somewhere else, so it's a really good idea to 
pick his brains‟ (Susan Wellings, When you need a helping hand, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 2008). 
Strata managers purport to be „experts‟ which is their selling point. Placing strata 
managers in the position of professionals implies that conversely, owners and 
volunteer run committees are not professional and unable to manage without help. 
An assessment of agency competency needs to be made whether the agent is the 
owner representative or an external manager. There were clear plugs for engaging 
a strata industry professional. Presumably engaging an industry professional who 
is an institute member will solve all questions of communication and conflict. They 
will be the „right‟ strata manager. Other industry professionals were mentioned as 
well as strata managers. Building managers or caretakers were mentioned along 
with the need for professional mediation services and solicitors. A number of 
specific business names were mentioned, which left the impression of an 
„infomercial‟ rather than journalistic excellence. 
There is only one mention of the volunteer nature of owner corporations within the 
media articles. This was in direct contrast to strata managers who were mentioned 
more often. committees of management apply high levels of professionalism. In 
Pouder and Clark‟s (2009) study, the volunteers applied strategic thinking, goal 
setting and business planning and implementation to their gated community 
indicating a high level of professionalism amongst the volunteers. In short they 
knew where they wanted to go, approximately how long it would take to get there, 
had assessed their resources and set about creating a cohesive community into 
which the majority of owners had bought. They were able to do this because the 
committee members came from a business background and were able to formulate 
vision statements and implementation plans which directed their building 
manager‟s activities. In Pouder and Clark‟s (2009) study, the owner corporation 
was able to apply „expertise‟ to their activities because of the committee‟s high skill 
level.  
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Industry websites however are all about industry expertise. Again perusal of these 
sites was left to information that was in the public domain. Industry websites are 
there to support industry professionals, not owners or prospective purchasers. 
„The National Community Titles Institute (NCTI) is the industry 
association representing the professional strata and community title 
managers and their suppliers to the sector across Australia‟ (NCTI 
2008, www.ntci.org.au accessed 28 April 2008)
13
. 
When industry professionals call for change, it must be noted from the above 
statement that they do so from an egocentric viewpoint and are not necessarily 
working in the best interests of the owners who employ them on individual 
contracts. Three types of membership are available, that of owner corporation 
managers, suppliers to the owner corporation industry, and affiliate membership. 
An individual owner, or committee member is unable to join under any of these 
categories.  
Industry websites indicated that they had a high degree of professionalism. 
However `the frequent spelling mistakes on their web-pages detracted from this 
image. Much of the information available was about building and shaping the 
industry rather than aimed at providing information about solving specific existing 
issues. The industry websites were clear in their intention to lobby governments, 
influence policy, and initiate change within the sector.   
„… advocate and lobby for the sector and present to government, the 
public and other bodies as appropriate, the issues relevant to the 
sector‟ (NCTI 2008, www.ntci.org.au accessed 28 April 2008) 
The industry was also clear about the need for greater education. However the 
need for education appeared to be limited to industry professionals, rather than 
educating the public prior to purchase. Nor did it extend to the need for owners and 
committee members to be educated in their ongoing obligations towards the 
community, understanding key concepts of governance such as transparency and 
accountability, engender trust, life participation or engender owner cohesion. Nor 
do the sites refer owners to other government or non-profit websites. This failure 
represents a key drawback to the industry sites.  
                                                          
13
 The National Community Titles Institute (NCTI) changed its name to Strata Communities Australia 
in 2012 
 
 Page    143 
  
 
5.4.3.2 Contractual arrangements 
Slack et al. (2004) concede that sourcing decisions affect quality, speed, 
dependability, flexibility and cost. Because of the contractual obligations associated 
with buying in expertise, sourcing strategy is also closely related to both 
governance issues and levels of professionalism.  Discussion of competence 
brings this discussion full circle. The focus of this section is on contractual 
arrangements between developer and purchaser (past time-space), and the 
committee of management and the expertise they purchase (present time-space). 
Contracts are rarely mentioned and specific clauses in contracts not stated. 
However:  
„The Department of Consumer Protection said consumers should be 
wary when buying off the plan. Spokesman Mike Winchester said 
there was no specific contract for these purchases. `Contracts can 
contain clauses that allow the developer to withdraw from the sale or 
the project at any time before settlement‟, he said. `Some contracts 
contain clauses that allow developers to alter the size of the building, 
size of the rooms, and fixtures without the buyer's consent‟ (Anger 
over two-year wait, The Sunday Times (Perth), 27 April 2008). 
The above article alerts prospective purchasers to contractual pitfalls when 
purchasing, highlighting the agency exhibited by developers in honing the contracts 
to their owner terms. At the same time, the lack of agency experienced by 
purchasers is evident in the following scenario. 
 „Your brand new off-the-plan apartment has more leaks than a 
whistleblowers' convention. Your building manager has been selling 
unit master keys on eBay. And pets are running riot throughout the 
common property. Who ya gonna call‟ (Susan Wellings, When you 
need a helping hand, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 2008). 
The article continues citing problems that may be encountered and industry 
professionals that may be able to assist. However none of the articles referred 
owners to the legislative web sites, consumer affair websites or other government 
run websites that may offer less commercially motivated and more independent 
assistance. This article and others referred owners and committee members to the 
Strata Title Management Institute (now Strata Community Australia) which is an 
industry based organisation. Further discussion of this organisation is detailed 
under the industry web sites section. The media article becomes another ritual that 
supports the legitimation of a burgeoning industry in which owners do not need to 
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be concerned with the day to day running of their complex. Thus it supports a 
structural view of the strata industry in which the exercise of agency by individual 
owners is neither required nor desired. 
What is missing from this conversation, and indeed from all the media articles and 
infomercials, is the need for clear contracts that protect both the owner committees 
and the industry professionals, and the need for owner committees to actively 
manage the contractual obligations that they have with strata managers, building 
managers or other contracted parties. This is because media articles are intended 
to sell or generate advertising revenue rather than inform the public. Yet there 
needs to be a balance between information and sale where housing futures are at 
stake. 
Government websites assisted in filling this gap to some extent. Surprisingly, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) also came up in the 
search criteria. However, the information on this website was limited to the 
business directory which directed searchers to the strata industry web site rather 
than the state based consumer or legislative websites. This is interesting because 
the ACCC is there to protect and advise consumers rather than act as a referral to 
businesses. In doing this it is actually supporting the structural status quo while 
limiting the agency of purchasers it is sworn to protect.  
State based websites fared better. They consisted of two types which were evenly 
distributed. Half related to legislative websites which contained copies of the 
relevant state based legislation. I do not intend to comment on these websites. The 
remaining websites contained information and information booklets about living in a 
strata community and summaries of duties of the corporation. However a 
prospective purchaser would need to be aware of the existence of the governing 
body and terminology in order to effectively search and find these sites. Thus the 
knowledge required to run an owner corporation remains hidden from the majority 
of prospective purchasers and their owners. The development of mutual 
knowledge between the owners and structurally aligned parties such as strata 
managers, remains limited. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented content analysis of the strata environment as 
presented by Australian media, blogs and government and industry web sites. It 
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presents a picture in time. Through a process of elimination, relevant websites and 
media articles were thematically sorted according to the information they contained.  
The media generally depicted strata titled properties as being convenient, luxurious 
and contemporary, in some cases maintenance free. They were targeted to 
specific age and cultural groups rather than a community which one joins through 
the contract mechanism at purchase. Levies, by-laws and insurance issues 
appeared rarely, and were primarily limited to websites, rather than the media. The 
capacity of owners to oversee their contractual obligations, whether with strata 
managers or with owners in terms of application of by-laws and levies, is an 
important part of building capacity that requires a sound knowledge and skills 
based approach. However this was not evidenced within the media articles or 
websites in this phase of the study.  These findings differ from Blandy and Lister‟s 
(2006) work which found that security and surveillance were important 
considerations for prospective purchasers. This research fills a gap left between 
two key studies into how purchasers become aware of their obligations within the 
strata environment.  
This chapter conceptualised the Australian experience of buying strata property as 
one of luxury, convenience, and low maintenance. Target groups for off-the plan 
sales aimed at specific market segments. The emotion of community was strong, 
though contractual linkages between owners were downplayed. Low strata fees 
were seen as a good thing.  There is little discussion of the costs involved in strata 
living with most real estate advertisements failing to mention these costs. The link 
between governance structures, participation and the purchase of expertise advice 
through the engagement of a strata manager identified in the literature review was 
rarely raised. While the media do not demonstrate that positive images influence 
people, these media messages can be contrasted with the problems described in 
the next few chapters. To further probe this area, I used a semi structured interview 
process. There were fourteen participants, comprised of committee chairs and 
strata managers. 
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Chapter 6 - The Gilded Cage 
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6.0 Introduction 
Governance, including transparency and accountability of processes, trust and 
participation of stakeholders, begins with the developer when the organisation is 
formed. As the previous chapter noted, the purchaser gains little knowledge of the 
owner corporation, its structure, processes and procedures or the rights, 
responsibilities and restrictions during the purchase stage. How the developer sets 
up the owner corporation influences the owner‟s actions and ability to act. The 
structural forces are set in motion by the developer. The banking and insurance 
industries, developer, councils and construction industries are the main drivers of 
change at this stage. The owners have not taken possession of the organisation 
because the property sale has not yet been finalised. Whereas once the owners 
have taken control of the organisation, agency may be demonstrated through the 
actions of owners, but be influenced by the residual effect of structural forces and 
where the loyalties of the strata manager lie. The future stage of the organisation is 
not part of this thesis, as none of the interviews took place under demolition 
circumstances.  
This chapter considers the transparency and accountability of processes, 
particularly in relation to the „buying expertise‟ of strata managers. It goes on to 
consider issues of trust, participation and stakeholder cohesion specifically 
between the committee, its members and the strata manager where one has been 
nominated. This is achieved through discussion of stakeholder relationships and 
by-laws. Thirdly, the extent to which there is either a conflict or an alignment of 
interests between the strata manager and owner corporation is commented on.   
To cover this ground, interviews from both strata managers and committees of 
management are drawn upon.  
6.1 Governance, developers and the buy-in 
stage 
In the Australian context, the creation of strata titled properties in the form of 
apartments and master planned communities is a growth business. Developers 
seek to maximise profit through increased utilization of land size. State and local 
government policies, such as the Building Better Cities Program (FAHCSIA 2012), 
places emphasis on increased density as a way of maximising cost efficiencies in 
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the public sector. This is facilitated through planning practices. As noted in Figure 6 
(Structuration and Strata) this occurs in the past timeframe. 
The literature review refers to the owner corporation as an organisation that is set 
up with a specific governance structure by the developer. That is, the rules of 
operation and resources of the organisation are determined by the developer and 
to some extent by the governing legislation influenced by key industry players. The 
extent to which the processes that create an owner corporation and its committee 
of management meet the functions of an organisation with demonstrable 
governance are discussed. In the context of this analysis, people enter the strata 
organisation as an owner or as a strata manager. The committee is formed under 
legislation on paper by the developer, and each individually titled property is sold 
either off the plan or shortly thereafter. Each individual property title is tied to the 
property that is held in common.   
Developers feature strongly at several stages. There are at least nine ways in 
which developers may influence the functioning of the organisation (Altmann 
2012b).  Altmann summarised them as: 
(1) developers influence the legislative and political processes and the 
formation of policy to their advantage (Butler-Bowden & Pickett 2007).  
(2) developers conspire with municipalities to create a supply driven economy 
in multi-owned dwellings (Blakely & Snyder 1999).  
(3) developers determine the standard to which property is built.  
(4) developers determine the legal and contractual documents (McKenzie 
2006; Clarke 2006).  
(5) developers may determine the number and type of sub-committees, 
influencing the committee structure (Townshend 2006). 
(6) developers may appoint themselves as the property manager for the 
complex (Clarke 2006).   
(7) Developers‟ ability to set up multiple third party contracts on advantageous 
terms (for the developer) limit the owner corporation‟s ability for self 
determination (Sherry 2010).  
(8) developers may remain an owner through the performing stage of the 
organisation enabling them to sit on the committee as an owner. The 
developer may be the only person on the committee able to fully 
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comprehend the governing documents and the ramifications of the 
decisions made.  
(9) developers influence the owner corporation through marketing campaigns 
often failing to mention the nature of the governing documents or collective 
nature of belonging (Blakely & Snyder 1999).  
 
These interviews however highlighted yet another developer-limiting influence on 
the functioning of the committee of management. For one committee, the way in 
which the complex was built caused difficulties with compliance processes and 
inspection regimes: 
we have groundwater monitoring and we have a sheet pile wall … 
there's no way to get under the building to actually check the sheet 
pile wall, because it's on council land to get under it. … It‟s letter after 
letter after letter … only one tower is supposedly meant to maintain it, 
which is ours (Chair K). 
Interestingly, this complex was lauded for its innovative design during the design 
and development stages, promising a luxurious lifestyle to prospective purchasers.  
Despite this, it had severe design flaws which impacted on the viability of the 
owner corporation to maintain the appropriate inspection regimes once the building 
physically existed. The structural piled footing system required access from an 
adjoining land owner (the council) in order to facilitate the mandatory inspection 
regime. The council was party to the creation of the organisation and provided 
subdivision, planning and building approval permits for the precinct and the 
buildings. The complex ran the risk of becoming non-compliant and the council 
revoking the occupancy certificate because the appropriate inspections had not 
been carried out. However as adjoining owner, the council refused access. The 
lack of forethought about such issues at the design and approval stage highlights a 
serious lack of concern for the functionality of the building once the building is 
occupied, to the extent that it may ultimately impact on the building‟s ability to 
remain fit-for-purpose. Within this situation, it is the council that sets the rules and 
controls the resources. Despite the specialised knowledge of both parties, a shared 
understanding of the issues is lacking leading to a breakdown in communication. 
The unintended future consequences may well be that the inspection regime is not 
carried out and the „certificates of occupancy‟ revoked, leaving owners and tenants 
illegally occupying their dwelling. 
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As indicated in the above statement, the significant cost of maintaining the 
inspection regime and maintenance works was attributed to one building rather 
than the whole precinct which comprised several tower buildings attached to the 
one strata plan (see Figure 5). The signification for owners is that they are bearing 
an unjust cost that should be shared by all owners within the strata scheme. The 
apportioning of ongoing maintenance liabilities is a sticky issue creating unjust cost 
imposts upon future property owners. In this instance the annual levy payment 
increased by $8,000-10,000 per owner per annum to cover the piling inspection 
and repair regime in only one of the four buildings on the site even through all 
buildings benefited. The level of specialised knowledge required to identify such 
issues by prospective purchasers is significant.  Developers initially sell units „off 
the plan‟ before the attribution of cost liability has been apportioned to individual 
buildings. The processes involved make transparency of liability and cost to 
individual owners impossible to identify at the off the plan stage with purchasers 
buying into the complex „blind‟. The apportioning of maintenance costs throughout 
the life of the building are a significant bugbear of strata property owners, and this 
was bought to the fore in Queensland‟s 2004 landmark decision in the Centerpoint 
Case
14
  which has the potential to alter the way in which levy payments are 
apportioned between owners.  
The two issues raised here show a lack of dovetailing of processes and little 
understanding of how the physical creation of a building and the functioning of the 
organisation impact upon each other, creating difficulties with ongoing process 
compliance. The integrated practices adhere to expected rituals, norms and values. 
However, the shared meaning between the owners and committee of management 
                                                          
14 The Centrepoint building is located at 69 Leichhardt Street, Spring Hill, Queensland . The 
decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal was made on 25 June 2004. See Fischer & Ors v 
Body Corporate for Centrepoint Community Title Scheme 7779 [2004] QCA 214, available 
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QCA/2004/214.html 
This is a landmark case because the decision enforced both a ‘contribution schedule lots’ 
and ‘interest schedule lots’ in which the respective contributions of the apartment owners 
to the maintenance cost and thus levy amounts payable were re-determined according to 
the new schedule. The effect of the enforceable change was that those owners who had 
previously enjoyed low fees were significantly disadvantaged while those had previously 
paid high levies had significant cuts to their levy payments.  As a result of the 
redistribution of levies owners reported increased payments of up to $400 per week, thus 
making their units unaffordable.  
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are at odds with the developer, design professionals and council‟s view.  
Signification in a Giddens‟ sense is lost to this latter group and the committee of 
management are effectively hamstrung by the rules and resources controlled by 
the council. Whether the developer and council action was intended or unintended 
remains unclear in this scenario. 
6.1.1 Trust and building defects 
Other issues were raised by strata managers and committee members in relation 
to the handling of building defects. For example, Chair K went on to discuss a 
situation that occurred at the defects liability stage in which the developer had 
failed to act, causing significant disruption at a later stage.  
But the previous management company had not followed up the 
reports and even though they were sent registered mail at my request 
to the developer and the builder,  the developer … we've found out 
since, handed them on to someone else and didn't do anything with 
them, so never sent them to head office.  Then I found out that the girl, 
which sometimes unfortunately they're like secretaries, as I call them, 
then in her wonderful wisdom sent it to the defects person and by the 
same wisdom it never got any further than him.  So, hence we now 
have to have a whole new roof rebuilt (Chair K). 
Subsequent documents supplied by the owner corporation indicated that a problem 
with the roofing structure and requests for the developer and builder to inspect had 
occurred within six months of the building being occupied. However no action was 
taken by the construction company, developer or the developer appointed strata 
manager with the result the roof failed significantly during a storm event leaving 
residents homeless. Thus the rules and resources worked in the favour of the 
developer since they effectively limited action by the owner corporation. There are 
significant issues with accountability in this dialogue which impact the amount of 
trust that is eventually reposed in the strata management company.  The „girl‟ in 
this instance is actually the strata manager. Her role and authority has been 
significantly downplayed as trust dwindled. The role of strata manager has been 
relegated to that of a „secretary‟, a term used in a derogatory sense. The strata 
management company is no longer seen in terms of providing „expert‟ advice to the 
organisation as outlined by Drucker (1990). Using structuration theory, I note that 
the developer was able to bend the rules to his or her will. The lack of response 
from the developer is part of his or her value system. However, because the value 
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system is not shared by the owners, the result is a lack of trust in the developer 
and strata manager. The unintended outcome is evidenced by the derogatory 
comments that downgrade the strata manager to a „secretary‟. 
The ability of strata managers to navigate and guide owner committees through the 
defects liability period is fraught with conflict of interest issues. As one strata 
manager put it: 
well basically the (previous strata) manager just didn‟t want to do it. 
They had a relationship with the developer and didn‟t want to strain 
that relationship by chasing up the defects on behalf of the owners‟ 
corporation (Strata Manager D). 
The nurturing of close relationships between strata managers and developers is 
not unusual as noted by Strata Manager F:  
I am actually personal friends of the developer … as one professional 
to another (Strata Manager F). 
In regional townships with smaller populations, perhaps the closer personal ties are 
more understandable. However it was also noted that some strata managers 
actively seek out large developments in the early stages in order to secure ongoing 
business: 
We are quite well placed with the directors of that organisation so that 
we would expect to have a role to play and I guess that, the circles I 
move in, I talk to a lot of developers. The areas that I don‟t market as 
well, are the interstate developments and that is probably why I‟ve 
taken the time to come here today and rub shoulders with these 
people because it is probable that 80% of the developments are going 
to come from Melbourne anyway (Strata Manager G). 
Two conflicting scenarios arise from this. Some strata managers see the need to 
maintain ties to developers in order to secure work as desirable, while others find 
close association with developers as a negative. Both groups are exercising 
purposive agency albeit with a different outcome that meets the individual strata 
manager‟s needs. Not all strata managers believe that being appointed by the 
developer as the initial strata manager is a good move. As one person put it, there 
is a lot of additional work for the strata manager in these initial stages in sorting out 
building defects that can place a severe strain on relationships.   
What we tend to find in the industry is that whoever has the facility 
management contract coming out of the development stage, does not 
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last long. There are too many disgruntled owners. Peoples‟ cars have 
been leaked on and the pool is leaking and blah blah. (Strata Manager 
H). 
Relationships between the strata manager, committee of management and 
developer/builder can become so strained that owners generally appoint a different 
strata manager at the first opportunity. Thus the reflexive monitoring of the situation 
by owners leads to an exercise of agency.  Whether the consequences of these 
strata manager – developer ties for owner committees are positive or negative, 
depends on how transparent the process is, and how accountable the strata 
manager remains towards the owner corporation, rather than the developer. 
Oh well you get a chance with a new build to actually put some of 
those potential issues to rights from the start.  In this case I wasn‟t 
there before titles issued which means that I did not have a say in 
terms of property boundary‟s location, centre of wall or outside of wall 
or those sorts of things which I wish I had (Strata Manager G). 
In this instance, the strata manager highlights the influence that the developer has 
in setting up the boundaries between each individual‟s private ownership and the 
shared common areas within the building complex. Whereas the developer may 
see these boundaries as relatively unimportant, apportioning them in an arbitrary 
way influences the levy allocation and impacts on stakeholder relationships 
throughout the occupation of the complex and the management period of the 
organisation. The location of property boundaries may also affect what 
maintenance and retrofitting options are available to the owner corporation. This is 
because any change to the physical structure or common use services at a later 
date needs to match the common boundaries identified on the certificate of title for 
each property within the scheme. Thus an upgrade to individual water meters at a 
later stage may include the physical and legal costs associated with changes to the 
title documents for each owner.  An experienced strata manager working with the 
developer at this early stage may be able to provide specialist advice on the best 
placement of boundaries, to facilitate stronger relationships throughout the life of 
the owner corporation. Where this type of closer association does exist, 
transparency of process may become blurred and accountability to the owner 
corporation jeopardised though conflict of interest situations. The lines of 
accountability between whom the strata manager is employed by and working for, 
begin to disintegrate.  
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6.1.2 Trust, estate agents and the buy-in stage 
While not all strata managers are aligned with the developer during the planning 
and construction stage of a strata complex, there is no doubt that real estate 
agents will often align themselves with the developer in order to make the sale. 
There is no conflict of interest here for the estate agent. The real estate agent‟s 
commission is clearly paid for by the developer. In some instances the estate agent 
is a subsidiary company of the developer as seen in the following extract: 
The developer also holds the real estate contract under their 
associated company (Chair C). 
Yet issues still arise over what lengths estate agents will go to in order to make a 
sale particularly at the off the plan stage. As this strata manager reports: 
The issue was what the real estate agents told the prospective buyers 
was going to be the entitlements and body corporate fees before we 
started. We came up with a budget based on the actual expense 
items and then allocated the entitlement structure. There was a 
substantial variation and of course the purchasers were not happy 
(Strata Manager G). 
The issue here is that when the purchaser does try to obtain accurate information 
prior to purchase, the information necessary to make an informed decision is not 
always available, making decisions flawed. The reference made by Strata Manager 
G to „entitlements‟ harks back to the „piling‟ issue raised by Chair K. Even where 
correct maintenance figures are available, changes to entitlement allocation lack 
transparency and affect an owner‟s financial decision-making capacity. Within 
these interviews, councils, developers, construction companies, estate agents and 
strata managers align themselves in some, but not all instances, at the structural 
level in order to sell to gullible or uninformed consumers. There is little place for 
owner agency which is stymied at the planning, construction, sale, defects and 
management stages. 
For many owners, buying off the plan and issues of defects are not an issue. 
Owners purchase into a complex that has been in existence for some years. The 
interviews conducted as part of this thesis, were with well-educated and articulate 
owners. Some owned other strata titled properties and were familiar with the 
different layers of shared ownership and governing organisations. Despite this, 
experienced purchasers had difficulty understanding process and felt that they 
were not adequately protected. First time purchasers also found the process 
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difficult. The difficulties for first home owners of this type of property were 
highlighted particularly for Chairs L and M: 
when I bought in I don‟t think we really understood that we really 
needed to be a body corporate. You know, in my mind they were 
separately titled, so that was kind of a learning curve. So the real 
estate had completely downplayed this aspect of living I think (Chair 
M). 
In Victoria the owner corporation is required to supply information as part of the 
sale documents for existing strata titled property. The supply of the appropriate 
documentation signed off by the owner corporation is required by Section 32 of the 
Owner Corporations Act (Victoria) 2006. Included in the certification are details of 
current and unpaid fees and charges, special levies, insurance cover details, 
balance of funds held, agreements, licences and leases affecting the common 
property, by-laws, and legal proceedings. The disclosure at point of sale is seen as 
informing owners about the changed relationship between owners and 
responsibility for common property issues including by-laws and levies. However 
despite the system being in place for several years, difficulties with the system 
were still reported by both strata managers and owners: 
I‟ve had a few where I‟ve actually taken over the complex and I was 
initially a bit tardy registering with Land Victoria that I was the 
manager for all addressed notices, so a few  of the units sold within 
this complex and I asked the question „so how did the owners 
corporation  certificate get signed? Who did that?‟ And you get a fairly 
warm and fuzzy answer about the real estate, or the lot owner just put 
something together on that. So it is not something that is as 
professional as it should be to protect the purchaser (Strata Manager 
F). 
Structurally, it highlights a lack of accountability for strata managers and estate 
agents within the system. There are no checks and balances in the system that 
ensure strata managers act in a timely manner. Nor are there penalties for a failure 
to act in a timely manner. This strata manager recognises that he has a role to play 
in ensuring that appropriate disclosure occurs, and apportions the lack of 
transparency for incoming owners to his own „tardiness‟ in completing the 
registration process. His reflexive monitoring of the strata schemes he is 
responsible for is poor, leading to mistrust in the system as a whole. There is little 
recognition by the strata manager or strata industry of the potential financial impact 
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to incoming owners where transparency fails due to non or incorrect disclosure. 
The rules are in place, yet the ritual and norms are brushed to one side, interfering 
with shared meaning. This systemic failure of transparency and accountability is 
not addressed within the current legislative processes. The ability of estate agents 
and owners to engage in creative documentation is not considered a serious issue 
by industry professionals, but it is a serious issue for prospective purchasers and 
owners for whom it represents serious breach of trust. Reputationally it has the 
possibility of adversely affecting the strata industry as a whole: 
My purchase was mismanaged … there was an issue with the 
common property which was about to face a 15 year period for a claim 
of adverse possession …. the estate agent has sold four more 
properties without the properly completed forms (Chair L). 
This first-time purchaser claims that she would not have purchased had she known 
the difficulties resultant from the adverse possession claim over common property. 
The claim was known to the estate agent who was also the strata manager as well 
as the committee of management. Throughout her interview, a sense of 
powerlessness in the system was evident. Her views are coloured by other issues 
within the complex and the fact that she sees herself as an unwilling owner.  
I knew that I had just settled my father‟s estate and was likely to join 
the bourgeoisie which was not what I wanted to do or become a land 
owner anyway. ... All these things went to my solicitor. …  Now of 
course their comeback is „you‟re the purchaser, you should have 
informed yourself‟ (Chair  L). 
Yet her defence is clear. She was new to home ownership, did not understand that 
she was joining an organisation and expected there to be something in place to 
inform her. The processes designed to protect her failed because the disclosure 
documents were incomplete and filled in by the estate agent with the dual role of 
strata manager. There was nothing to highlight the conflict of interest between the 
two roles. The importance of the documents as part of the sale process was not 
highlighted and they were passed onto her solicitor whom she expected to assist 
and offer her some protection. However even this failed, with the solicitor placing 
responsibility back onto the purchaser. For first home purchasers used to rental 
tenancies or free hold suburban title, identifying that there is a governing 
organisation is difficult. Understanding the importance of a valid Section 32 
documentation, or more importantly, how to identify an invalid Section 32 
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document attached to a contract for sale, is like asking someone who has just 
mastered the art of addition to verify an algebraic equation.  
The onus here should not rest with the prospective purchaser. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, there is little in the current Australian print media to alert the public as to 
what to expect during the pre-purchase and purchase stages. Lifestyle shows, for 
instance, predominantly focus on freehold title situations in which no owner 
organisation exists. The majority of Australians grow up in suburban freehold 
allotments where joining an organisation is not mandatory to property ownership. 
As Mills (1958, p. 304) asserts, in a mass society, the dominant communication is 
the formal media in which people are mere media market segments that media 
stories can be fed to. The focus of the print media in this instance, is on the 
amenity of the property and how wonderful it will be living there as part of the sales 
pitch, a position consistent with the views expressed in the previous chapter. As 
such developers and estate agents feel no need to draw attention to the 
organisation which stands behind the strata titled property, or the contractual 
obligations to neighbours or the organisation as a whole.  
I really, really wish that I had been more astute when I purchased into 
this complex. We saw the (owner corporation) money was in the bank, 
but we did not make enough enquiries into the age and condition of 
the plant and equipment. And particularly the lack of a central service 
compliance. If I had been more savvy in those areas, I would have 
seen that that surplus $200,000 was not going to last.  Probably ten 
months only (Strata Manager & Chair H). 
In the above scenario, the owner has previous experience of living and owning 
within the strata title environment. The documents were provided at point of sale, 
and the prospective purchaser knew their importance and had a background in real 
property conveyancing. However, even for a knowledgeable purchaser, there were 
difficulties in understanding the importance of the financial figures provided. Within 
the strata industry, it is not just a straight transfer of property that is at issue. The 
purchaser is required to clarify the age and condition of the plant and equipment 
within the individual property title and the common property, and make an 
assessment of whether the organisational funds available will offset any plant 
deficiencies. The transfer of residential real estate property has entered into 
commercial territory when this occurs. Thus the specialised knowledge is lacking, 
even among those supposedly „in the know‟ leading to a breakdown in reflexive 
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monitoring of the situation and affecting the agency that purchasers exhibit.  The 
transparency of process is severely jeopardised for the lay person as indicated 
previously in Blandy and Lister‟s (2006) research.  It is clear from the above 
interviews, that even when steps are in place that should highlight to prospective 
purchasers that they are entering into an association with other owners,  the 
process is less than rigorous, with the possibility of severe financial impact to new 
owners. 
However, not all of the difficulties lie with the vendor. This strata manager 
highlights deficiencies in the sale process to both the vendor and the purchaser 
through their solicitor. 
Technically you are reliant on both the purchaser and the seller to fulfil 
their role and fulfil it properly. And when I say that I mean, if I am a 
seller I will pay a solicitor for conveyance, and then the purchaser‟s 
solicitor will come back and say „well send us a notice to say the 
property is now sold and this is the new owner‟ and I can tell you that 
80% of the time that information is incorrect (Strata Manager B). 
Transparency and accountability during the purchase process is reliant on many 
players, as highlighted by the above Strata Manager, and there are many stages at 
which these processes are jeopardised by rituals and norms that are ineffective for 
other actors. However, when a strata manager assumes that eighty per cent of 
strata property transfers are incorrect, then it should be clear that there are 
significant process flaws that need to be strengthened in order to restore trust in 
the system of real estate property transfer. It is no longer a case of „buyer beware‟ 
and contractual norms of purchase and sale, since purchasers may be said to be 
buying under false pretences once invalid documents are provided as part of the 
purchase process. Owners seeking to purchase into a strata titled property cannot 
be said to have the full benefit of the law under these circumstances. However, 
because so few of these issues appear to be challenged, structural change that 
assists purchasers is unlikely to occur. I turn now from what occurs during the 
purchase stage to issues of trust, participation and stakeholder cohesion – all 
required for sound governance during the functioning stage of the owner 
corporation. 
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6.2 Trust, participation and stakeholder 
cohesion  
Thus far issues of transparency, accountability, systemic failures in organisational 
formation and the purchase process have been highlighted. This section focuses 
on what in Figure 6 (Structuration and Strata) is called the present phase of the 
organisation since this is the period where interaction between the strata manager 
and the owner corporation occurs. That is what happens when the organisation 
has been in existence for some period of time. What role does the strata manager 
take in facilitating openness, transparency and accountability, trust and 
participation? At this stage, responsibility for running the organisation and control 
of the common property are considered to have been passed to the owner 
committee of management. There is discussion as to how much responsibility the 
strata manager has, and how his or her role has been influenced by the developer. 
As such there are five key stakeholder groups that are represented within this 
discussion – developers; estate agents; strata managers; committees of 
management and owners. Applying Giddens‟ (1993) approach, the organisation 
provides a setting within which individual agency is able to occur. However whether 
this is the case will depend on differing levels of understanding and participation in 
the organisation. As with the previous section, information was sought during 
interviews with both strata managers and committee members.  
6.2.1 Who are you and what do you do? 
Where owners have not been privy to, or understood the sale documents, owners 
may be unclear as to what the role of the strata manager is. Purchasers that did 
not understand the import of the sale documents, or had no idea what a strata 
development was, do not appear in isolation according to strata managers: 
I‟ll say again, around about 40% of the new owners that come in to the 
business or come into the owners corporation the first thing they will 
say are “well who are you, I don‟t know anything about you.  What do 
you do for me” (Strata Manager B). 
Whereas the strata manager is quite clear about his or her role within the 
organisation: 
I see the role of body corporate manager as really being a facilitator 
and an administrator for the owners corporation (Strata Manager F). 
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The role of the owner corporation as an organisation in decision making is quite 
clear to this strata manager. He is there to facilitate decision-making but not make 
decisions. His role is to facilitate outcomes and expedite paperwork which adds to 
transparency of decision making processes as shown in the following extract: 
There is quite a lot of paperwork or administration that you are 
required to maintain now under the Act which is all good because it 
helps with transparency. That‟s what I‟m here for (Strata Manager F). 
Understanding the role of the strata manager is crucial for committees of 
management. There were instances where a strata manager had been employed, 
but his or her role was not understood by participants: 
You try to explain to them, we don‟t make the rules, our job is just to 
implement your decisions. They can‟t do it. They are happy to have a 
lot of discussions. Ra Ra Ra, lots of barking but no bite (Strata 
Manager B). 
Thus shared meaning was missing within this context according to Giddens‟ 
approach which in turn affects the integrated practices. The competence required 
to undertake reflexive monitoring of the situation is missing, leading to a 
breakdown in agency being exercised. According to strata managers, a substantial 
number of purchasers do not understand the nature of the complexes they are 
buying into. They do not understand the nature of shared space within the complex, 
and may not have heard of the governing organisation, the governing legislation or 
the need for a strata manager. The fact that prospective purchasers have access 
to the owner corporation‟s certificate at the point of sale as a guide to purchasers 
appears void, because no-one has told them that the attachments are important to 
their financial and living arrangements. They are just documents that go to a 
solicitor. A substantial number of complexes appear non-compliant with the 
paperwork anyway. The transparency of the system is jeopardized. Accountability 
is shifted back onto the purchaser who is expected to have somehow surmised that 
the system was broken and undertaken more rigorous inquiry, though from whom 
this information might be gleaned is not clear. For purchasers, their first 
acquaintance with the complex system of rules and by-laws governing the common 
property and their interaction with other owners, is the strata manager with a bill in 
hand. Mistrust of a system they have not understood develops as a result.  
Whereas strata managers are clear as to their role in facilitating decisions, the fact 
that a strata manager has been employed, appears to be a chance for some 
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owners to offload responsibility for their strata complex. As a result participation in 
organisational processes is diminished:  
These people are just not willing to participate. And they assume that 
you are the manager, you sort it out. … Basically you need at least 
one person to turn up.  All that we can do is continue to do what was 
done the year (Strata Manager B). 
For owner corporations, the annual general meeting (AGM) is a key ritual that 
occurs at regular intervals along with the election of representatives. However 
where the role of the owner within the organisation is not understood, or the owner 
chooses not to exercise their voting rights, the ritual has the capacity to lack 
legitimation because no-one turns up to the meetings. It was further reported by 
this strata manager that only six per cent of owners turned up at an AGM with a 
much smaller number being willing to actively participate. He had attended 
meetings in which no-one had turned up at all. These statements illustrate a clear 
abdication of responsibility by some owners from the owner corporation. This 
apathy may be clearly linked to the purchaser‟s initial understanding that they were 
joining an organisation in the first instance. However participation was seen as a 
key component of transparency and accountability of the overseeing committee. It 
fostered trust in the system, and enabled sound decisions to be reached. With no 
decisions being made, a holding pattern is implemented in which current 
expenditure is not increased to cover rising costs or to renew existing contracts.   
Of course they may just have too many other commitments as Bush and Gamage 
(2001) observed within school boards.  
6.2.2 The committees’ voice 
Yet there are clearly a group of active committee members within this research 
who do understand their need to be involved in the running of strata complexes. 
Four out of the six interviews were with owners that had previously purchased in 
strata complexes, or were aligned to building and estate conveyance industries, 
and therefore could be expected to know of the organisation‟s purpose. For 
committees made up of members that do understand their role in making decisions, 
difficulties may still arise in relation to participation in the processes. The first issue 
is one of interaction with their strata manager: 
One of the big issues here which has made it really difficult, they have 
some kind of a screening on their email systems, that reject emails … 
it was including my email (Chair C). 
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Screening of emails by strata managers to the point where correspondence was 
not actioned constituted a significant issue for owner corporations. Three of the 
committee members interviewed reported that filtering of emails by their strata 
manager was impacting on the ability of the owner corporation to attend to 
business or exercise agency. In particular the inability of strata managers to attend 
to correspondence whether electronic or paper had significantly eroded trust for 
two committees to the point where changes were imminent.  
We have seen no correspondence whatsoever, in or out. … It is never 
tabled.  Never.  … It takes time to be one step ahead. We feel that we 
have to be one step ahead of the strata managers all the time (Chair 
E). 
This particular committee chair put the strata manager to the test and sent written 
correspondence to the committee via the strata manager with the following result:  
When I challenged the strata managers, “George [name changed] did 
not get that letter what have you done with it?”  This young girl running 
our building said “oh I just thought it was a copy of the letter so I 
opened it or something.”  She opened it anyway which she should not 
have done.  He never received the letter.  And I just thought that was 
outrageous (Chair E). 
This scenario describes how the owners tried to act with agency, to take 
responsibility and to make decisions. However they are hampered by the strata 
managers because normal rituals of tabling correspondence, or sending and 
receiving emails are jeopardised by the strata manager. In this sense, strata 
managers are creating their own rules and withholding resources required for the 
smooth functioning of the owner corporation. When correspondence goes missing 
or remains unanswered within an organisation, problems arise that may be critical 
to the running of the organisation. In short business is not  attended to. Complaints 
are not addressed, with the result that individual owners remain unsatisfied. When 
strata management companies fail to address issues raised in correspondence, 
trust in the strata manager is lowered. When the correspondence is not tabled for 
consideration by the owner corporation either, then trust in the committee of 
management also diminishes. Matters raised in the correspondence remain 
unaddressed. When trust in the organisation diminishes, participation levels also 
begin to fall, and accountability diminishes as a result. Falling trust and reduced 
participation can significantly impact on the owner corporation if left unaddressed. 
Chair C reported: 
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I find that people become apathetic. It is too much of a headache. … 
There has been a big turn-over of properties here (Chair C). 
This was not the only time that the issue of people leaving because of an inability 
to get complaints sorted was raised. In the above instance, the unaddressed 
issues were seen as a reason to sell the strata unit and get out of the tangled web 
of contractual ties with other owners. Thus the owner has the right to exercise the 
ultimate act of agency by removing themselves from the organisation with the 
resultant apartment churn outlined by Murphy (1997). 
6.2.2.1 Conflict and by-laws 
One of the key responsibilities for owner corporations is the requirement for 
adhering to by-laws to assist in the smooth functioning of the strata complexes and 
to provide balance between self-interest and the collective interest of all owners. 
The initial purchase contracts bind individual owners to all other owners and 
subject them to the governance provision of by-laws, often set up by the original 
developer. While Australian legislation differs between states, each state does 
have a set of model by-laws that set minimum behavioural standards. By-laws, or 
in Giddens‟ (1993) approach, rules and regulations, may cover maintenance 
standards or behavioural issues. Issues of moderating behaviour between owners 
are still a key responsibility for committees of management and strata managers, 
as it is their duty to enforce existing by-laws and they may recommend new ones to 
address upcoming issues. Even where no specific by-laws are in force, the model 
by-laws take effect. This means that no existing strata complex is without by-laws 
of some sort:  
Half the ones I have just revert to model rules (Chair G). 
It was further reported by the strata managers interviewed that they went to 
reasonable lengths to inform new occupants of the complex‟s by-laws or the rules 
governing the complex: 
If I know that a property or tenancy has changed hands I ask the 
chairman to knock on the door, introduce themselves and hand over a 
copy of the by-laws to the new occupants. It nips trouble in the bud so 
to speak (Strata Manager  G). 
However receiving a copy of the by-laws after purchase or signing a tenancy lease, 
when the new occupants are already committed to the property financially, tends to 
come as a surprise to many owners and tenants: 
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I had no idea these things existed (Chair  L).  
Despite the lack of prior knowledge, strata managers reported that the majority of 
disputes over by-laws fell within three key areas of noise, rubbish disposal and 
parking: 
If you took away those three things then we would be out of a job, 
they take up most of our time (Strata Manager A). 
The committee members that I interviewed for this research tended to agree with 
this assessment. Noise, rubbish disposal and parking spaces were significant 
issues for them. The meaning of shared spaces and resultant appropriate 
behaviour appeared to be lacking, and this may hark back to the lack of mutual 
knowledge about strata living or the failure of collective living within individualistic 
societies, such as Australia. Even complaints about pets appeared to be more 
about the noise they made than any offence that the actual pets give: 
We actually wrote to the anti-dog people and asked them to desist 
their behaviour which was to yell and scream at the top of their voice 
“shut that ruddy dog up”.  We found it to be more provocative than the 
actual dogs barking (Strata Manager G). 
Four of the committee members in this study stated that a complex specific set of 
by-laws were in place when they purchased off the plan. Strata managers identified 
part of their role in assisting developers was to suggest and vet suitable by-laws at 
the planning stage. Three of the five strata managers interviewed stated that they 
had a set of by-laws that they pushed developers and committees to accept: 
We basically have our own set of by-laws that we like to work with. 
That way everything works in the same way (Strata Manager  D). 
Pushing all complexes to work with the same by-laws enables strata managers to 
streamline their operations. Individual employees do not have to spend time 
referring and remembering individual differences between complexes when 
addressing queries from committee members.  However the use of standardised 
sets of by-laws that are drawn up to align with the strata manager‟s business 
removes the committee‟s and the individual owner‟s ability to take charge of their 
individual complexes by limiting individual capacity for change in each complex.  
Where owners exercised agency and actively sought additional by-laws to be 
created, they tended to be specific to the use of particular facility types. For 
example complexes containing swimming pools and gymnasiums were more likely 
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to have additional by-laws pertaining to the use of those facilities and were aimed 
at reducing the likelihood of future adverse insurance claims. 
We have by-laws that ban unaccompanied children from the 
gymnasium. It does not stop them from coming in. It‟s a risk that we 
have to constantly manage (Chair N).   
Thus risk assessment becomes part of the reflexive monitoring of social 
interactions. However seeking compliance with by-laws could become an onerous 
task for committee and strata managers. They took up a significant amount of time 
and were not always a cost effective solution.  Chair E noted that they had included 
by-laws to recoup interest on unpaid levy fees and additional account keeping fees 
for second and third notices. These fees were seen as just, since time costs were 
incurred chasing tardy owners. However Chair N stated that the additional 
administrative costs had been challenged at VCAT and declared void by the 
tribunal: 
For being 14 days late with a payment I was up to over $800 in late 
payment fees so I took the matter to VCAT who found that the fees 
were unjust and in the end I only had to pay about $40 as a late fee.  
The (strata) manager and the rest of the committee were very cross 
(Chair N).   
Thus there was an ever changing landscape for the owner corporation to negotiate 
as the push and pull of structure and agency competed to occupy the disputed 
ground.  Few by-laws appeared to be tested at the tribunal level. A more usual 
response to a by-law disagreement was to challenge the validity of the by-law at 
the committee level. For Chairs N and L, unjust by-laws appeared to be the 
impetus for standing for a committee position in the hope of getting specific by-laws 
over-turned. These committee members were of the belief that the by-laws were 
risk management gone mad.  
… just because one person is a vegetarian and doesn‟t want the smell 
of cooked meat. What is the point in having a balcony if we are not 
allowed to use it? (Chair N) 
The wrangling over structural rules requires constant reflexive monitoring by 
owners as the meaning of by-laws once enacted become apparent.  At the very 
least, the sense of outrage inspired by some by-laws appeared to stimulate 
participation, and thus create better transparency. However this only occurs where 
constant reflexive monitoring of action occurs leading to social action through 
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participation. It also confirms Olson‟s (2000) claim that owners are likely to put their 
own good before that of others, particularly where economic considerations are at 
stake. In Olson‟s view, the greater the number of people involved with an 
organisation or community, the greater the propensity for free-riding. Thus larger 
owner corporations are more likely to experience greater amounts of non-
participation, or owners who do not reflexively monitor the situation regularly. It 
then takes a scenario causing outrage to make them re-tune into what is occurring 
within their organisation, and exercise agency.  
While many of the by-laws related specifically to the use of common property, there 
was an increasing tendency to place limitations on the use of private dwelling 
spaces including balconies through the use of by-laws. Half the committee 
members interviewed had limitations placed on the use of private internal or 
external space such as courtyards and balconies. Limitations to private space 
included use of BBQ‟s as stated above, the type of window furnishings allowed 
(Chair N); cigarette smoking on the balcony banned (Chairs C, K and N); cigarette 
smoking internally banned due to air conditioning reticulation and passive smoking 
concerns (Chairs C, K & L); banning of hanging washing on balconies (Chairs C, K, 
L and N); types of pot plants and their location (Chair L). Even curfews for 
balconies were enforced: 
 It‟s 10 o‟clock on week nights (Chair N). 
The enjoyment of private space within the complexes was therefore severely 
jeopardised for owners, particularly those who had been unaware of the terms 
when signing their contracts. While the rules were in place, the integrated practices 
were often missing leading to this statement: 
It‟s difficult to enforce. We have so much trouble getting the message 
across (Chair K). 
It is noted here that had the participants been drawn largely from master planned 
estates, then the issues raised may have been different. Regardless of the rules, 
owners were still acting with agency and determining their own behaviour rather 
than adhering to the rules of the complex. The failure to adhere to rules is evidence 
that the shared meaning of living within a strata community has been lost.  
The use of by-laws can be summarised in two distinct ways. Firstly, they are used 
by developers and strata managers to uphold the physical standard of the original 
complex and create a sense of sameness between individual dwellings. 
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Maintaining the physical standard of the complex - through limiting „unsightly 
washing or window furnishings‟ assists in attracting purchasers seeking to live 
within that standard of behaviour. Second, by-laws are used as a way to reinforce 
behaviour modification. Sometimes this takes the form of a stick to enforce 
administrative compliance as with the timely payment of levies. At other times the 
purpose is to reduce the risk of public liability claims against the owner corporation 
through limiting anti-social behaviour. However, once in place, by-laws are difficult 
to remove (Douglas et al. 2008). Concern has also been raised regarding  the 
propensity for by-law creation that benefits specific individuals. This may occur 
when owners stand for committee positions with single purpose self-interested 
issues. 
6.2.2.2 Conflict over entrenched interests of owners  
Achieving good governance poses a challenge for an organisation like the owner 
corporation. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) imply that individuals may prioritize their 
own needs above that of the group, claiming that „group good‟ is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for collective action.  The owner corporation has 
a role in enforcing the group good over that of the individual, as it relates to 
common property. Motivations may also be different between large and small 
groups of owners, and this behaviour can be referred to as the “collective action 
problem” highlighted by Olson (1965). It is perhaps the complexity of managing 
stakeholder relationships, as well as the need for good governance that impacts 
most upon owner corporations and influences their capacity to make robust 
decisions. There are clear instances where an individual owner stands to achieve a 
self-interested outcome. Even where the owners appear to have the best interests 
of the complex at heart, it often stems from self-interest: 
One of the questions that I asked at the AGM (prior to being 
nominated for a position on the committee), and asked of the 
committee, was why are you choosing KPMG? It is one of the most 
expensive, if not the most expensive accounting firms (Chair C). 
The above question led to the owner standing for a committee position. However 
the initial interest in who was going to be appointed as auditor was one of cost, 
both to the owner committee and to the individual owner through the levy system. 
The owner had attended the meeting primarily because she was not happy with the 
high cost of levies and wanted to better understand what the levies were being 
spent on. This particular owner was associated with the construction industry in a 
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professional capacity and had a reasonable idea of the cost of running a large 
commercial building as a basis for comparison. It was her familiarity with the 
concept of contracts and tendering processes which ultimately forced change in 
the way the committee functioned, and how the strata manager presented 
quotations. To this extent she bought associated „expertise‟ to the committee of 
management and was able to improve transparency of processes and 
accountability of decision making. Her action benefited herself as well as the 
collective interest of all owners.  
Examples of owner self-interest limiting the functioning of the organisation, or 
impinging on the collective rights of others were also found: 
We all wanted a clothes line. A clothes line! We did not have one 
because the committee chair [at that time] did not want to see other 
people‟s smalls out there in public and blocked change at every 
opportunity (Chair L). 
Here the difficulty of getting a by-law changed is made clear. Owners battle 
bureaucratic processes as well as owner self interest in order to get a by-law 
changed. Goodman and Douglas (2008) report that changing the nature of by-laws 
is difficult with a requirement for seventy-five per cent of owners needing to agree 
to the change. Even when the majority of owners wanted change, they were 
unable to affect it because of the seventy-five per cent rule. With high levels of 
owner disinterest, as outlined earlier in this chapter, getting that percentage to vote 
to remove a by-law is extremely difficult. Many of the by-laws were created by 
advertising them on the basis that if there were no objections, then the new law 
stood. However it was clear that committees and strata managers did not always 
understand the processes required under the Owner Corporations Act 2006 (Vic) 
to make a valid by-law. 
If no-one objects within the 28 days then they become law (Chair B). 
Here then is a major misunderstanding of the provision of the legislation by the 
owners, committee of management and the strata managers. Observers may recall 
that one of the key reasons for employing a strata manager within non-profit 
sectors is to gain expertise that may be lacking in committee members.  Yet in this 
instance, the standard of expertise offered by the management company was not 
sufficient to maintain adherence with legislative requirements. 
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Strata managers have a role to play in managing collective action within the 
complex: 
It was decided with (manager) that the best way to tackle it would be 
through me becoming a committee member and attending meetings. 
That way we could nip things in the bud (Chair N).  
Whether these cosy relationships exist or not will depend on the norms, rituals and 
values established by the strata manager. The entrenched interests of long-
standing committee members have the ability to frustrate owners, particularly 
where their views are out of synch with the rest of the owners or committee 
members. In such cases a ground swell of support may remove the chairman but 
not the by-law: 
We rolled him! He has been rolled! (Chair E).  
This member shouted with glee at the memory of a long fought for victory. The 
frustration of participants unable to get their own way or make themselves heard 
was reported by both owners and strata managers as, if not a regular occurrence, 
at least not unusual. The escalation of pent-up frustration and lack of control over 
participants is highlighted in the following strata manager‟s comment:  
He also stabbed four other committee members‟ tyres and put grease 
on the carpets leading up to their doorways on the doorknobs and 
honey everywhere. … Several times in our offices here, a fight has 
broken out between owners (Strata Manager D). 
In other cases, neighbours bartered for immunity from violence within their strata 
complex, by trading rights to various facilities, as explained by Chair L in teary 
distress. 
Oh alright, you can park your car there, but just don‟t complain about 
my family violence, drug dealing, drug taking, constant visitors, 
whatever „because I‟ll punch you‟re fucking head in‟. Excuse me. 
Does that put you right in the picture [crying] (Chair L). 
I feel safer sleeping in my car than in my apartment which I own and 
legally entitled to do so (Chair L). 
When relationships between owners reach such a low, there would seem little 
hope for being able to reach a collective decision in the organisation‟s best 
interests. Baumgartner‟s (1988) work suggests that in these instances, people from 
lower socioeconomic groups will be more inclined to violence, while the middle 
class are more likely to engage in subversive tit-for-tat behaviour, or move. Moving 
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was suggested as a viable way to resolve conflict by Chair C. In either case trust is 
a casualty and transparency within the organisation suffers, leaving those who are 
less able to sustain a change in residence at the mercy of such bullying tactics.  
Under such emotionally charged situations, the suggestion that conflict resolution 
is merely a matter of requires discussion seems ludicrous: 
For most things you just need to talk to people. Nine times out of ten 
when you approach someone with a neighbour‟s issue you take them 
by surprise.  They generally say that they had no idea that so and so 
felt that way. That‟s what happens when someone is having a blue 
with a neighbour (Strata Manager A). 
Perhaps the issue here is early intervention in a problem, as opposed to letting 
conflict fester and erupt. Intervention and discussion engages people in a direct 
way and forces them to participate in the resolution of a problem without incurring 
the time and expense imposts associated with external mediation and tribunal 
hearings.  
6.3  Conclusion 
The structural alignment between developers and estate agents is clear in these 
accounts, particularly when they are both part of the same company structure. 
There appear to be elements of shared practices across local government, 
developers and real estate agents that obstruct transparency at the purchase stage. 
Purchase transactions for strata titled homes are so complex that experienced 
business owners find them difficult to navigate. The buildings themselves house 
complex commercial services, plant and equipment. Strata managers fall into two 
distinct camps when it comes to whether assistance at the design stage is 
desirable. There appears little evidence to suggest that owner corporations work 
better when assistance has been provided during design. Whether strata 
managers are of benefit during the defects liability period appears to rest on how 
close their relationship is with the developer, to the detriment of owners confirming 
the structural alignment between developers and strata managers.  
Strata managers state that they assist the decision making process and act as 
facilitators in the decision making process. The committee members that I 
interviewed wanted to make decisions, but found it difficult to do so. The interviews 
provide evidence that some owner corporation struggle with the decision making 
process. There is a dearth of volunteers to fill positions reported. However 
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participation in governance may be better if people actually understood what they 
were buying into. For some, it was a learning process fraught with angst about their 
new living arrangements that motivated people to either leave or become violent. 
For others it was a positive motivating factor that saw them participate in the 
governance arrangements, though rarely from altruistic motives.  There is certainly 
evidence that strata managers can provide a buffer between two or more owners in 
terms of conflict management.   
The above discussion has identified five stakeholder groups:  the developer; the 
estate agent; the strata manager; the committee of management; and individual 
owners. It focussed on competing interests within the organisation that result in a 
lack of trust and participation. The lack of trust and participation impacts on 
transparency of process, however the opposite was also seen to be true. Where 
standard processes for communication were not followed a lack of trust ensued, 
and ability for individual owners to participate and be heard was reduced. 
The next chapter continues the investigation by taking up these themes of trust, 
participation and accountability, in the context of contractual relationships between 
the committee and the strata manager. The aim of Chapter 7 is to shed further light 
on the expertise of the participants. 
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Chapter 7 - Expertise and 
professionalism in an outsourced, 
contract environment 
  
 
 Page    173 
  
 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two key subsections that complement each other. First, I 
consider how owners and committee members buy-in, contract or source the 
services and the expertise they require to undertake their legislated tasks. The first 
section examines the contractual relationships that exist between owners, the 
committee of management and strata managers during the life of the strata 
complex. In considering contractual ties between these actors, issues of 
governance, accountability and transparency are assessed within a structure and 
agency setting. The second section examines the issue of professionalism. 
Professionalism in this context is focussed on the expertise required to fill the 
various roles of owner, owner committee and strata manager. I give consideration 
to what it means to be an expert, who the experts are and how experts apply their 
agency within the owner corporation environment.  Consideration is given to the 
professional behaviours, attributes and qualifications required by each party in their 
interactions with each other. I highlight issues of power imbalance that result from 
expert knowledge. This is linked to wider structural considerations and what 
different actors want or expect from the strata industry as a whole. Giddens‟ (1984) 
structuration theory is used as a lens to highlight the interaction between various 
actors. 
7.1 A question of contracts and accountability 
Strata managers charge a management fee for service that is a recurrent cost to 
the owner corporation. The strata manager fulfils three key functions: 
administrative; secretarial and financial (Lei & Van der Merwe 2009). Their role is 
not that of an employee but of a contracted expert, providing what Giddens (1993) 
refers to as specialised knowledge. However while the strata manager takes on 
these duties, they are not the decision makers, the decision making capacity within 
the Victorian legislation stays with the owner corporation committee of 
management, and thus the owners. This situation is similar to the South African 
experience that Lei & Van der Merwe (2009) outline. Thus the owner corporation 
as decision makers, through the legislative rules hold considerable power or are 
enabled in the Giddens (1993) sense.  
Attention is first focussed on the issue of transparency and accountability as it 
relates to how owner corporations source the expertise of their strata manager, 
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and the considerations that are derived from the contract environment during the 
functioning stage of the organisation. Firstly the appointment of the strata manager 
is addressed. Secondly, consideration is given to the facilities management 
contracts. Thirdly, additional service and works contracts facilitated by the strata 
manager, but not designated as third party contracts, are considered. Finally, 
aspects of undertaking work where no strata manager is in place are considered. 
7.1.1 Contracts the owner corporation and the strata 
manager 
In section 7.1, aspects of developer influence were discussed in terms of the 
planning, design and construction process, and the property sale and building 
defects processes. It was noted that at this stage, the developer holds significant 
power and it is difficult for the individual purchaser to exercise agency and 
therefore influence wider outcomes. The purchaser‟s agency is largely limited to 
whether to proceed with a purchase and negotiations over purchase price. This 
section tests transparency and accountability during the appointment of the strata 
manager process. It is at this stage that owners (as actors) have the greatest 
agency whether purposive or individualistic. In discussing the process of forming 
an owner corporation, discussion is progressed to considering ongoing contracts. It 
should be noted that in Victoria developers have been banned from staying on as 
the strata manager. This was to limit issues of conflict-of-interest between the two 
roles, particularly within new buildings still under warranty. However the 
management of two of the building complexes in which I interviewed were still tied 
to the original developer. Discussion turns initially to issues arising under such a 
regime. 
The owner corporations that operate in this complex, there are five, 
are tied to the developer. He appointed the strata company for a 
period of five years with two five year options to renew. That is - you 
know, the strata company which is a subsidiary of the development 
company, has the option to renew, but we don‟t have the option to not 
renew their contract. We are bound to them (Chair C).  
The above statement raises two issues. First, there is a limitation to the agency 
that can be exercised by owners. The owners‟ agency is once again, limited to on-
selling their interest in the complex in order to sever ties with the developer or 
strata manager. This is a drastic step that may see an owner lose a substantial 
sum of money in the exchange, due to the costs involved in the sale process. The 
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second is the purposive action of the developer. The action taken by the developer 
to appoint themselves as strata manager on highly advantageous terms means 
that they have the ability to guide and provide advice on issues of developer 
liability to the owner, limiting the agency of the owner corporation in the matter of 
insurance claims.  
Lei and Van der Merwe (2009) note that within the South African context, 
developers must tender all appointments for strata managers. Their term is limited 
to one year maximum and their contract needs to be ratified by the owners at their 
first meeting. However when legislation was passed in Victoria in 2006 to stop 
developers from appointing themselves as strata management companies, no 
retrospective legislation was passed. Properties built before 2006 may still in some 
instances be tied to the developer in terms of ongoing management. The situation 
with contracts is unusual in this instance, where the owner corporation is bound for 
a total of fifteen years should the strata manager take the option to renew. This 
appears to be an excessively long period of time, and under the equivalent South 
African legislation would be void according to Lei and Van der Merwe (2009). 
Regardless of the standard with which the duties are undertaken, the owner 
corporation, in this instance, has no choice about reappointment. Under such 
circumstances there is little incentive for the strata manager to act in a way that is 
accountable to the owner corporation for the majority of the fifteen year period. 
Their services and fee for service is guaranteed for a 15 year period.  
Yet even with the separation of duties between developers and strata managers 
there appears to be no significant understanding of the conflict-of-interest that 
ensues or the disadvantage that it places owners under. One strata manager 
appeared to lack understanding of the legislation even though he was able to recite 
the legislation and what it meant.  
We started developing our own units and that is how I got into this. 
We still manage some of the complexes. ...  Conflict of interest? There 
is no conflict of interest there. It‟s not allowed under legislation any 
more (Strata Manager B). 
 
In the above interview, the strata manager is able to recognise the relevant 
legislation, and parrot the meaning of the legislation, but is unable to apply the 
principles of separation of duties and attendant conflict of interest to his own 
situation. This is significant, since this respondent had played a significant role 
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within the strata industry. The strata industry represents itself as a professional 
body and is a key player at the structural level having links to the insurance and 
banking sector. However it would appear from this statement that lip service only is 
paid to legislation, which in turn impacts on the viability of the legislation and the 
owner‟s ability to exercise agency within this framework. Giddens (1993) considers 
that conflict of interest relates to the purposes of individual actors and the interest 
of collectively. Therefore it should not be treated as a problematic component of 
divergent group interest. However for Chair C, the lack of transparency and 
subsequent conflict of interest is clearly problematic. 
7.1.2 Trading contracts 
Chair C experienced difficulties over and above being tied to the developer that 
were not seen in the other interviews. In this instance, as well as being tied to the 
developer owned company for an extended period of time, the developer had on-
sold the management contract to another strata management company, further 
limiting the individual owner agency as well as that of the owner corporation.  
The developer sold the (strata development) company, so we ended 
up with a change in strata manager that we did not approve or have 
choice in. He (the developer) then bought it back again (and became 
the strata manager for a second time). We cannot walk away from the 
contract because of the options agreement. … We have thought about 
legal action to break the contract (Chair C). 
Yet even within this context, agency can be applied at a cost and carries significant 
risk factors for the owner corporation (and therefore individual owners). This type of 
action, intentional, would fall within what Giddens (1993) calls purposive action. 
Within the facilities management and estate agent industries, it is not unusual for 
companies to be taken over by new firms. Contracts and lists of customers can be 
on-sold. Consider for a moment, the sole trader cleaning company that seeks to 
sell their business. The cleaner may sell the business goodwill to a larger national 
company and in so doing the new owner inherits the residual of the contracts held 
by the original small company. Customers are generally happy to receive continuity 
of service and, if they are unhappy, choose not to reappoint the new company at 
the end of their contract. What is unusual here however is the extended time lag for 
renewal (15 years), which negates any ability on the part of owners to choose the 
strata management company. The change in ownership of the company is also a 
concern. Selling the company and then buying it back negates the intent of the 
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legislation, in that the developer‟s direct involvement in his appointment as strata 
manager is broken through the intervention of the business sale and buy-back. 
This example highlights the strength of structural influences at play. The rules are 
set by industry who control the resources. The integrated practices have meaning 
for the owners. However, their reflexive monitoring of the situation is negative, as 
they strive for a means to effect change upon the status quo. The owners are in a 
sense, mere pawns in the developer‟s plan to maintain control of the complex and 
reap profit. The extent of this profit is commented on. 
7.1.3 Strata manager contract renewal 
In discussing the renewal process, the committee members and strata managers 
agreed that the usual contract length was between one and three years duration. 
Within the strata industry, standard contracts are generally for a three year period 
with an annual renewal clause. Strata managers‟ report that there are sound 
business reasons for this: 
There is quite a bit of work involved in the initial set up so if you only 
have a one year contract you are sort of putting yourself at risk a little 
bit. You are not going to get a return for that first year‟s investment if 
you like. … The costs are higher for us in the first year (Chair F).    
The administrative handover costs to the new strata manager are stated as 
significant. There is a need to recoup handover costs as with any business 
transaction. However, because the hand-over period is not charged to owners as a 
separate discrete piece of work, the owners may be less likely to understand the 
costs associated with the changeover period. The standard rates for strata 
manager work are inflated in order to cover the upfront costs, therefore the longer 
the strata manager can hang onto the contract, the greater the profit for a 
decreasing amount of administrative effort.   
While much of the discussion in this chapter has been about dissatisfaction with 
the appointed strata manager, clearly some committees have settled relationships 
with their strata managers.   
Yes, it's always been (strata manager). I think he has been there for 
17 or so years (Chair I). 
Chair I stated that her complex was happy with their strata manager and had no 
reason to consider changing. The relationship became symbiotic with each party 
content with the status quo. However the respondent also stated that she had 
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never seen the contract that the strata manager was signed up to, despite the fact 
that she had been on the committee for nine years. 
I really sort of thought that it would come up every year and be 
renewed at the annual meeting, but it could have been in the minutes 
and I haven't - but I haven't seen it (Chair I). 
The comment above reveals a fundamental flaw within the owner corporation 
environment, that is, committee members do not always see the need to monitor 
their key contracts or negotiate their outcomes. In Chair C, the committee was 
concerned with the strata manager‟s contract because they wanted to break it. 
However, breaking an existing contract is clearly not on every committee‟s agenda. 
Monitoring the contract was identified as a priority only where one wished to break 
the contract, not where trust existed between the committee and the strata 
manager. Where there is no desire to change the strata manager, the committees 
of management appear to put the contract in a drawer and forget about it. The 
literature identified that trust was key to increasing participation and increasing 
governance outcomes overall. The failure of committees of management to actively 
monitor the contracts to which they are a party lacks accountability and sound 
stewardship principles. The above committee member stated that she attended the 
AGM but does not appear to be familiar with any aspect of the contract and refers 
to the minutes. Other reasons for not monitoring the contract were identified.  
The failure of owners to actively monitor their strata manager‟s contracts appeared 
to be endemic, though the reasons varied. Chair I trusted her complexes strata 
manager to do the right thing. In the previous chapter, Strata Manager B reported a 
lack of participation and interest by owners more generally, and through non 
attending AGMs, the abdication of all responsibility for the complex, with owners 
mistakenly believing responsibility is vested in the strata manager.  
Some owner corporation sought to actively manage the contract, but had difficulty 
getting hold of it. This is clearly a power play tactic by the strata manager: 
Some of us are in the process of trying to find out the terms of our 
manager‟s contract. We don‟t have the paperwork. An attempt to look 
at all the paperwork at the strata manager‟s office was blocked (Chair 
E).  
This statement raises two points. Firstly, there is a need here to question why an 
owner corporation may not have the paperwork outlining the strata manager‟s 
appointment. Sound management of any organisation requires adequate filing and 
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storage of key documents, including copies of contracts, agenda, meeting minutes 
and other financial matters. Notwithstanding the fact that the people filling 
committee positions change from time to time, complete sets of documents should 
be handed over with the change in committee membership. Inadequate handovers 
for non-profit board members was identified by Miller (2002) as an issue. This 
concern may now be extended to owner corporations as non-profit organisations. 
Secondly, the attempts by strata managers to impede owner corporations from 
seeing the paperwork to which they are signed up, does not appear to be a one-off 
occurrence. For example Chair L also commented on this aspect: 
I have tried to make appointments to go out to see the (strata 
manager‟s) contract … It has never been convenient for them (Chair 
L).  
In this instance, the property manager‟s office is more than fifteen kilometres from 
the actual complex, making access to the documents difficult during business 
hours. In addition there appears to be an unwillingness by strata managers to 
openly provide access to the documents, thus limiting owner and committee 
agency. Blandy (2010) refers to a tyranny of distance which affects the owner‟s 
ability to adequately access maintenance documents. In the judicial case cited by 
her, it was found that the strata management company was at fault in expecting the 
owners to travel large distances to vet documents. This theme of strata managers 
having the upper hand in relation to controlling all documents is striking, since it 
shows the difficulty that owners and committees of management have in managing 
their responsibilities under the Act15. This is a key accountability role for them in an 
outsourced, contract environment that is central to good governance. It also 
highlights the difficulty owners face in taking purposive action leading to an 
exercise of agency through the committee structure. Building on Norton‟s (2007) 
work, in this instance, the power in the narrower relational sense remains a 
property of interaction, and cannot be said to be transformative. The strata 
manager has limited the ability of the owners and committee members to transform 
their circumstances by exercising power in the form of domination over the 
situation. 
During the interviews, contract renewal was an issue also raised by strata 
managers. They felt there were limitations placed on their ability to enact agency 
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 Owner Corporation Act [69/2006] at www.legislation.vic.gov.au. 
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because of the failure of owners and committees to undertake purposive action. 
Specifically, when quorums are not reached at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), 
the strata manager‟s contract renewal will roll over for one more year. However, no 
changes to the contract including fee structure is able to occur.  
… all that we can do is continue to do what was done the year before. 
We can‟t increase. We can‟t decrease. We can‟t make any 
suggestions (Strata Manager B). 
This creates a problem for strata managers where it continues for an extended 
time period. Costs to the strata management company do not keep pace with 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases, limiting profitability. The strata manager 
may reduce services in order to cover costs under these circumstances or become 
lethargic about carrying out their duties. McKenzie (1996) considered non-
attendance at owner corporation committee meetings and low participation 
numbers to be a key factor in poor transparency and accountability outcomes. 
When non-attendance occurs, none of the interested parties are able to effect 
change because comment on the quality of strata management is not occurring. 
Moreover a disinterest in the complex by the owners may lead to a disinterest by 
the strata manager. There is no external stimulus to push the strata manager to 
maintain their contract conditions to a rigorous standard. In short, it is an abdication 
of responsibility via non-attendance of duties to the organisation‟s key stakeholders, 
the owners. There is little recognition by owners that an outsourced contract based 
mechanism exists that needs to be monitored through its committee structure. 
Though not a legal expert, Giddens (1993, p. 3) considers that in legal theory a 
person is regarded as culpable where it is adjudged that he or she „should have 
known‟. Applied to this instance, the failure to enact agency and attend to 
organisational duties „should have been known‟ to the committee, indicating that 
the committee is ultimately responsible. Giddens‟ point is that agency and 
accountability is experienced through the interpretation of governing law. 
7.1.4 Cancellation of an existing strata manager’s contract  
Thus far, interviews have revealed a failure on the part of both the strata manager 
and the owner corporation to fulfil their duties as contract partners. In such 
instances, where differences cannot be resolved cancellation of a fixed term 
contract may be sought by either party.  Both strata managers and committees of 
management agreed that there were grounds for cancellation of a contract: 
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In each committee (where I am an owner) there has been something 
that would be deemed to be worthy of a cancellation of contract.  … 
We are hoping that mediation will give us some sort of satisfaction. 
Otherwise we feel that there are definite areas there that are for 
litigation (Strata Manager & Chair H). 
However cancellation of an existing contract was considered to be a difficult and 
time consuming option. There appeared to be no trust in the legal system that is 
set up to deal with this type of conflict. Douglas et al. (2008, p. 4; Libbis & 
Leshinsky 2008) note that dispute resolution in Victoria takes a three tiered 
approach. First, internal dispute resolutions including mediation may occur. Second, 
application to the Director of Consumer Affairs can be made, requesting external 
mediation of a dispute. Finally, application to the Victorian Civil And Administrative 
Tribunal (VCAT) may occur. However in reality, few committees of management 
have an internal dispute mechanism, and most disputes are listed with VCAT for 
hearing. The increasing VCAT workload and lengthy delays for hearings has 
prompted Strata Community Australia (2011) 16  to recommend compulsory 
mediation for all disputes. In this case Strata Australia are enacting what Giddens 
(1993) refers to as purposive action leading to the transformative effects of 
structural change. 
Two key reasons were outlined for the change to mediation. The first was that 
existing tribunals were a costly process for individual owners, committee of 
management, strata managers and the court system. When the tribunal process 
was first introduced, there were fewer strata complexes, the strata management 
industry was almost non-existent and the building infrastructure and common 
property were less complex. It was a time when strata experts were few and rarely 
called to give evidence. The tribunal lists were shorter, meaning there was less 
delay in having matters dealt with. Lawyers rarely attended to represent clients.  
The case today is vastly different. Litigation rates have increased substantially as 
the industry has grown and faith in the VCAT system has diminished over time. 
The move to mediated outcomes has financial benefits at the state level also. As 
this strata manager put it: 
(VCAT) came out as the new you beaut fix it, but the length of waiting 
time and the strange decisions that are coming out. I think that a lot of 
people are just steering a little bit clear of it. It is ok for basic account 
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collections, but you really don‟t want to have to go to VCAT if you can 
avoid it. I am sure that there is a lot of mediation being done that 
perhaps wasn‟t being done before. Mediated outcomes are being 
arranged - merely done on the „oh well we will take you to VCAT‟ 
(Strata Manager & Chair H). 
The last sentence of this quote is interesting because it provides an indication that 
the industry is working towards a system of mediated outcomes rather than tribunal 
and court rulings. When mediation occurs, transparency is reduced. The issues are 
not debated openly, deals are done behind closed doors and the outcome is not 
open to public scrutiny.  The lack of public scrutiny is beneficial  to the structural 
interests of the strata industry. Committees of management are no longer able to 
view court listings and rulings to gain an idea of past strata manager behaviour and 
practices.  Mediated outcomes allow the strata industry to hold their head up and 
say „look we have not had any adverse court rulings against our members. We 
operate with high standards of professionalism‟. The cost of mediation is borne by 
the participants rather than the state as with court and tribunal heard cases, 
allowing state governments to save money. The entrenched interests of 
government departments are upheld with a mediated system. Government 
departments will be able to wash their hands of mediated outcomes and point to a 
„better‟ functioning system, despite the lack of transparency. Against these 
entrenched interests, the owners and committees of management may benefit by 
shorter timeframe resolution and in some - but not all cases - legal costs may be 
lower. Since the strata industry are more likely to hold lawyers and other consultant 
experts on retainers than are owner corporation, the mediation system may well 
lead to a „David and Goliath‟ system in which mediated outcomes provide poor 
results to owners and committees of management. However mediation very much 
depends on „best‟ argument rather than „right‟ argument.  The law therefore will not 
be tested in a public way. Mediation may benefit owners and their committees of 
management relative to tribunal mandated solutions. However, it is likely to be of 
greater reputational benefit to strata managers, as disputes are hidden from the 
public eye. 
7.1.5 Subservient contracts where a strata manager is in 
place 
The strata manager‟s contract represents a significant undertaking for an owner 
corporation. However it is not the only contract that was commented on by 
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participants. All of the participants commented on the series of contracts organised 
by strata managers to cover items such as cleaning, maintenance, gardening and 
caretakers. None of the participants identified these contracts as third party 
contracts. A third party contract is said to exist where sections of a primary contract 
is outsourced to a third party, with the third party remaining responsible to the 
contractor, not the owner. However in all instances, the contracts while arranged 
by the strata manager remained primary contracts between the owner corporation 
and the service provider. This arrangement creates difficulties for the committee of 
management and individual owners. For example, the committee members 
remained unaware of the work contract details, and as with the primary contract, 
they often had difficulty getting hold of the individual work contracts in order to 
ascertain what terms the owner corporation was actually signed up to. 
No, No, we pay for the (cleaning) contracts, but we never see them, 
we don‟t know what is in them, so we can‟t argue effectively as to 
whether they are meeting the contracts. We don‟t know what is in and 
what is out. When we say but the cleaning has not been done, they 
(strata manager) wave a sign-off list to say (the cleaners) have. But if 
the cleaners have attended, how come we need to vacuum our own 
hallways. We never see them. Something is not right (Chair C). 
This quotation reveals a key failure of the contract system for owner corporation. 
The terms of the contract may well be being met, yet the clients are still unhappy 
with the service being provided. The strata managers do not see it as their role to 
oversee the contract beyond arranging payments to the contractors. So, for 
example, the cleaners are not overseen. The inability of owners to gain access to 
the contract conditions dis-empowers them from overseeing the contract. There is 
no requirement for the committee to sign-off on the performed duties and the 
standard of work prior to the strata manager organising payment. It is unclear as to 
whether a standard of work has been agreed by the owners prior to the letting of 
contract. Moreover Strata Community Australia (Victoria)17 has recently released a 
statement in regard to the pre-tender vetting arrangements for these types of 
contracts (OCV 2011). In this advice contractors make an annual „cost cover‟ 
payment to the strata manager for keeping contractors on their appointment books. 
In effect this means that the strata manager is double-charging for arranging the 
                                                          
17
 Strata Community Australia (Victoria) was previously known as the Owner Corporation of Victoria. 
The name change occurred when the national body was formed in 2011. 
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contract, once to the contractor for registration with their office and once to the 
committee of management as part of organising the contract.  
Strata managers appear to have the upper hand in all contractual matters. This is 
despite them having no decision making power. One owner corporation reported 
that the failure of the strata manager to pay an invoice had caused difficulties: 
The owner corporation manager claimed that it was within his rights to 
choose not to pay the (contractor‟s) demand for payment and we got 
sued for $26,000. … I said „is it not part of your responsibility if you 
choose not to pay an invoice, should you not bring that to the attention 
of the owner committee so that we can be involved in that decision?‟ 
He said „I have the power within my contact to pay or not pay invoices‟.  
The power embedded in the contract conditions between the strata manager and 
the owner corporation regulates the interaction between other service providers 
employed at the strata complex. The strata industry mandates the contract 
conditions through standardised contracts that are drawn up in the industry‟s 
favour. There appears to be no external input from committee members or steering 
groups into the formation of individual contracts. Of greater interest is the fact that 
there appears to be little input by owner committees into the scope of works 
attached to the service contracts.  The transparency of contracts, their terms and 
conditions and the inability of owner corporations to monitor contracts has 
significant ramifications for the owner corporation, in issues of transparency and 
accountability, factors that are so embedded in the trust relationship discussed in 
the previous chapter.   
7.1.6 When there is no strata manager 
There has been considerable change in the landscape for strata titled properties 
over time. New properties are more likely to have had a strata manager appointed 
from the start. However, in regional areas, and areas where smaller developments 
exist, there is still a significant proportion of strata titled properties where no strata 
manager has been appointed. The following section considers what occurs in a 
smaller complex with no strata manager. It acts as a point of comparison for some 
of the contractual issues raised above. The discussion now turns to stakeholder 
relations and management issues within these complexes. 
In my area I would say that 85% plus of body corporate are self-
managed, they don‟t have a manager and a large percentage of those 
would definably be non-compliant with the Act (Strata Manager F). 
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That some strata complexes are non-compliant with the Act is confirmed by an 
email I received in response to a targeted letterbox drop seeking participants. The 
respondent later agreed to publication of this email: 
I don‟t think we can help you as we do not have either a strata 
management company or a committee (email 1). 
This email was provided by an owner within a seven unit town house development. 
Under existing legislation, any strata complex of more than two units is required to 
meet annually to appoint office bearers, which automatically makes this owner 
corporation non-compliant with the Act. The owners appear unaware of their 
obligations to each other under legislation. They do not appear to understand that 
they are in breach of the law. The organisation clearly lacks accountability in 
relation to the system that set it up. Because the owners in the above email were 
unwilling to be formally interviewed, information on how contracts are managed in 
smaller complexes in an informal or semi-formal setting was drawn from just one 
interview. There may well be some informal network in place between the owners. 
This was the case where Chair M lived: 
We just had a really lovely kind of, very informally written, but more of 
a verbal arrangement where we would just kind of negotiate 
responsibilities or works or whatever and the manner in which we 
would do that (Chair M). 
Chair M goes on to describe their contractual arrangements as reactive, but well-
coordinated. 
Definitely reactively. But when there is an issue, I think that it is 
coordinated well. But then, well I would have to say that really, 
because I‟m coordinating it.  
However there were also concerns of a financial nature which were explained in 
terms of differing values. Differences in values and standards was noted by Blakely 
& Snyder 1999; Low 2003; McKenzie 1996) as areas of potential conflict between 
owners. 
You need participants who kind of have a shared set of values I think, 
because like I‟m relying on them to pay half the bill.  So it is kind of a 
leap of faith. It would be quite possible that you could get someone 
who you know, did not see it as problematic if they left it, didn‟t pay 
their bill for three months or something like that (Chair M). 
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This was a particularly important point because the invoices and quotations in this 
complex were always sought in one name, with a verbal reliance on the other 
person agreeing to pay half the invoice. Under these circumstances the owner‟s 
agency is limited. Difficulty arose for this owner when she sought quotations from 
contractors addressed to more than one owner and unit within the complex. She 
highlighted that there was an element of trust between owners when it came to 
invoicing, and this was heightened because there was no personal financial buffer 
in place. There was no joint account with her neighbour to draw on for expenses in 
relation to the complex. 
I don‟t have a financial buffer at all. I would just probably borrow 
against my mortgage or something like that, which I could do, so it is 
kind of not irresponsible of me. But I think that is part of the trust as 
well. I‟ve got no idea of their financial status and they‟ve got no idea of 
mine. So yeah, that is kind of vulnerability I think (Chair M). 
The ability to create a system of trust appears more apparent between owners 
within smaller complexes. Participation in solving problems in a collective way for 
the good of both owners relies on good-will towards neighbours. Perhaps it is just 
that people are less likely to shirk duties where people are on what Alterman (2010) 
calls „nodding terms‟. Closer proximity forces participation and this in turn builds 
trust, transparency and accountability towards neighbours within smaller 
complexes, which fosters greater exercise of agency by owners. 
A contract is a formal relationship between two or more people or entities. The 
above discussion has focussed on four contractual areas: the relationship between 
the strata manager and the owner corporation; the relationship between the strata 
manager, owner corporation and other contracted service providers; the 
relationship between contracted service providers and owners where there is no 
strata manager; and contracts between owners where there is no strata manager.  
7.1.7 Contracting-out summary 
This section of the chapter has emphasised the contractual relationships between 
each key stakeholder highlighting issues of governance and stakeholder 
relationships within an outsourced environment. The strata manager is engaged 
through an outsourced, contract based mechanism designed to increase 
compliance with legislation, and thus mitigate risk to the owners. Yet what benefits 
do these contractual arrangements bring to the committee of management, and 
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hence the individual owners? The committee members interviewed outlined 
difficulties in their contractual relationships which formalise the outsourced 
activities and lay much of the blame for this on the convoluted contract 
mechanisms that exist at the buying stage and a lack of information, advice and 
assistance when purchasing. 
Yet much of the contractual conflict reported was between strata managers and the 
committees of management. The contractual power stayed with the strata manager, 
and some owner corporation appeared content with this outcome. Certainly in 
complexes where no owners attend AGMs, there is the assumption that the owners 
are content for agency power to stay with strata managers, though they take on 
limited risk with the transfer of power. For others, the wresting of power from the 
structural influences of the developer and strata manager appeared to be the 
cause of much of the conflict.  Trust, participation, accountability and transparency 
dwindled as the outsourced contractual relationship was tested and found lacking.  
The following section considers why conflict may exist within the context of 
professionalism exhibited by the parties concerned. 
7.2 Professionalism and expertise 
In the Australian context, strata managers provide expertise to non-profit boards 
made up of strata property owners. The strata industry sets itself up as providing 
professional, expert management or, in Giddens‟ (1984) words, „specialised 
knowledge‟. In the previous chapter it was noted that strata managers assisted the 
committee of management by performing administrative duties on behalf of owner 
corporations thereby contributing to sound governance. The first part of this 
chapter considered whether the outsourced, contractual ties between various 
stakeholder groups assisted the owner corporation to function. This subsection 
considers what type of assistance the strata managers believe they offer to the 
owner corporation, and what qualifications they need to underpin that assistance. I 
then consider how this view fits with what committee members believe they are 
getting and what they want. It then comments on similarities and differences 
between the two views.   
7.2.1  Expertise, professionalism and the strata industry 
At the time of these interviews Australia had no national or state related 
professional qualifications for strata managers. In Victoria, where the interviews 
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predominantly took place, there is a state based licensing system for strata 
managers. However, the Victorian system, administered by the Business Licensing 
Authority Victoria did not require any form of professional qualification in order to 
be registered. Rather, the mandatory licensing system provides surety to owners 
and committees in terms of purchased professional indemnity insurance and an 
indication that the strata management company will remain solvent: 
„You can register as an owners corporation manager if you are: 
 18 years or over 
 have the required minimum level of professional indemnity 
insurance cover of $1.5 million 
 not insolvent under administration (i.e. bankrupt) 
 not a represented person within the meaning of the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986‟. 
(http://www.bla.vic.gov.au/home/owners+corporation+managers/ 
accessed 12/7/2012) 
Strata Manager and Chair H summarised the licensing registration requirements in 
Victoria: 
I registered to be a licensed manager. My father lived in one of the 
units. I met all the licensing requirements with my other businesses 
anyway. And I thought I could do a better job for these elderly people. 
Not only do the job but do it with heart (Strata Manager & Chair H). 
As with Strata Manager and Chair H above, all the strata managers interviewed 
were licensed and all the committees of management employed licensed strata 
managers18. This situation is different to the one that Lei & Van der Merwe (2009) 
outline.  In their comparison between South Africa and China, the licence was 
given only to strata managers who met specific professional requirements. New 
strata management companies had to start at the lowest level and work their way 
up, and the highest level required set numbers of employees with a range of 
qualifications. However two of the committee chairs indicated that they were 
unsure of the licensing status of their manager and did not understand the 
licensing system: 
I don‟t think I was aware that they needed a licence (Chair L). 
                                                          
18
 The strata manager’s licensing and business status were checked in the course of background 
investigation and prior to the interviews. 
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and 
I thought that if they were licensed they would have qualifications in 
the area but it appears not to be the case (Chair E). 
The licensing system is designed to ensure an element of redress should things go 
wrong, but does not address the issue of knowledge, expertise or professionalism 
within the industry. Yet strata managers assert that they are experts accorded with 
professional standing. As discussed in the previous chapter, strata managers take 
on a role similar to an outsourced CEO position within non-profit companies. The 
interviewed strata managers asserted that they understood the Act, and that many 
of the difficulties encountered related to a lack of clarity in the legislation itself. 
We understand it (the Act) really well, but one of the things that is still 
a concern is that the Act itself is not clear and defined (Strata 
Manager D). 
However at 7.1.1 it was noted that the legislation was clear in relation to the 
segregation of developer and strata manager roles. Strata Manager B was able to 
cite the Act yet at the same time state that they were breaching it. He breached the 
act by acting as a strata manager to a unit complex that they were also the 
developer for - thus failing to identify a conflict of interest.   
To tease out this issue of expertise and professionalism further, strata managers 
were asked what skills and attributes they thought were necessary for their own 
role and that of the committee members. This understanding is important since 
2013 has been earmarked for the introduction of professional development 
schemes for strata managers at a national level.  
7.2.1.1 Strata managers and their backgrounds 
The backgrounds of the strata managers interviewed were varied. Included were a 
businessman who described his background as administrative. At various times he 
had managed a brickworks and a silverware factory. He felt that his skill-set fitted 
with the strata industry since both were detailed, technical and people oriented. 
One was making coffees for his uncle in a café. Another had previously been a 
bank manager and was looking for a change of direction after taking a redundancy. 
Others were drawn from property related industries such as engineering, quantity 
surveying and conveyancing: 
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I have always worked in a professional capacity. This is a side 
business to my building surveyor role, so I understand all the technical 
issues (Strata Manager G). 
Despite the varied backgrounds, all strata managers stated that they were 
business oriented people looking for business opportunities. 
I saw an opportunity and took it (Strata Manager A). 
The proposed national professional qualifications (Certificate IV in Property (Strata 
Management) provides a detailed focus on the technical aspects of the strata 
property mechanism including an understanding of the various state based Acts: 
You will learn the fundamentals competencies and concepts of 
property and business law, agency risk management, management 
and maintenance procedures, property security issues and a range of 
agency administrative processes and procedure including financial 
and trust accounting skills involved in the proprietorship and 
management of Strata/Community Title Management Agency practice. 
(https://www.tafensw.edu.au/howex/servlet/Course?Command=GetCourse
&CourseNo=9674). 
One strata manager agreed with the proposed competencies: 
There are a whole lot of, range (of competencies) that each manager 
needs. Obviously, accounting, people skills and most importantly, time 
management being able to do everything all at once (Strata Manager 
D). 
Others felt that a range of competencies were necessary, though not necessarily 
those outlined:  
That‟s the benefit of these professional associations. There is always 
someone you can ask to get advice when it comes to the letter of the 
law (Strata Manager F). 
Knowledge of the relevant state-based legislation was seen as less important by 
strata managers, yet Lei and Van der Merwe (2009) consider expertise in this area 
to be a key requirement for strata managers. Other strata managers viewed their 
roles differently. Strata Manager G considered professional integrity more 
important than task focussed outcomes: 
I don‟t think it really matters that they are a surveyor, engineer, lawyer 
or accountant as long as you understand the importance of a code of 
ethics and the importance of working with integrity, and making sure 
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that no one‟s interests supersedes someone else‟s either in 
individuals or in groups of peoples (Strata Manager G) 
While for Strata Manager J, the role was not about the skill or attributes that strata 
manager‟s bought to the table at all. It was about the business work culture and 
who fitted in with their business rather than what the owners specifically wanted: 
Look, I‟ve changed my view completely, I mean we‟ve gone through 
where we‟ve sought experienced managers that have come in from 
other firms that simply haven‟t lasted with us. … So my policy now is 
for, I‟m looking for smart young ones coming through the industry, 
because when you employ mature experienced managers and try to 
bring them into your culture, my culture just fails (Strata Manager J). 
Most strata managers however believed that strata management was a people-
oriented role rather than a property related one. This may be why the backgrounds 
of strata managers were so varied: 
I think this is a people business.  I know it is a property or property 
management business but you are actually dealing with the people 
who are the lot owners, so I think that if you didn‟t have people skills it 
would make your job very difficult (Strata Manager F). 
People skills are important for conflict resolution, and defusing the highly emotional 
situations that may occur within strata meetings and between owners is important: 
I don‟t have any formal training … I‟m not a marriage guidance 
counsellor.  I‟m doing this for the good of all the owners, which is the 
body corporate‟s role and this didn‟t involve all the body corporate,  or 
committee, it was actually one disaffected ex committee person 
(Strata Manager G). 
Despite this focus on people skills and conflict management, some strata 
managers believed that usurping the power vested in the committee of 
management to direct meeting procedure was to the advantage of all committee 
members: 
I usually chair the meetings. It‟s more efficient. You can control the 
meeting and things don‟t get off track so easily (Strata Manager J). 
This strata manager was task-focussed rather than people-focussed. His 
motivations were centred in the self. There was little understanding of the 
„unintended consequences of action‟ (Giddens 1984, p. 5). This approach did not 
 
 Page    192 
  
 
sit well with committee members who wanted to exercise their agency but were 
unable to do so: 
The strata managers were chairing it!  They just took over! They ran it! 
And the strata manager sat in the chair! We were a bit dumbfounded 
(Chair E). 
Strata Manager G took a slightly different approach varying his involvement in the 
chairing process according to individual need: 
If you have a good chairman, that really helps. If you don‟t have a 
good chairman then I tend to do the chairing. You still need people 
who respect the value of having an effective meeting and giving 
everybody the chance to say something (Strata Manager G). 
The approach undertaken by Strata Manager G is more akin to Giddens‟ (1993) 
approach to networked structures, where individual agency is leveraged against 
others in order to effect group agency, each party within the group benefiting. 
Strata managers considered that there were desirable and less desirable attributes 
that owners and committee members needed in order for the organisation to 
function. They impacted on the strata manager‟s ability to effect sound 
management of the complex. 
Well you need a balance of ideas, and having an uneven number is 
always good. You have someone to break the deadlock. Common 
sense.  They need common sense and an ability to work with others.  
To be able to listen and see differing points of view.  The problems 
that come up area varied over time, so just because you have a 
building background does not mean that that is always a relevant 
experience.  The best one I work with has a teacher at the helm 
another has an 86 year old Irish women.  The thing they have in 
common is a desire to get along with people and not have any 
particular axe to grind (Strata Manager A). 
So here again people management was a key attribute. While strata management 
companies are able to interview their employees prior to a job offer, committees of 
management cannot interview prospective owners to ascertain their people skills 
any more than they are able to be interviewed for technical abilities:  
You‟ve got to be careful. Sometimes I‟m fortunate enough to have 
competent committees, professional people. Across the industry there 
will be plenty of instances where people have a butcher, a baker, and 
a candlestick maker, and it makes it very hard to be looking at those 
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people saying „well what do you think?‟ They won‟t know (Strata 
Manager J). 
One strata manager believed that the growth in property prices combined with the 
growth in inner city apartments would change the committee makeup over time: 
Things are changing. I target the larger inner city complexes. They are 
more likely to attract business owners and professionals because the 
costs are so high. They are more time conscious and used to doing 
business. Easier to get along with generally (Strata Manager J). 
This observation echoes Baumgartner‟s (1988) view that groups of similar socio-
economic background will tend to group together and that the conflict enacted by 
middle and upper class residents will take on a different shape or form to that of 
the socio-economically disadvantaged. From this passage we can assume that 
there is less overt conflict enacted within Strata Manager J‟s complexes. Pre 1990s 
a larger proportion of strata complexes were small in nature and limited to 
suburban residential blocks. They sought to provide housing for older residents 
who wanted to downsize. The case is different post 1990s where the size of 
apartments is increasing with many now larger than the average suburban house, 
and more people of all age groups seeking apartment and townhouse 
accommodation. Smaller, older or more affordable unit developments may tend to 
have a greater socio economic mix. It was with this in mind that I questioned 
committees about the makeup of their owner group in section 7.2.2. 
7.2.2 What strata managers want from their clients 
Strata managers were clear about their role as administrative support for the owner 
corporation. Some sidestepped the issue of key competencies considered 
necessary within the proposed accreditation schemes, deeming the schemes to be 
less important than the overall requirement for people skills. I was interested to see 
how close this view was to what committees believed were necessary core 
competencies for strata managers, and also how strata managers viewed their own 
level of competency. It is to this discourse that I now turn: 
I would love to have someone with a legal background, accounting 
knowledge, finance background and of course someone with building 
knowledge. Those are the backgrounds that would really enhance a 
committee. Unfortunately the one who is an accountant is also a 
director of (strata management company) because they also own a lot. 
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So every time someone asks questions, he answers them but it would 
be a biased or conflicted answer (Chair C). 
I think financial management is the important thing.  You need to have 
money in the sinking fund and it needs to be managed (Chair I). 
Knowledge of law and finance were recurring issues for owners who believed that 
they were often given conflicting or wrong advice by their strata managers: 
I have to say legal, because everything that an owner corporation 
does has a legal fall out. And if you don‟t know where you are about to 
go wrong, you are in trouble (Strata Manager and Chair H). 
While some owners believed that a legal background was required, others 
considered specific knowledge of the Owner Corporation Act to be more pertinent: 
Have a complete understanding of the Act to begin with. The skills to 
implement the Act.  The ability to – what is that word – transparency 
(Chair E). 
Knowledge of the Act did not rate highly with all strata managers. For example 
Strata Manager F believed there was always someone to ask rather than needing 
to have the knowledge up front. While others considered that although this was 
important, more general administrative skills, experience and a „professional‟ 
attitude were important: 
Ideally, I think law, property law so that you can have someone with a 
legal background that would be useful. I think people with good 
administrative skills. That know how to take minutes of a meeting and 
how to record conversations, how to disseminate information to all the 
parties. I also think someone who has got a clue about how meetings 
are run as well, so um. You know I am very used to dealing with 
committees at management.  If you didn‟t have someone with some of 
those ideas, I think there would be an absolute bun
19
 fight. A chaotic 
bun fight (Chair K). 
and 
So maturity, training, specified, certified training in conflict resolution 
and transformation, business management information systems, and 
regular certification, automatically without request, provided to the 
clients that he represents, not just the committee, of his ongoing 
relevant training that is relevant to his role. And it should be a pre-
                                                          
19
 Colloquial. A bun fight means a dispute possibly leading to bullying and physical fighting. 
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requisite for the overarching principle of some firm that his individual 
property managers go through that stream (Chair L).  
The range of views expressed by committee members spanned a number of areas 
that broadly reflected the proposed national competencies, focussing on law, 
finance, property and administrative skills. However the comments committees 
made in relation to what was lacking in their dealings with strata managers were 
perhaps more illuminating than the skills they outlined as necessary: 
I don't think a lot of them are professional enough.  I don't think 
they've got enough experience.  They just take the minutes. They 
have no communication or people skills (Chair K).  
We are inexperienced so we need someone who can guide us in 
relation to the legislation for a reasonable fee.  Also to take on issues 
of contracts and overseeing them and making the building function 
properly. … There are times when (strata manager) just seems to get 
in the way.  He creates more trouble that he is worth at times. The 
invoicing is a good example (Chair N). 
I went to VCAT. … That is not the first piece of information that they 
have given us that is radically wrong (Chair E). 
The perceived lack of professionalism and experience, the provision of incorrect 
information and the inability to run contracts with transparency emerged as key 
issues for the committee of management. Much of the conflict experienced 
between the strata manager and the committee relates to administration of 
contracts and a failure of transparency. The transparency aspect however did not 
appear to be a significant concern for strata managers, as outlined in the above 
sub-section. The principle of governance to which transparency is related does not 
appear to form a necessary part of the national core competencies for strata 
managers. Communication and people management skills appear lacking in terms 
of the proposed accreditation. The lack of attention to these skills has an effect on 
the amount of conflict that is able to be defused within the complexes and in 
dealings between the committee and the strata manager. High levels of conflict 
appeared to be a major concern of committee members and strata managers alike 
7.2.2.1 Committee members and their backgrounds 
Owners placed emphasis on professionalism, people management skills and 
communication as well as the core competencies of finance and law. I was 
interested to know whether committee members considered that they required 
 
 Page    196 
  
 
skills, how the backgrounds of owners and committee members benefited the 
organisation, and whether their skill base met the needs outlined by for strata 
managers. When it came to the backgrounds of committee members the 
committee chairs reported 
It‟s a diverse range of owners, all business people (address 1). The 
other owners in (address 2) come nearly all from a professional 
background. My background is quasi legal (Chair I). 
Well we all started as teachers but we did not all end up as teachers 
let me say (Chair E). 
We are a mixed bunch really.  A couple of us are investors and 
business owners. There is one accountant and a doctor. Some are 
just stay at home women who have never worked (Chair N). 
As the above interview data indicates, the background of property owners varied. 
As a consequence the committee make up also varied, since only owners are able 
to sit on the committee. When it came to the attributes that committee members 
most wanted in other committee members, there appeared to be little consensus. 
Some committee members deemed specific technical backgrounds in building, law 
and accounting as necessary.  
Professional, legal background because you have got to keep yourself 
clean. You need to be accountable. Accountable is closer to what I 
want to say (Strata Manager & Chair H). 
You need to have an ability to read financial statements of course and 
it would be handy to have someone who is from a legal background I 
guess. That might save us some money (Chair N). 
I am an architect so that is great (in terms of building knowledge) 
(Chair C). 
This did not mirror the comments of strata managers in relation to the skill base 
desired in owners and committee members. Other committee members were 
content with generic skills in management. Most prized however were people 
management skills which was in line with what strata managers most sought in 
committee members: 
I loved having someone like that who then we could send a newsletter 
out and it just looks so professional.  People-people; people who can 
work with people helps.  I think you really have to have had a bit of 
experience in life, in managing things (Chair K). 
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And I think this is really important, I think that you need people skilled 
with working with other people, who understand emotional nuances 
because I reckon that‟s at the heart (Chair M). 
I think one of the important things is people skills.  We have to be 
diplomatic and I think that would be very important.  They have to be 
efficient and address problems.  I guess they need to have some skills 
in management too (Chair I). 
We elected the one who was calmer. I was a good strategist and I 
appear- to be very mild. Non-threatening to other people while holding 
my own (Chair E). 
Committee members were more vociferous when commenting on the attributes 
they most disliked in other committee members: 
The ones that unnerve me the most are those that have a problem 
and those who talk about their problem and then are not available to 
help fix it (Strata Manager & Chair H). 
You can't have someone who's a hot-tempered person, so you've 
really got to have people who you can actually talk with and sort 
things out with, without having someone who's a total idiot that causes 
disruptions (Chair K). 
If you had people on the board who could see beyond their own 
needs… (Chair N). 
Interestingly, the attributes most disliked by committee members were a lack of 
people skills and those people who were focussed on pushing their own agenda. 
People skills among non-profit board members was seen as desirable by a number 
of academics within the literature review. Owners who push their own barrows 
rather than think strategically for the benefit of all tended to be viewed as disruptive 
and counterproductive within the non-profit setting discussed in chapter three. A 
collective attitude was seen as supportive to volunteer board members who were 
more likely to withdraw their services when their views were sidelined. These views 
were supported in the interviews undertaken: 
At the meetings we had to raise our hand if we wanted to talk.  I'm 
going, „I don't hold meetings, like, raising my hand‟.  So, all the 
committee had disbanded (Chair K). 
Committee members that disliked spending money on the common property were 
considered a nuisance by committees:  
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The chairman who got rolled, said „ you can‟t do that, don‟t do that.  
They were paid to run the building, if you ask them to do this, this and 
this they will raise their fees‟.  Which is to me is no argument what so 
ever (Chair E). 
Those who to try to keep their own fees down.  It‟s dangerous for the 
building. Dangerous for everybody's investment (Chair K). 
When asked why penny pinching was so dangerous, Chair K replied:  
We have a legionnaire's
20
 issue because we did not approve the 
spending of funds for the  water tanks on the roof.   I didn't realise 
legionella spreads up to four kilometres.  I had no idea.  I went, „Great.  
Thanks‟.  Another issue. But they don‟t think of that, and the strata 
manager didn‟t tell me (Chair K). 
This response is perhaps one of the most telling among the interviews. It raises 
two issues that go to the heart of much of the conflict between owners, committee 
members and strata managers, power plays and issues of professionalism. First, 
the non-funding of basic maintenance was seen as central to much of the conflict 
by strata managers and committee members.  Larger tower complexes where 
sinking funds were mandated by law appeared to have just as much difficulty, with 
few properties appearing to be compliant. The committee members of lager 
complexes appeared to be fully au fait with the public liability issues concerning 
noncompliance.  
Property has issues with the sinking fund, we are a little bit behind 
there. I don‟t have issues in so far as are we going to get the money, it 
is just a matter of that we haven‟t got it yet. And here at (Address 1) 
we have facility problems. A thirty three year old air conditioning 
problem. We have just cleared the majority of our asbestos. We have 
never achieved … services compliance.  (Strata Manager & Chair H).  
Until recently I understand the place was broke and there was no 
money for anything (Chair E). 
All identified that there was a balancing act between making sure that fees did not 
present a major impost for owners, and meeting compliance issues related to 
various Acts for inspection regimes: 
                                                          
20
 Silk et al. (2010) identified thirty-five cases of Legionnaires disease in Las Vegas condominiums 
between 2002 and 2008, presenting a significant problem to public health officials given that the 
disease may ultimately lead to death and spread up to a kilometre from the infected building.   Were 
this to happen in a CBD location it may ultimately shut down the city centre affecting economic 
activity. 
 
 Page    199 
  
 
They are very problematic.  They don‟t take into account peoples life 
circumstances at that particular point in time. Maybe they have just 
had a child or lost their job or are retired or something. They may not 
have the money up front for a costly repair (Strata Manager A).   
The above comment from a strata manager presents the difficulty of getting people 
to meet their financial obligations to the committee of management by ensuring 
sufficient funds in reserve to meet services maintenance or a basic upgrade. It may 
also be a reason why some strata managers appear reluctant to push for additional 
cash reserves. Silk et al. (2010) found that it was the strata manager who was held 
to blame for the failure to raise adequate funds. Yet the committee members that I 
interviewed saw noncompliance and failure to raise sufficient funds as even more 
problematic, leaving all owners open to legal censure. They saw no point in 
individual owners saving money at the expense of complex law suits. 
But hopefully next year, we get in a competent manager who will deal 
with this sinking fund issue effectively (Chair C). 
The second issue is who is at fault for a failure when the committee is non-
compliant in meeting their duties, whether raising funds or maintaining the building 
services and fabric, or maintaining order. Owners in this study believed that it was 
difficult to hold strata managers accountable for their failure to provide appropriate 
guidance. Strata managers believed that they provided a good service, but that 
they were inadequately instructed by the committees of management who were 
unwilling to bear the high costs involved with strata living. This issue has its seeds 
in the previous chapter and relates to inadequacies in the amount of information 
provided to prospective purchasers prior to joining the owner corporation. 
7.2.3 Negotiating the space between the two positions 
This section began by stating that strata managers provide expertise to non-profit 
boards comprised of strata property owners. The strata industry sets itself up as 
providing professional, expert, management. In Chapter 6, it was noted that strata 
managers assisted the committee of management by performing administrative 
duties on behalf of owner corporations. This chapter considers what type of 
assistance the strata managers believe they offer to the owner corporation, and 
what qualifications they need to underpin that assistance. The chapter then 
considered how this view fits with what committee members believed they are 
getting and what they want when engaging a strata manager. It then commented 
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on similarities and differences between the two views. Chair K honed in on 
differences in motivation between strata managers: 
I've attended the national conferences in Queensland as an invitee 
and I spoke at the last one.  I found at those conferences that there 
was particular groups that were there for the money and particular 
groups that were there for the interest and the betterment of owners' 
corporations (Chair K). 
For committees of management, determining which of these two groups their strata 
manager fits into comes easily, after close acquaintance. However trying to 
determine this information prior to their engagement appears more difficult. 
Reputationally, strata management companies and committees of management 
can both fall out of favour.  
We no longer run the complex that we are discussing.  It was our 
decision to leave (Strata Manager A). 
We would change (strata management companies) if we could (Chair 
E). 
Professionalism is a two-way street and needs to be exhibited by all parties to the 
contract. This is consistent with Giddens‟ (1984) view that as well as specialist 
knowledge, there also needs to be mutual knowledge leading to shared meaning. 
In the above two passages, both ends of the spectrum are noted. Strata Manager 
A provides the view that they would rather walk away from their contract than battle 
on with that particular committee. Chair E sees changing where they source their 
expertise from as the best way to solve the problem. What is missing from these 
comments is the acknowledgement that strata managers set the ground rules for 
engagement through contract conditions; owners merely choose between strata 
management firms who tend to have industry standard contracts. There is, 
therefore, little real contract negotiation. 
7.3 This is business 
Perhaps the reasons for this lack of real contract negotiation relate to each party‟s 
primary concern what their role really is. This final section examines how the owner 
corporation see the work that they undertake: 
This (the strata industry) is a good growth business (Strata Manager 
A). 
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Strata managers see the strata industry as a good growth industry. This idea is 
synonymous with the notion of the walkable city and the need to consolidate land 
usage by utilizing tower buildings that Bagaeen and Uduku (2010) report are 
becoming synonymous with economic growth and globalisation. Certainly the 
development phase of the strata complexes contributes to economic growth in the 
Australian context via the building and construction industries: 
The Australian dream is having enough room in the backyard to have 
a barbie and always have your own place with your garden. But the 
needs that are put on us with our growing population, the only place to 
go now is up (Strata Manager D). 
Population pressures and the green ethos of the walkable, compact city are not the 
only reason for change. The strata industry itself is intent on professionalising and 
with this will come change: 
I‟ve watched the Owner‟s Corporations Victoria change over the 
journey of time. I think pricing was something I thought I could change 
within the industry. People just continually undersell themselves with 
regards to what they deliver and what they get paid.  I think in five 
years‟ time it will really be, you‟ll either have major players or boutique 
operators that have a set business plan.  The level of professionalism, 
the demands are becoming so high, it‟s no longer the cottage industry 
it was (Strata Manager J). 
The view for strata managers is that of a world that is becoming more complex, 
with more strata buildings, greater industry professionalization, status and profit. 
Strata managers see the owner corporation from two distinct viewpoints. In one 
interview, strata managers are the heroes that attend to the incompetence of 
owners who are unable to adequately perform their duties: 
Last year the budget was up around $350,000 per annum and one 
person turned up at the AGM (Strata Manager B). 
It was $80,000 in debt when I took over, $80,000. All the unpaid bills 
and it was because people did not pay their levies on time (Strata 
Manager B).  
From an alternative viewpoint, strata managers suggest that owners are changing 
in a synchronistic way to meet higher density living and a more complex 
environment: 
I target the larger inner city complexes. They are more likely to attract 
business owners and professionals (as owners) because the (buy-in) 
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costs are so high. They (committee members) are more time 
conscious and used to doing business (Strata Manager J). 
This issue of the preparedness of owners and committee members to undertake 
their duties is a focal point for this thesis:  
You know from a business perspective and that is technically what 
these organisations are (Strata Manager B). 
Committee members saw their role in the following way: 
And my attitude is that this is a multi-million dollar business of which I 
am an integral investor and I am going to do my damnedness to make 
it work property and not just for me (Chair L). 
This committee member saw her connection to the other apartments through the 
common property mechanism. The cost of her property multiplied by the cost of 
thirty other properties meant that the committee of management was responsible 
for a conservative estimate of $15 million. If the committee failed to do its duty, 
then all owners would suffer a loss of asset. Several of the committee members, as 
well as strata managers mentioned the extent of the budget that committees of 
management were responsible for:  
Our turnover for each (sub) owner corporation is over a 1 million 
dollars a year, and it just should not be (Chair C). 
We‟re now looking at a $1.8m air conditioning upgrade and that was 
quoted in the report as needing over the next 10 years $75,000 dollars 
(Strata Manager H).  
Because you can be looking at buildings or assets in excess of $150 
million with [annual] budgets in excess of $750,000 up to $2.5 million 
(Strata Manager J). 
Given the scope of the asset value, the amount of levies collected and annual 
spend mentioned by the respondents, it is not surprising that the organisation was 
viewed as a business, operating within a business context that required sound 
governance and contract mechanisms, good stakeholder cohesion and board 
professionalism. The value of assets has, in Giddens‟ (1993) terms, signification 
outside that of the individual property owners. As with any other business, the 
committee of management needs to have a clear understanding of the business in 
order to adequately direct the strata manager. One committee member put it like 
this: 
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I know more about this business, this complex than all of them. I have 
been doing it (Committee chair) for so long now. They (strata 
managers and contractors) all come to me in the end when they want 
to know something (Chair K). 
Someone said, "People get scared when you talk".  I said, "Well, just 
take the noughts off the end.  You've got telephone, you've got gas, 
you've got lift maintenance, you've got all these tip top maintenances.  
Well, just take the noughts off, because that's all you're really dealing 
with.  Just like running a house, just got a couple of noughts on the 
end and instead of one house it's got double.  That's how I look at it.  I 
find it no different to running a house (Chair K).   
Yet at the same time there was a definite need for recognition of the role 
committee members played and the support that they needed to perform their roles. 
Given the scale of the financial and public liability obligations, this may indeed be 
necessary. Two owners were able to verbalise this: 
It's imperative there is a group that represents owners, because 
there's not - as I've said, I've got to the point that, how much can you 
do on your own?  There's a need for it.  I want it [the network of 
owners] to be national. There needs to be national recognition of us 
as owners. Courses on what to do and how to do it. After all we are 
the responsible ones. I'd love to do it. There's a definite need for it, 
newsletters and updates. I think that that's where I don't see it as so 
bad that there's a management group, because you can get access to 
what's happening and industry things. They're the ones that have 
been getting all the government grants, the managers.  They're the 
ones that have been doing the courses, which is almost ridiculous. 
They don‟t take the responsibility. It stays with us (Chair K). 
So then another person from interstate told me „look NSW already has 
a body like this. They are prepared to let us be part of their network 
and be a branch off their side‟. I mean it was all there, but we just 
couldn‟t get it up (Chair L). 
Here the reflexive monitoring of the situation has identified a need for increased 
competence that may be built partly through increased knowledge and partly 
through reflexive monitoring of external sources. There is a perceived need to 
address unintended consequences attributable to the perceived lack of information 
and support. The growth of the strata industry has been significant over the past 
two decades, and with this the status of strata managers has increased (Randolph 
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et al. 2011). Certainly they provide expertise in many instances, and this is 
expected to increase. Strata managers have a business network that is working 
toward a national standard of competency (OCV 2010). However the engagement 
of a strata manager by an owner corporation is designed to mitigate risk, not 
transfer responsibility. The responsibly for meeting the legislated duties stays with 
the owner corporation. This is why the committee members believed there was a 
need for a complementary network of owners. Perhaps education and networking 
opportunities, similar to those operating in the USA (McKenzie 2006a) and NSW, is 
indeed the way forward for committees of management, and will constitute a useful 
support mechanism. 
Many of the decisions were made within a business case. The ability of interest 
groups to lobby for change will be crucial if some decisions are to be implemented. 
It entails a learning process from those successful in gaining grant funding to those 
who are yet to be successful in accessing grant funding. Thus the flow of ideas via 
networking opportunities for strata property owners is seen as necessary among 
strata owners. The creation of interest groups and network opportunities is an 
established way of „doing business‟ and a central part of building power 
relationships (Padgett & Powell 2012). Giddens‟ (1993) work is important here 
because of the reflexive monitoring by individuals and interest groups, and the 
effect they have in influencing the rules, regulations and legitimation processes 
within the strata industry. 
The final theme relates to how various respondents saw their role within a wider 
context. Committee members and strata managers viewed the committee of 
management not just as an organisation, but as a business. The businesses 
managed significant financial and property assets within a complex contractual 
environment. There were health and safety issues for the wider community 
identified. For owners, there was limited access to support. The need for an 
organisation that represents owners and committee members in the form of a self-
support group was raised, with a view to addressing a knowledge shortage within 
their ranks. While strata managers felt that industry aligned managers could fulfil 
this role, committee members saw the issue differently, seeking access to special 
purpose educational programs for committee members and owners. Others sought 
to raise the profile of the issues faced within these new forms of housing and 
garner better government policy initiatives for those living within the compact city.  
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7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter further developed the theme of responsibility by focussing on the 
contractual conflict that strata managers, owners and their committee of 
management face. Each party (strata manager, owner, committee of management) 
abdicated responsibility in some way, leading to a failure in accountability, 
transparency, trust and participation. The three subsections contained within this 
chapter developed this theme. First, this chapter analysed the contractual 
relationships that exist between owners, the committee of management and strata 
managers at various stages of the ownership. The chapter highlighted conflict as a 
result of poor contractual and administrative processes enacted by committees of 
management and strata managers.  It accomplished this by focusing discussion on 
four contractual areas: the relationship between the strata manager and the owner 
corporation; the relationship between the strata manager, owner corporation and 
other contracted service providers; and between contracted service providers and 
owners where there is no strata manager; and informal contracts between owners 
where there is no strata manager. The strata manager was engaged through an 
outsourced, contract based mechanism designed to increase compliance with 
legislation, and thus mitigate risk to the owners. Second, the benefits that 
contractual arrangements bring to the committee of management were examined. 
Strata managers believed they bought professional attributes to the table. While 
some focussed on more generic skills such as financing and building management, 
strata managers considered the ability to interact effectively with a range of people 
and limit conflict was of greater significance. The committee members interviewed 
also believed that people skills were significant attributes in their strata manager. 
An important observation in this research is that people management and conflict 
resolution skills were not included in the proposed training schemes for strata 
managers.  
Finally, the idea of business growth and the application of business principles was 
explored within the owner corporation. It highlighted the possibility of a significantly 
changed landscape that not only related to industry professionalization, but a 
change in the type of owners who were likely to be attracted to strata purchase. 
Given that such a high proportion of purchasers in recent years has been to the 
investor sector, is seems likely that both strata managers and committees of 
management may increasingly bring higher levels of professionalism and reflective 
monitoring of others to the strata sector. 
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Committee members outlined difficulties in their contractual relationships which 
formalise the outsourced, contractual activities and lay much of the blame for this 
on the convoluted contract mechanisms that exist at the buying stage, lack of 
information, advice and assistance when purchasing. They also felt that strata 
managers had usurped their power in some instances. The contractual power 
stayed with the strata manager, and some owner corporations appeared content 
with this outcome. For others, the wresting of power from the structural influences 
of the developer and strata manager appeared to be the cause of much of the 
conflict. Trust, participation, accountability and transparency dwindled as the 
outsourced contractual relationship was tested and found lacking.  
However, these interviews show power still vested with the developer, strata 
managers that are unable to fulfil their contractual obligations and are in many 
instances disruptive to the functioning of the owner corporation. As experts, strata 
managers standardise contracts in their favour, leaving the committee of 
management little choice as a consumer. This enforces their position and structural 
power. For committees of management the contracts have signification within 
Giddens‟ meaning. Committees seek to reflexively monitor their contracts but are 
unable to do so for a range of reasons including lack of access to the contract. The 
reflexive monitoring of the contract conditions is therefore ineffective.  The result is 
that the upkeep of the property (whether cleaning or maintenance) is effectively 
taken out of the owner corporation‟s hands, nullifying their position as decision 
maker, particularly where subservient contracts are in place. While both the strata 
managers and owner corporations agreed that conflict resolution and people skills 
were important aspects of training for both parties, these interviews show a lack of 
understanding about some of the causes for conflict within their mutual relationship. 
The result is an increasing amount of distrust between parties, and additional 
reflexive monitoring on the part of the committee of management. 
The strata industry sets itself up as providing professional, expert management. It 
was noted that strata managers assisted the committee of management by 
performing administrative duties on behalf of owner corporations. This chapter 
considered what type of assistance strata managers believe they offer to the owner 
corporation, and what qualifications they need to underpin that assistance. The 
chapter went on to consider how this view fitted with what committee members 
believe they are getting and what they wanted in their strata manager. I found that 
there were similarities between the two views related to professional behaviour. 
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Professionalism in this context was focussed on the expertise required to fill the 
various roles of owner, owner committee and strata manager. I found that people 
management skills were for the most part considered important. However owners 
were relying on strata managers to guide them in their duties. Most of the 
interviewed Chairs found strata managers lacking in one or more of the key areas 
identified. The outsourced, contract environment means that committees of 
management take on liability for failure not to act that is normally relegated to 
commercial undertakings. The responsibility for cooling towers and problems with 
legionella means that not only are owners and tenants of the building potentially 
affected but the whole neighbourhood potentially faces catastrophic consequences. 
Consideration was given here to the professional behaviours, attributes and 
qualifications required by each party in their interactions with each other. This was 
linked to wider structural considerations and what different actors want or expect 
from the strata industry as a whole.   
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Part E – A broader 
sociological approach 
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Chapter 8 - Towards understanding 
strata organisations 
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8.0  Introduction 
I began this research by considering the impact of institutional players on the 
owner corporation because I wanted to understand what they added to the owner 
corporation in terms of expertise, particularly by way of capacity and governance.  
I approach this research with a background and qualifications in construction, 
contract and project management, rather than that of a sociologist, lawyer, planner 
or building designer. As Berger and Luckman (1984) note, the social world is 
constructed by the views of actors in each major area. Therefore my view of power 
may not fit with the preconceived notions of other groups of people. For example, 
planners place a different emphasis on the phenomena of strata title than do 
building designers, lawyers, owners or sociologists. Mizruchi and Fein (1999) 
consider these individual modified views to be „distortions of reality‟. They are not 
wholly truth or untruth – just different views. The sociologist‟s role is to take an 
overall view of society and to observe the inter-relatedness of each of these 
traditions. Yet even within sociology, different views take precedence. Sociologists 
are not a uniform group and within the discipline different views dominate. For 
example sociologists arguing for a decrease in homelessness may welcome an 
increase in the number of dwellings that strata dwellings can provide. Likewise 
those arguing for smaller environmental footprints may argue for a more compact 
city and associated high-density living. Yet those arguing against segregation or 
self-segregation may not see a benefit in strata communities since they are closed 
enclaves of privatisation that engender fear of the „other‟ (Brunn 2006). The 
application of larger theoretical frameworks may assist the researcher to tread 
between the lines here.  
In this research I have not viewed the creation of strata complexes, a physical form 
of housing as either good or bad, merely something that exists and which I am 
trying to understand more fully. My concern lies with the organisation and how 
people come to be associated with the organisation, both owners and strata 
managers, and how that interaction assists the organisational governance. There is 
no doubt that a contractual relationship exists between the two. The contract itself 
is a construct. For organisations, it is the medium through which goods and 
services are exchanged, whether implied or explicit. In this concluding section, I 
revisit the owner corporation through the lens of Giddens‟ (1993) structuration 
theory, new institutionalism, power and its contestation. Much of the interview 
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discussions focussed on situations of conflict as well as the exercise of power. 
Here, I relate these issues back to Di Maggio and Powell‟s (1991) discussion of 
isomorphism. The three constructs of institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic 
and normative – are discussed as they relate to power and the governance 
structures, systems and processes within the owner corporation.  
8.1  Coercive isomorphism 
A number of ways that developers are able to exert coercive power over the 
formation and performance of the owner corporation organisation have been 
highlighted throughout this thesis. Firstly they influence the legislative and political 
processes and the formation of policy to their advantage, as outlined by Glazse 
(2006a). Lend Lease‟s drafting of strata title legislation is a case in point (Butler-
Bowden & Pickett 2007). Secondly, developers conspire with municipalities to 
create a supply driven economy in multi-owned dwellings (Blakely & Snyder 1999; 
McKenzie 2006b). As Blandy and Lister (2006) note, owners pay for additional 
goods within the strata complex which they may have no need for but are required 
to maintain. Developers determine the amount of common property, which in turn 
influences the amount of levies payable for maintenance and replacement. These 
supply-driven economies benefit councils through increased rating capacity and 
decreased infrastructure costs to the wider community. Thirdly, developers 
determine the standard to which property is built. Cheap construction methods 
wear out more quickly and are less flexible in meeting changing societal needs 
requiring demolition more quickly creating a cycle of property demand. Fourthly, as 
McKenzie (2006b) notes, developers determine the legal and contractual 
documents for the owner corporation. Included in this is the apportioning of votes 
and percentage of levies paid per dwelling.  
Developers also determine the boundaries between private and common 
properties within the legal documents and by applying covenants, determine the 
standard to which the property is maintained and/or the initial set of by-laws as part 
of this stage (Blakely & Snyder 1999). This fourth way that developers apply 
coercive power over the owner corporation is equivalent to the first of Clarke‟s 
(2006) Type developer influence. Fifthly, as identified by Townshend (2006), 
developers may determine the number and type of sub-committees, influencing the 
committee structure, and the number of volunteers required to operate the owner 
corporation. Together, developers influence the governing structure. A sixth way 
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that developers may influence the owner corporation is by appointing themselves 
to be the property manager for the complex.  This is equivalent to the second of 
Clarke‟s (2006) two type developer influence. Associated with this, is the 
developer‟s ability to set up multiple third party contracts on advantageous terms 
(for the developer), limiting the owner corporation‟s ability for self-determination 
(Sherry 2010). Within this thesis, significant difficulties were faced by the owner 
corporation through this type of developer coercion. This is a seventh way that 
developers influence owner corporations adversely. An eight way that developers 
may adversely affect the owner corporation is by retaining ownership of an 
apartment or lot. This enables the developer to sit on the committee as an owner. 
The developer may be the only person on the committee able to fully comprehend 
the governing documents and the ramifications of the decisions made. A ninth way 
developers influence the owner corporation is through marketing campaigns. As 
Blakely and Snyder (1999) report, real estate agents sell the emotion of home not 
the associated owner corporation. By failing to mention the governing documents 
in the marketing material, the developer and estate agent influence people to 
purchase without understanding the contractual relationships with other owners. 
Last, developers are setting the agenda for demolition legislation in a bid to realise 
greater profits through higher land yield on existing occupied sites (Altmann 2011). 
In chapter six this theme of domination by the developer, government and business 
was extended. Their considerable power extended from rule setting to resource 
control. The participants asserted that they received little information about the 
governance aspects of their owner corporation from the real estate industry.  There 
appeared to be some level of consensus among strata managers that estate 
agents were likely to invent the necessary paperwork required to allow the sale of 
the strata property rather than going through due process in order to receive the 
appropriate certification required under the Owner Corporation Act 2006. 
Purchasing off the plan was considered even more problematic. Because the 
owner corporation had not yet formed, little information was available in relation to 
the ongoing organisational costs. Real estate agents, whether intentionally or 
otherwise, appeared to consistently underestimate the costs of levies to the owners 
during the sale process. This meant that purchasers may have failed to fully 
account for the cost associated with living in a strata environment. The 
underestimation of levy costs may be a contributory factor to the high churn levels 
reported within strata environments reported in other countries (McLaren & Murphy 
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1997; Redmond et al. 2007).  In McLaren and Murphy‟s (1997) study, almost half 
the apartment owners sold within three years. The developer and real estate 
agents play down the cost of levies in order to enhance sales. Thus there are 
unintended consequences for purchasers and wider society in terms of housing 
affordability from the failure to adequately inform owners about the governing body, 
levy payments and increased cost of upkeep throughout the period of ownership, 
though the intended consequences for the developer are met through creation of 
increased property sales. Collusion exists between state authorities, media, real 
estate agents and developers to suppress the true costs of living within a strata 
development, while at the same time supporting the construction industry and 
actively promoting the desirability of the compact city. 
Finally, in chapter six, the design of the building and location of its structural 
elements became problematic for the owner corporation who were unable to meet 
statutory obligations to maintain the building into the future. This problem was 
exacerbated by the council who had approved the building design yet denied the 
owner corporation access to adjoining land in order to facilitate the mandatory 
maintenance. Thus the coercive power of council, building designers and 
developers was able to significantly influence the ongoing performance of the 
owner corporation. Similar issues were raised by the owner corporation in relation 
to energy consumption and production costs. The building design dictated how 
energy efficient the building was and how the energy usage costs were allocated 
between the owner corporation and residents with the result that neither party had 
any incentive for reducing energy use based on monetary concerns. I pick up this 
theme further in relation to the normative power of re-education processes. 
However it is not sufficient merely to enumerate isomorphic coercive pressures 
from the past timeframe created by the developer. For example, associated with 
the buying and selling of business contracts was the sale of „goodwill‟ of strata 
businesses from one strata company to another. As noted by Chair C‟s comments, 
the transfer of owner corporation contracts from one strata manager to another 
created significant concern for the owner corporation members who were then tied 
to a company to which they did not seek to be tied. In this way, coercive power is 
used by strata managers because the owners merely have control over who their 
strata managers are at two particular points in time - that is at the time of 
appointing the strata manager or upon terminating the strata manager‟s contract 
and suffering any potential financial loss that may result from such an action.  
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The research also saw strata managers become collusive with estate agents in 
exercising coercive power during the sale process. The failure of Strata Manager F 
to remain „on the ball‟ allowed a number of properties to be sold without 
appropriate documentation. The certification required under the Act in Victoria was 
ultimately met by the real estate agent even though it was illegal for the real estate 
agent to do so. Mistakes in the certification were not picked up by solicitors acting 
for the purchasers at property transfer either. Indeed the comment from Chair L 
seemed to indicate that solicitors were employed merely to facilitate the property 
transfer, not check that the documentation was correctly supplied or advise on the 
difference between strata and freehold property.  
Society at large and the strata owners also exert coercive forces on the owner 
corporation. For example the large maintenance deficits associated with older 
buildings have been acknowledged by wider society in that there is now legislation 
about sinking funds, minimum levels of financial commitment and the need for 
maintenance of assets plans for „prescribed‟ buildings. While all participants 
acknowledged the need for such measures, only one of the complexes in which I 
interviewed had such measures, though many spoke about needing them. Strata 
Manager and Chair H acknowledged that this was in breach of the legislation. 
However the legislation does not have the ability to enforce punitive damages 
against those owner corporations in breach of the legislation, and merely relies on 
individual owners taking action against the owner corporation for failing to meet 
their duty in providing such items as sinking funds and maintenance plans. There 
also appeared to be some confusion as to who the responsibility rested with 
regarding the provision of such plans and sinking funds, the owner corporation as 
the decision maker or the contracted strata manager.  
A repeated statement among committee chairs related to the ability of the strata 
manager to disrupt communication. Much of this related to issues of 
correspondence and email which Chairs C, K and E commented on. When 
instituted, this essentially meant that strata managers were able to ignore or unable 
to follow up on issues raised by the owner corporation to the satisfactory 
conclusion of both parties. Ignoring communication and the associated failure to 
act are a form of subversive coercion that is akin to bullying in a corporate sense. 
Bullying in its various forms is a growing concern within boardrooms (Harvey & 
Heames 2006). The email blocking software was most evident in complexes where 
long term, developer appointed strata managers were in place.  Associated with 
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this is the failure of strata managers to supply contract documentation on request. 
While no-one disputes that constantly having to supply such documentation is a 
time consuming activity and may need to be charged for, the failure to supply 
duplicates of contract documentation on any basis is a major concern effectively 
interfering with the owner corporation‟s ability to oversee contracts to which they 
are a party to. In essence, without the copy of the contract, it is impossible to 
monitor whether the owner corporation is getting value for money. Perhaps there is 
a nervousness by strata managers in having contracts monitored by the owner 
corporation. As Strata Manager and Chair H noted, where contracts were 
monitored, strata managers were found to be in breach of their contract conditions 
and, in at least one instance, failed to follow the advice of the committee of 
management, to their financial disadvantage. Chair K highlighted the fact that their 
strata manager was clearly providing inflated prices to the owner corporation, and 
while no one disputes the fact that an administration fee for overseeing a contract 
may be justified, the failure to provide transparency around quotations and/or 
invoices for each activity disempowers the owner corporation‟s decision making 
ability, and lessens the accountability of the contractors to the owner corporation.  
The issue of transparency of contract conditions as well as processes between 
strata managers and committees of management should not be a tricky one – yet it 
is. Society has entered into an era of contracting out of services in which the 
„dickering and other standard forms of bargaining‟ are not adhered to (Kornhauser 
1976, p. 1156). That is, institutionalised forms of contract are presented to those 
seeking to purchase a service in approximately 99% of contracts (Marotta-Wurgler 
2007). Those industries that support standard forms of contract include the strata 
industry.  In considering standard forms of contract within the software industry, 
Marotta-Wurgler (2007) found that the license agreements „displayed a net bias …  
in favor of the software company‟. Likewise the strata managers interviewed for 
this research all stated that they used standard forms of contract supplied by the 
strata industry and that these were non-negotiable in terms of key sections. They 
were reliant on differences in price and reputation rather than any noticeable 
difference in the terms of engagement that may protect the owner. The drawback 
here is that all of the participant strata managers in this research were industry 
affiliated. Using standard forms of contract that are biased in favour of specific 
industries may constitute a normalized form of bargaining. However, it is also a 
coercive tactic by industry professions. This coercion is not just limited to the 
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standard form of contract however. Committees of management also noted a 
tendency by strata managers to dictate the meeting agendas, usurp the position of 
Chair, and indulge in power games by designating meeting places on non-neutral 
ground. In Chair E‟s version of events, these high handed tactics of taking the 
power seat in a prestigious meeting room overawed the committee into submission. 
I turn now from coercive isomorphism to that of mimetic isomorphism to explain an 
additional power paradigm that significantly influences trust. 
8.2 Mimetic isomorphism 
This thesis identifies a number of other trust relationships crucial to the functioning 
of the owner corporation. For example, Chair K identified the lack of trust between 
the strata manager and owner corporation as an issue when dealing with building 
defects. In this instance the owner corporation did not trust the strata manager to 
facilitate the remedy. This affected their dealings with the strata manager over 
other matters, ultimately relegating the strata manager to the status of „the girl‟, 
thus stripping her of authority. This situation may arise due to the mimetic 
isomorphism or as coercive isomorphism. In coercive isomorphism, the ties are 
closer between the developer and strata manager than between the strata 
manager and the owner corporation. Thus the developer and strata manager act 
as a cohesive unit to the benefit of the developer. The developer‟s defects liability 
insurance may be affected either positively or negatively. In mimetic isomorphism 
engaging facility managers, through outsourced contract based mechanisms, is an 
increasing part of many businesses as identified by Clegg et al. (2006).  It also ties 
into the „contract state‟ as outlined by Hood (1997).  Using second and third party 
providers particularly for facilities management and information technology has 
been identified as a possible fad among business owners, with clear indications 
that results are short term rather than providing medium to long term solutions. Yet 
the use of such mechanisms for the facility management arm of owner corporation 
is natural (Sherry 2010). The literature review provided evidence that where 
contracts continue long term, expert power shifts to the contracted-in party. This 
idea can be extended to the strata manager who may become the expert on strata 
issues within the complexes that he or she manages, particularly in complexes 
where there is a low turnout for annual and periodic meetings. 
Alternatively, the role of strata manager was considered as an expert 
communicator rather than as an expert on strata matters within section 7.2.1. 
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Strata managers represented themselves as such, and considered that their skills 
in this area were exceptional. They placed value on their people skills and being 
able to negotiate outcomes between owners holding strong opposing views. Yet 
bullying appeared rife in some complexes, with factional splits not uncommon. 
Strata managers commented on the propensity of owners to intimidate staff, but 
also in terms of owner to owner bullying. Where entrenched interests were being 
affected, communication and negotiation skills did not stop antisocial behaviour 
occurring in the first place. While aggressive behaviour was often seen as the norm, 
isolation as a form of bullying was also found to be problematic. For instance, Chair 
N spoke of not being included on email lists and thus not being notified when 
meetings were to occur as an exclusionary bullying tactic aimed at forcing her from 
the board. However the threat of physical violence was also present.  
While bullying of individuals may seem a normative response to issues of distrust 
within the owner corporation environment, as suggested by McKenzie (2006a), I 
suggest here that it is a mimetic mechanism linked to issues of uncertainty of 
outcome. For example Lencioni (2002) considers that team failure is linked firstly to 
an absence of trust. Migliore (2009, p. 320) concurs with this view, stating that 
„board members who do not trust each other will not have meaningful, open, and 
respectful debate, which in turn hinders obtaining commitment, holding each other 
accountable, and focusing on results‟. This uncertainty of outcome, inability to 
negotiate or have open and respectful debate leading to lack of trust may be linked 
to the balancing of self-interest  against group good outlined by Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) and noted as endemic within other non-profit organisations. 
Within this research, there appeared to be confusion within some owner 
corporation as to who has the decision making role. Within organisations coercive 
power usually sits with the decision making role which has the power to either 
reward or punish. Both the carrot and stick approach may be used to bring about 
change in behaviour. While strata managers were clear about the owner 
corporation being the ultimate decision makers, owner corporations appeared less 
than enthusiastic in taking up the role. Strata managers complained that few 
people turned up for meetings, thus normalising absence from the decision making 
process. Inadequate meeting attendance, particularly for annual general meetings, 
and a resultant lack of candidates for official positions was a significant bug-bear 
for strata managers. Committee chairs noted that there were often insufficient 
candidates to fill all positions. Again these traits are noted within other non-profit 
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organisations. Whether the mimicking is intentional or otherwise, the owner 
corporation has many traits in common with other non-profit organisations. 
I turn now to the issue of normative behaviour and legitimisation of values and 
rituals that enforce and reinforce the status quo. 
8.3 Normative isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1991) normative factors stem from the influence of the 
professions and the role of education, in this case seen as the four minor players – 
developers, estate agents, councils and the strata industry. For example the role of 
education has been discussed in terms of lack of purchaser knowledge about the 
community or organisation they are joining and the difficulty of finding out that 
information within the „past‟. Chapter 5 identified the difficulty of locating 
appropriate information to properly inform prospective purchasers prior to 
committing to purchase. Prospective purchasers were informed about the strata 
environment through real estate media, as opposed to independent advice which 
purchasers may not have the technical language to use as search terms. This lack 
of education therefore reduced the likelihood that owners would be knowledgeable 
about the type of property they were purchasing. 
Real estate agents are seen as highly knowledgeable about contractual issues 
relevant to the sale of strata property. Their professional associations are strong 
and there have been minimum standards of education and codes of conduct in 
both Victoria and Tasmania for estate agents. Despite this, strata managers 
maintain that their power was being usurped by estate agents during the sales 
process.  
Education for strata managers was a key issue related to expertise that was their 
stock in trade. Professional associations of strata managers were active at state 
and national level and had resulted in the proposed introduction of minimum 
standards of certification for strata managers. Chapter 7 considered the question of 
certification of strata managers. A number of issues arose. First, the lack of owner 
knowledge extended to the system of licensing strata managers in Victoria. 
Owners and committee chairs often appeared confused about what the licensing of 
strata managers as opposed to registration meant. Some considered that a 
licensed manager meant that they had met some minimum standard of knowledge 
in the area of strata management already. Others were confused as to how to 
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check registration and licensing. This research found that there was a discrepancy 
between what was being proposed in terms of minimum educational standards and 
what was actually wanted by strata managers and committees.  
Owners and committees rely on the expertise of strata managers. Strata managers 
wanted and expected greater expertise from their committees of management and 
owners generally. Strata managers presented a lack of knowledge about the role of 
the strata manager as the normative state for new property owners in section 5.2.1. 
This refers back to the role played by the developer, estate agent and conveyance 
solicitors as well as the media in suppressing information about the owner 
corporation. However it is also noted that the strata manager has a role to play in 
terms of education and induction of new owners. Strata managers appeared to 
take on the role of inducting new owners into the functioning of the strata 
community, though in reality this role sits more naturally with the committee of 
management. The amount of paperwork required by the owner corporation is 
increasing as the need for legislative compliance increases. The body of law 
surrounding strata complexes continues to metastasize (McKenzie 1998; 
McKenzie 2006b) creating a quagmire of legal implications. Administrative 
expertise is required. As the number of lots and thus potential owners within each 
strata complex increase, the appointment of a strata manager by the developer 
becomes more likely. There are a number of reasons why developers may do this, 
and while this thesis did not gain firsthand knowledge from developers, strata 
managers and owners provided some insight. Strata managers considered that 
developers were experts at creating complexes but not in running them, therefore 
developers sought to involve strata managers at the earliest opportunity, even at 
the design stage. Whereas the owners considered that developers perhaps sought 
to involve strata managers early in the sale process in order to run interference 
with the building defect process. This reason, as well as increased profits was seen 
as one reason for developers retaining the strata management role in-house. 
Owners perceived that a close relationship between the developer and the strata 
manager as the equivalent of less service. Strata managers were divided as to 
whether this was the case or not. However, Strata Manager D acknowledged the 
significant lack of trust between the strata manager and owners.  
Strata managers were also critical of real estate agents that usurped the power of 
the strata manager to provide sale documentation for strata property. Instead the 
estate managers created their own documentation and this appeared to be an 
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entrenched practice. Yet individual strata managers generally appeared to take 
little responsibility for the length of time needed to create the required 
documentation to facilitate the sale. Instead they insist that the fault lies with the 
committee of management or individual owners who fail to notify them when a 
property is about to go on to the market. 
These are salient points. There appears to be no start point for education for 
committee members, although some inroads have been made regarding the 
professionalization and education of strata managers as indicated in Chapter 7.  
Greenwood et al. (2002) noted that professional organisations do play a significant 
role in theorising, endorsing and thus legitimising change. According to them, 
professional organisations are important because they are the forum through which 
industry professionals represent and reinvent themselves to outsiders; provide a 
forum for interaction between individuals confirming and reaffirming their legitimacy; 
and set the boundaries for participation. Notably, in Chapter 7, the professional 
association representing strata managers, Strata Australia, and its Victorian 
affiliated group, Owner Corporation of Victoria had succeeded in pushing for 
Australian wide mandatory qualifications for strata managers. This is the first step 
in the professionalization process, setting the boundaries for who can join – only 
those who have undertaken approved courses. Secondly, it reinforces the standing 
of strata managers in the community, re-affirming the position of individual strata 
managers both to themselves and the wider strata community. In this research, 
strata managers came from a variety of backgrounds, with some already 
exceeding the qualifications needed by the strata association confirming Di Maggio 
and Powell‟s (1991) observation that professional associations are not 
homogeneous groups but rather contain a variety of players. While the strata 
community had endorsed the minimum educational requirements for strata 
managers, the strata managers that participated in this research clearly valued a 
different set of attributes to those proposed by either the new educational 
framework or by the committee chairs. Thus they confirm Dezalay and Garth‟s 
(1996) view that decision making in such groups is not cohesive and is subject to 
negotiation and political processes.  
The difference in opinion between individual members is significant. Consistent 
with Greenwood et al.‟s (2002) assertion, professional bodies have a role to play in 
enforcing standards among their membership both normatively and coercively 
through the application of sanctions. Strata Manager D bemoans the fact that at 
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the time of interview, the strata industry had failed to ensure that standards of 
conduct for members had been met, stating that the organisation would not truly 
become professional until such time as this occurred. The concept of 
professionalism relies on belief in a set of attributes and adherence to those beliefs 
through the ritualization of ceremonies including training and educational practices, 
internal ranking status and enforcement of conduct. Contrary to seeing 
membership associations as agents for change, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) see 
associations as groups with entrenched interests seeking reproduction and 
legitimisation of self.  Yet it is clear that, at the early stage when associations and 
groups of professionals are forming, they are indeed capable of transforming the 
landscape within which players operate, as noted through the introduction of 
mandatory minimum educational requirements for their strata managers and 
making it a base requirement for membership of their professional association.   
The introduction of minimum standards of education and possibility of enforcing 
codes of ethics amongst members of the professional strata associations appears 
heartening. However it does not address the lack of education for committee 
members and owners, as noted in this research. Whereas strata managers have 
formal networks within which to learn, comprising of professional associations and 
training opportunities, no such network or opportunities exist for committee 
members in Victoria or Tasmania. Two committee members raised the issue of the 
creation of formal networks of association for strata owners, similar to the scheme 
currently in operation in New South Wales. McKenzie (2006b) notes that there are 
informal networks of association in operation in the USA. Gabrielle et al. (2010) 
note that in relation to retrofitting of properties for sustainable energy, informal 
networks between owners and technical personnel exist and create centres of 
knowledge which allow people to make informed decisions. Since owners are the 
ultimate decision makers within the present timeframe, that is the period of 
operation, it would appear necessary for them to be familiar with the basics of 
meeting procedure, the ability to recognise and prioritise group good over 
individual good and the need for transparency in contract management. These 
attributes would assist in the implementation of the duties outlined in legislation 
and noted by Sherry (2009).  
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8.4  Power as an explanation of relationship 
The relational question posed between outsourcing strategy, governance and 
capacity to govern has been viewed through the eyes of two key sets of players, 
the strata manager and the committee chair. The relationship between the owners 
is engineered by the developer. The way in which each party views the other is 
also a crucial part of the relationship. The contractual relationship between the two 
is a construct as is the organisation itself. Seen through a power paradigm, clearly, 
the actions of one group affect the other. Each owner‟s understanding of their role 
within the owner corporation affects their identity and experience of ownership.  
Their actions and their interaction with others in turn influence the politics and 
economy of the compact city, and vice versa, within the cycle of structuration 
theory.  Yet the building is a physically constructed place over which each owner is 
seeking to imprint their socially constructed view of what should or should not 
happen in relation to by-laws, levies, usage and ownership, in order to define their 
own place of belonging. For instance, „some people may argue for bounded 
notions of particular place, while others see that place as a node in networks of 
relations‟ (Easthope 2006). Both views are relevant to the owner corporation. 
However where there is tension between the views of different actors. 
8.4.1 Tension and Power 
Much of the literature on the strata environment has focussed on various forms of 
tension that exists between the different actors and groups of actors. Tension 
exists where space is contested. In Figure 6 „Structuration and Strata‟, 
relationships between actors and groups of actors were conceptualised. In this 
section, I take a step back with a view to conceptualising the relationships between 
the strata manager and the committee chair. I do this with reference to the wider 
framework of governance and outsourced contract management. 
Within this framework, a number of tensions exist. Strata managers presented 
themselves as professionals with expertise in a particular field. However there 
were discrepancies as to the standard expected even among strata managers. 
Strata managers appeared clear as to who held the decision making power for the 
owner corporation. However some strata managers appeared to negate the role of 
the decision maker by making it impossible for them to undertake the role. At the 
same time committee chairs appeared to want to make decisions, but some were 
unable to do so because of the constraints placed upon them by their strata 
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managers. Power plays and resultant tension was typified by both avoidance 
strategies and the threat of physical violence. The result of these tensions 
presented stark differences.  
This thesis has noted five separate relationships leading to tension between the 
actors involved. These are:  
 Developer – purchaser 
 Owner corporation – Owner 
 Strata manager – owner corporation 
 Owner; Owner Corporation; strata manager – Non-profit organisation 
 Legislation & policy makers – Owner; owner corporation; strata manager 
The tension in each relationship is influenced as „reflexive monitoring of action‟ 
occurs by each of the groups involved. What occurs in one area will affect each of 
the other areas in turn. Foucault (1977) considers that in modern societies political 
power is increasingly centralised within the state. The state in this instance is 
represented by the laws governing or failing to govern the behaviour of individuals 
within the strata environment, but also by the owner corporation as a separate tier 
of government. Foucault also argues that such political power is increasingly 
focussed on the management of people and groups of people.  
Strata legislation is not about managing the physical complexes associated with 
the compact city, but identifying and managing key groups of people within the 
strata environment. Strata managers and committee chairs both commented on a 
lack of disciplinary power despite dispute mechanisms within the legislation. Chair 
K refers to a lack of disciplinary power in terms of limiting the number of short term 
lets and wants to force legislative change so that building standards are increased 
for multi owned complexes. Strata Managers J and N comment on the inability to 
apply sanctions on non-payment of levies. Chairs C and K discuss the inability to 
enforce payment of water levies. Strata Manager D notes the unwillingness of 
professional associations to apply sanctions against poorly performing strata 
managers. Several strata managers bemoan the fact that they cannot force owners 
to attend meetings or make those that do attend make decisions. Yet Foucault‟s 
view of power is that these two processes are a move towards disciplinary power 
and certainly there is a framework for disciplinary action outlined within the Owner 
Corporation Act 2006.  
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8.5 Contracting strategies, organisational 
governance and capacity 
Each of these relationships influences the ability of the actors to effectively monitor 
and contest power. The focus of this thesis has been on the relationship between 
strata manager and owner corporation. Yet this relationship is influenced by the 
interaction of other actor groups. I turn now again to Sherry (2009) who so 
succinctly sets out the duties to be undertaken by the owner corporation, and 
consider those duties in terms of the strata manager – owner corporation 
relationship. 
Australia‟s strata legislation refers to three major concepts within owner 
corporations as:  
 The collective ownership of common property; 
 The creation of rules that govern behaviour within the development; and 
 The creation of a governing body to control administration of the common 
property (Sherry 2009, p. 133). 
The governing body or owner corporation appoints the strata manager to assist in 
administrative control of the common property. The owner corporation is 
represented by the committee chair. The relationship between the two has been 
characterised by power plays, some of which are outside of the control of either 
party. Nevertheless, these power plays affect the way that each party views the 
other. Governance processes assist in the organization of management between 
the owner, owner corporation, civil society and government, ensuring the fulfilment 
of public processes and agendas within a privatised setting. As indicated within the 
literature review, good governance is defined by processes that engender 
transparency, accountability and trust.  In order to undertake the administrative 
duties relative to the common property, create by-laws and rules that govern 
behaviour, processes must be in place. Transparency and accountability is 
required and must engender trust.  
Yet the research has largely been about power plays that disrupt processes, 
interfere with transparency and foster a lack of accountability. The failures in each 
level of relationship (discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis) add to the 
level of distrust, and impacts on the relationship between the owner corporation 
 
 Page    225 
  
 
and the strata manager. Strata managers are employed to undertake or assist in 
the undertaking of administrative duties. However the lack of transparency and 
accountability exhibited undermines their position of trust with the committee of 
management. Each negative experience builds upon a lack of trust in the 
processes, accountability, transparency and trust. Of course the opposite is also 
true. Positive experiences in these areas are likely to engender trust.  
Effective sourcing strategies are based on trust between the principal parties - trust 
that both parties will undertake their designated duties in a transparent and diligent 
manner.  However the interviews conducted for this thesis showed a marked lack 
of trust by both parties. The contestation of power over who the decision maker is, 
what the duties of each parties are, and who makes and enforces the rules, even 
the question of whether either party is able to make effective rules governing 
behaviour within the strata complexes, all lead to distrust. While much of the trust 
was directed between owners, there were other instances where it was directed at 
the strata manager. Whether intentional or not strata managers indicated several 
ways in which they wrested perceived power from the owner corporation rendering 
them less capable of exercising their decision making capacity. These included the 
non-attendance to correspondence, failure to provide transparent quotations or in 
some instances, any contract information at all. 
Giddens (1984; 1993; 1994) discusses trust as an integral part of action and interaction. 
It is the „face‟ 21 between two or more people, organisations or institutions. Giddens 
likens trust to the „foundation of a tension-management system, the trust/mistrust 
polarity is organised around relations between projection and introjection as 
mechanisms of personality‟ (Giddens 1984, p. 54). As such, trust becomes a 
negotiated space reliant on reflexive monitoring of situations and the competence to do 
so, but also the social interactions that build trust between the actors at various levels. 
Giddens further discusses the issues relevant to „face‟ and the importance of „face 
to face‟ contact in determining whether trust exists. He notes that the showing of 
the „back‟ region of the body is akin to contempt within many societies. Giddens 
(1984, p. 124) rejects Goffman‟s (1967) discussion of „front‟ and „back‟ noting that 
whatever is hidden (or back) does not necessarily relate to real feeling. Likewise 
whatever is „up front‟ may merely be tact or tactical manoeuvring. Thus tact is 
                                                          
21
 Giddens  (1984, p. 54) uses Becker’s (1962) idea of ‘face’ as the ‘positive feeling of self-warmth 
turned to the world for others scrutiny and potential sabotage’.  
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beneficial in organisational settings, and linked to trust, but does not necessarily 
build trust. 
Like Giddens (1993), Möllering (2006) considers that trust occurs within organisational 
settings where one or more parties negotiate the boundaries within which trust occurs 
and actively engage in the act of trust. Rose and Schlichter (2013) consider trust as 
crucial to success, but something that varies over time between contracted parties, an 
important point given the contractual nature of the owner organisation, and its 
relationship with the strata manager. Kroeger (2012) identified mechanisms and 
processes that link and mediate between trust on the (inter) personal and the (inter) 
organizational levels of organisations. Their view is that the processes for trust can be 
institutionalised but remain inactive where the participants do not actively engage in the 
action of trust. It follows that where active trust is not engaged, that mistrust will follow 
both within an institutionalised sense and at a lower level, between organisations.  
However, in this instance, trust has been placed in the institutionalised processes of 
planning approvals only to be found wanting from the owner corporation view. At an 
organisational level, the engagement of a strata manager has not resolved this lack of 
trust in planning authorities and legislative processes, but merely muddied the waters, 
leading to a lack of trust at both the organisational and institutional level. The creation 
of further processes, in itself, will not resolve the lack of trust issue. This is because at 
each level, a failure to put group good over individual good was identified. For example, 
strata managers seek to engender trust in their ability by actively promoting their 
industry and increasing their specialised knowledge. However these are merely 
processes of trust rather than active engagement in it. At „face‟, trust ceases to exist 
because trust has not actively been negotiated through the imposition of sanctions to 
the benefit of individual owner corporation. Likewise, Giddens (1993) considered that 
Goffman‟s (1967) „facework‟ was done at the access point to the organisation. 
Developers, planners, and real estate agents represent the „facework‟ and access point 
to the organisation for purchasers of strata title property. Since developers, planners 
and real estate agents are largely silent on the actual organisational structure attached 
to each dwelling, the reality of being part of the organisation differs significantly to the 
„community‟ ideals sold. Thus trust does not occur at the access point to the 
organisation. It is not until developers and planners begin to understand the 
ramifications of their „approvals‟ on the owner corporation as an organisation rather 
than a planning, building or construction exercise, that trust will begin to occur. The 
processes are in place but have been found lacking by owner corporation. Thus the 
cycle of trust and mistrust is perpetuated within the strata manager and owner 
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corporation environment, and as trust diminishes between each party, the standing 
of each party‟s expertise diminishes. There are policy implications of such findings 
for strata managers, owner corporation and owners that I consider in the following 
chapter.     
8.6 Summary 
I began this chapter with a discussion of Figure 6, „structuration and strata‟ (see 
page 87), and the five categories of structure and agency discussed within this 
thesis. As well as providing a useful point from which to discuss each actor, I was 
able to focus on the three divisions of time and space (past, present and future) as 
arbitrary constructs which Giddens himself acknowledges are infinitely divisible. A 
different division would have led to a different thesis, though each division is worthy 
of more detailed study.   
The issues of institutionalism and power as they have arisen within this thesis were 
also highlighted. The difficulties of combining different frameworks and bodies of 
literature were discussed. While I acknowledge that this is a sociological thesis and 
therefore must be grounded within key theories from that tradition, the strata 
organisation has been discussed from a range of existing traditions and it is only 
through considering each of these that a cohesive picture of the owner corporation 
can be built. Giddens‟ structuration theory allows the author the freedom to 
incorporate each of these literatures into the whole. The literature review drew from 
management theory rather than sociology in order to highlight how owner 
corporations are different to other organisations, though much of the literature on 
owner corporations is embedded in planning, law and sociology – particularly the 
debate about housing need and cost.  
The application of larger theoretical frameworks has enabled me to tread between 
the lines. Consideration of the owner corporation through Giddens‟ structuration 
theory, new institutionalism and the power paradigm has raised some interesting 
points. Conflict, of course, is the flip side of power and much of the interview 
discussion focussed on situation of conflict as well as the exercise of power. 
DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1991) discussion of isomorphism has highlighted the 
degree to which each of the players identified within figure 6 are able to exercise 
power and what type of power plays they are likely to make.  
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9.0  Introduction 
Sociology has the ability to provide a scientific basis for social intervention and 
political action. Its impact on government, law, business and the media has had 
profound effects through the investigation of what is and why (Babbie 2004). 
Linked to this, of course, is how each area intersects to form a cohesive society. 
The research undertaken by sociologists may bear witness to the state of affairs at 
the time of study. However, it is also influential in changing the status quo by 
highlighting areas of social inequality, providing evidenced research, seeing the 
interaction between different disciplines and outlining solutions to problems 
(Hamilton & Thompson 2002). The management disciplines have evolved from 
sociology, anthropology and psychology. While it is the role of management to 
improve existing ways of managing people, organisations and institutions, 
sociology also comments on economic life, public interaction with economic life, 
institutions, organisations, people and places. The role of government, government 
bureaucracies and law-makers creates opportunities for sociological and 
managerial study while at the same time allowing opportunities for change through 
reflexive monitoring, commentary and action. This research, then, fills identified 
gaps in knowledge while at the same time opening up areas for more research.   
In this final chapter, filled and unfilled gaps are outlined. First, I reflect on the 
significance of the sociological research undertaken by outlining policy implications.  
Second, I highlight areas for future research. Last, I outline the contribution to 
knowledge and provide concluding comments.  
9.1  Policy implications  
Policy has both intended and unintended outcomes. In this section I question the 
effectiveness of current legislation and put forward suggestions for policy and/or 
legislative changes that may assist the owner corporation to function more 
effectively. In doing so, I seek to remedy some of the areas of conflict identified in 
this research. Thus my role is more of a practitioner than sociologist, for as Babbie 
(2004, p. 13) states in reference to the relationship between research and policy, 
„we can use it to determine what ought to be only when people agree on the criteria 
for deciding what outcomes are better than others … an agreement that rarely 
occurs‟.  Based on my research findings, in this section I outline what could be so 
that further debate may be generated since each person has a right to put forward 
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suggestions based on their research and follow their argument to a natural 
conclusion. Many sociologists see policy implications as the natural conclusion to 
empirical research. Earlier in this thesis, I drew upon the work of renowned 
academics such as Clegg (2006), Bulmer (1987) and  Burrell and Morgan (1971) to 
elucidate the importance of power relations, and in particular power relations within 
the housing sector. In particular, Clegg (1975) noted the structure of domination 
within which power is exercised and the rules that link power and domination, key 
concepts on which Giddens‟ structuration theory is based. Jacobs (1999) 
dissertation examined the political processes within housing renewal projects and 
the intended and unintended outcomes that ensued.  
Policy makers create narratives to describe problems in terms of risk and gain. 
They describe the actions that will ensure action and inaction (Henry 2007). Policy 
makers seek stakeholder and broader community support through their narrative of 
success and failure. Henry (2007) notes that when policy is introduced that is 
framed without persuasive narrative, resistance to policy implementation is strong. 
Policy makers tout the walkable, compact city as desirable for a range of reasons. 
Strata titled property, and the attached owner corporation are the outcome of that 
desirability. Current policy narrative around the need for strata development 
includes increasing urban temperatures, climate change (Tian et al. 2012), 
infrastructure upgrade shortfalls (Brackertz & Kenley 2002) and the need for 
residents to be centres of economic activity (Giddens 2002) and the housing crisis 
(Yates et al. 2007). In Australia, concern over appropriate housing shortages has 
existed for over a century. Slum clearances, broad acre settlements and strata 
complexes have all been touted as meeting policy outcomes directed at addressing 
a lack of affordable, quality housing. Sociologists have a role to play in policy 
creation through their expertise in understanding the social conditions for effective 
legislation (Travers 2010). Thus the sociologist must consider more than the tenure 
types or the compact city, since both are linked. In framing policy, multiple needs 
and preferences need to be balanced. Researchers observe a particular 
phenomenon and seek an explanation for its existence.  Research questions are 
therefore formed within an existing policy context. Strata developments are a result 
of existing policy and an attempt by government to address and direct specific 
outcomes. Whitzman and Mizrachi (2012) note that much of the research on high 
rise in Australia, particularly that of family liveability has been framed within a social 
housing setting and is therefore irrelevant to today‟s private high rise revival, 
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particularly when it comes to their use as family homes. Yet academic literature 
considers that families do prefer living in suburban areas with detached freehold 
housing leaving more compact areas of the city to a young single cohort (Dowling 
& Mee 2007). This gives rise to questions about self-segregation raised by Le Giox 
(2006b) and Brunn (2006), and then there is the question of privacy outlined so 
effectively by Garvey (2005; see also Lindsay et al. 2010; Mulholland 2003). In this 
thesis, the key privacy issues manifested as noise, car parking issues, violence 
and other antisocial behaviour.  
In Australia, the current housing crisis has two key components – insufficient 
housing for burgeoning populations and a lack of affordability for renters and first 
home buyers. Both of these narratives describe a potential risk to the ontological 
security of ordinary citizens. The policy of building more dense housing 
environments by employing strata title mechanisms describes an action which, if 
taken, will mitigate those risks by increasing total properties close to economic 
centres of activity and therefore relieve pressures on price escalation for owners 
and renters. They do not describe adequately the unintended consequences of that 
policy.  
This thesis has outlined some of the unintended consequences of existing policy 
relative to the compact city. This thesis is not about the rights or the wrongs of high 
rise development. Strata title mechanisms exist in both low and high rise forms 
within the Australian context. Yet when it comes to the governance of urban strata 
complexes in Melbourne, there are indications that the existing legislative and 
policy frameworks are not meeting the needs of owners and their owner 
committees of management.  
The existing legislative framework allows the planning and building of the physical 
complexes, and provides a governance structure which outlines the operating 
constraints of the organisation. Neither fully considers the full gamut of governance 
constraints within which these complexes operate. This research provides 
assistance by outlining several areas where policy changes may enhance the 
governance of strata complexes. 
9.1.1 Addressing the lack of purchaser knowledge  
A number of policy implications are forthcoming from the print media and web 
context analysis. This research concurs with both Goodman and Douglas‟s and 
Blandy and Lister‟s findings. The lack of knowledge about the governance structure 
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of strata complexes has implications not just for the prospective purchaser, but for 
those who already live within these complexes. There is a need to address the new 
owner‟s lack of knowledge. In this thesis, committees and strata managers 
struggled with the lack of knowledge about strata complexes. People were 
purchasing without understanding how their property differed from freehold 
property. As noted in chapter five, government websites and blogs which contain 
the most useful information for prospective purchasers are difficult to find and are 
the least accessible, relying on the purchasers prior knowledge of terminology and 
the strata mechanism to direct them to the site. The search for appropriate 
information could be assisted by locating referrals to relevant web sites for each 
state where prospective purchasers can easily locate them, that is, in the real 
estate and home sections of new papers and their on-line equivalent. Such a move 
would go some way to negating the argument that prospective purchasers had little 
or no idea that they were buying anything other than freehold property. It may also 
ensure that owners pay additional attention to the contract of sale and title transfer 
documents. 
In line with some of the New South Wales‟ based newspapers, mandatory 
information on levies could be included in all real estate sales of strata property. 
This action may prompt prospective purchasers to question what type of property 
they are purchasing, improving the likelihood that they will search out additional 
information. This action may assist purchasers to identify issues of affordability 
early in their housing career, and ensure that those entering the strata housing 
market are able to meet their mandatory financial obligations. In addition to this, 
developers and estate agents will need to place emphasis on the rights, 
responsibilities and restrictions of living within a strata titled building complex. 
9.1.2 Addressing developer power 
As indicated in Chapter 7, there is significant power inequity within the developer – 
owner relationship. However the development of a policy to fit all exigencies would 
be difficult due to the variety of points at which this power is exercised. Moreover 
policy in this area is influenced by other actors within the design, planning and 
approvals process, including those held within the Surveyor General‟s department. 
There appears to be a lack of understanding among these design stage agents 
that what they approve has ramifications for future owners. That is, there is a 
disconnect between the approval of the physical building structure and the 
approval of the organisation formation, though the two are linked. The existing 
 
 Page    234 
  
 
processes consider the physical impact of the building on the surrounding 
neighbourhood but do not consider what it will be like to live within the newly 
created strata community other than in terms of physical amenity. Communities are 
made up of more than physical amenity however.  
Providing prospective purchasers with knowledge at the purchase stage may 
empower them to make more conscious choices of living within a strata 
environment. However it may be worth considering a process that determines 
whether the organisation is able to be responsive to owners‟ needs over time. One 
of the considerations here is how easily the owner corporation is able to restructure 
their committees over time. As noted by Chair E, the committee structure is 
extremely complex and both strata managers and committee chairs reported that 
there was a dearth of owners willing to sit on committees. Embedding the number 
of subcommittees within the title documents makes changing the committee 
structure much more complex since there are legal processes involved. Moreover 
the inability to respond to change over time is not in line with other organisational 
forms. 
9.1.3  Trust, conflict and training 
The study participants within this research experienced a significant amount of 
conflict. Much of the conflict can be traced back to a lack of understanding of the 
strata mechanism or the processes in place during the sale and transfer of property. 
Thus many owners begin their interaction with the strata mechanism with a sense 
of mistrust engendered by these processes. Conflict within strata organisations 
have been commented on extensively by a number of academics. This has 
primarily been on the distrust and conflict between owners engendered by the 
failure of owners to put group good before individual good, and the reactionary 
nature of strata legislation (McKenzie 1998). This thesis confirms this view of 
distrust between owners for Victoria and Tasmania, and extends the view of 
distrust to include distrust between committee members as each person pushes 
their own point of view. Further, it moves the focus of distrust away from the 
individual owners and focuses on the distrust between two key player groups – the 
committee of management and strata manager. 
The surprising finding in this research was the significant amount of distrust and 
lack of confidence in the strata managers that had been engaged by the 
committees of management. The committee chairs reported what amounts to 
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subversive bullying tactics in the form of email filtering, difficulties in accessing 
copies of key contracts, failure to provide transparent tendering mechanisms for 
sub-contracts and refusal by one strata manager to follow the owner corporation 
instruction. Coupled with this, strata managers reported dysfunction among their 
committees which in some instances bordered on distain for their clients.  This was 
particularly evident in the passages that referred to stand-up brawls amongst 
clients during meetings and abusive behaviour towards strata managers. The OCV 
(2010) policy documents also had an element of distain for owners that did not 
understand the strata organisation or voting systems. Increasing purchaser 
knowledge prior to purchase and for existing owners through targeted training may 
assist here. 
While the introduction of minimum mandatory Certificate IV training for strata 
property managers may resolve a number of these issues, it is unlikely to resolve 
all issues, particularly where it is taught by strata managers within institutional 
settings. The qualification is a minimum standard that may assist owners to have 
confidence when choosing their strata manager. However, the real test as outlined 
by Strata Manager D would be the application of sanctions against poorly 
performing strata managers by their industry body or government through the 
capacity to deregister poorly performing strata managers. To date this has not 
occurred within Victoria or Tasmania, nor is there the capacity to do so other than 
through the strata industry body. Perhaps there is an industry perception that to 
sanction poorly performing strata managers would bring the fledgling industry into 
disrepute. However, this does not appear to be the case. Such actions would 
engender trust amongst strata managers in terms of handover processes. More 
importantly it would engender trust among owners and committee chairs when 
choosing their strata manager. 
Neither industry sanctions nor the Certificate IV for strata property managers will 
guarantee an appropriate level of conflict management skill for owners and 
committee members. The development of short courses aimed at these groups 
may assist in a greater understanding of the duties required by each party and the 
responsibilities that they hold. Similar courses are run in New South Wales on a 
voluntary basis through the Owner Corporation Network, a non-profit organisation 
set up to provide independent advice and advocacy for owners. The extension of 
this, or a similar network to other jurisdictions, would provide a valuable service to 
owners struggling to gain independent advice and advocacy. Potentially, it could 
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significantly alter the existing imbalance of power between developers, councils, 
strata managers and owners and their corporation.  Moreover, the need for a 
network of strata owners to support each other has been raised by the corporation 
chairs within this study.  
9.1.4  Process and procedure 
While legislation outlines a number of processes and procedures relevant to the 
strata environment, it remains the duty of the owner corporation and strata 
managers to fill in the gaps to create a rigorous whole. The processes and 
procedures that existed at the time and place of these interviews were rarely 
transparent. There was a perceived lack of accountability for both strata managers 
and committees of management. Strata managers reported difficulty in getting 
committees of management to make decisions. In the same vein, committees of 
management reported difficulties in getting strata managers to implement decisions 
that they had made. This included issues of transparency related to managing their 
contracts. In particular the subservient contracts for cleaning, gardening and 
security could not be monitored by the committee of management and were not 
actively monitored by the strata managers. There appeared to be little negotiation 
or agreement as to the standard duties performed required by individual owner 
corporation. 
9.1.5  Risk and the strata environment 
As the densification of our cities increases, the compact, walkable city that marries 
living quarters with centres of economic activity is realised through strata property. 
McKenzie (2006b) and Nelson (2002) present opposing views, with one advocating 
for all property to be incorporated within strata precincts, the other suggesting that 
there are significant long term negative impacts to implementing the strata property 
mechanism. This thesis has outlined a number of those risks. For owners, there 
are financial, physical and emotional risks associated with being tied to other 
owners within a complex legal system that they may not have fully understood 
when purchasing their property. For owner corporation there are also financial, 
physical and emotional risks of trying to operate an organisation with limited 
resources. The failure of legal systems and disinterest of owners can have a direct 
bearing on the physical condition of strata complexes.  Where there is little active 
or informed management in place, management by crisis may occur and be 
activated by leaking roofs or structural collapse leading to sudden financial and 
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emotional issues that impact on feelings about home. These crises tap into the 
owner‟s deepest sense of ontological security since each owner may feel 
threatened by the non-budgeted financial burden placed upon them by others 
within the owner corporation.  
Resident involvement in the owner corporation is necessary to ensure residents do 
not feel „impotent, anomic and isolated‟ (Bounds 2010, p. 151). Skill sets for 
building social cohesion as well as running an organisation, increasing volunteer 
labour and making robust decisions is lacking. Training for undertaking 
organisational roles and dealing with the politics and power plays that balances 
collective good against individual needs is necessary.  
For policy makers, the creation of a city based on strata title also represents a 
significant risk. First, the lack of social cohesion within and beyond the owner 
corporation represents a significant challenge to policy makers. There is a need for 
neighbourhood communities to have settled residents willing to take part in local 
activities. Yet the literature reports that there is a tendency for people, particularly 
middle class people and tenants to move where situations of conflict occur. There 
may be reasons why others are forced to stay against their better judgement. 
Second, where owner corporation fail to function effectively and decision making 
does not occur in a timely manner, the impacts can be catastrophic. This was 
noted in Silk et al‟s (2010) research into legionella within apartment buildings. A 
spread of such a disease could cause significant loss of productivity within 
business districts. However perhaps the greatest risk faced by legislators and 
policy makers is noted in the following passage:    
„It seems higher density by infill is the latest politically correct taboo. 
We are effectively told accept it, don‟t question it‟. (N.N., Suburban 
Landfill is a Mockery, The Western Suburbs Weekly, 1 April 2008) 
That is, engaging with only the structural forces that create and sell strata property 
while failing to support those who live within the strata complexes through 
appropriate targeted research, training and networking opportunities represents a 
significant risk to the continued functioning of the walkable city.  
9.2  Research and its opportunities 
This paper has highlighted significant knowledge gaps within the strata sector in 
Victoria and Tasmania. The strata sector, particularly in Victoria is buoyant, with an 
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increasing number of larger inner city apartment complexes and luxury low rise 
living options available. The recently released Grattan Report (Kelly & Mares 2013) 
indicated that increasing the supply and density of housing in existing suburbs 
would ensure better job access and thus assist economic productivity. Medium to 
high density suburbs will no doubt become an increasing part of Australian 
lifestyles. To ensure that the experience is not marred by conflict and distrust of the 
built environment, additional research is required. 
9.2.1 Structuration theory and outcomes 
One of the key threads of structuration theory is that structure is constituted and 
reproduced throughout time through the reflexive monitoring of action. The effects 
of action at one point by an actor or group of actors accumulate into stable 
arrangements, giving rise to the legitimation of processes and signification through 
integrated practices.  
Of course Giddens conceived an infinite number of time segments, while I have for 
convenience sake grouped several periods into one period of „past‟ or „present‟.  
Within the past period, I grouped for convenience‟s sake land purchase, design, 
approvals period, construction, and sale. I did this because all these events occur 
prior to the individual purchasers taking ownership of their individual strata property. 
Yet in reality each of these stages is worthy of a detailed examination, since each 
has a discrete set of actors, legitimisation processes and rituals of decision making 
processes and approval mechanisms, which are reflexively monitored. For 
example the planning process is subject to rules (legislative requirements and 
Australian Standards) which the developer and designer must abide by. Planning 
approvals are legitimised through the ritual of application processes and 
negotiation over how tall, how large and what type of building is being proposed. 
The knowledge of expert planners and architects is required to sift through detail 
and ensure the rigorousness of compliance. Reflexive monitoring occurs by all 
parties including external community stakeholders. Decisions may be appealed. 
This is just one of the many time space dimensions that may be applicable to what 
I have described as „past‟. Likewise, in the present timeframe, each decision made 
by the committee can be viewed as discrete timeframes. The interaction between 
owners and the committee can be viewed in depth as can the interaction between 
individual owners for example.  
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By taking the stance of two timeframes I have balanced the need for greater depth 
against an overview of the situation in order to focus on the relationships that exist 
between strata managers and the owner committee or chair. I recorded and 
analysed how the rules, legitimation process and reflexive monitoring of each event 
impacts on that relationship.  In treading this line, I have provided data that is both 
„rich‟ and „thick‟ (Geertz 1973), but also linked that data to the wider societal 
framework. There is no right or wrong answer here, merely a need to acknowledge 
that a different thesis would have been written had I focussed on a different time 
space continuum, within Gidden‟s structuration theory. Greater attention to each 
time span within the creation of the strata development may provide richer 
information upon which to base policy decisions, though a sense of how these may 
fit together is also needed. 
9.2.2 Media and advertising 
In keeping with the idea that the creation of a strata complex is comprised of 
multiple discrete time-spans, it is possible to focus on the role of media and 
advertising in relation to how knowledgeable an owner is when entering into a 
purchase contract for strata property. This thesis has extended Goodman and 
Douglas‟s (2010) work on „off-the-plan‟ developer advertising of strata complexes 
to include the message presented to purchasers through real estate and general 
media advertising.  However there is still a gap to be filled here. Further information 
about how product savvy consumers of strata title products are would be beneficial 
in determining what additional information consumers need to make robust 
purchasing decisions, and provide them with the knowledge they need to 
successfully negotiate this contractually bound lifestyle. This applies to prospective 
renters as well as purchasers.  
9.2.3 Contracting within the strata environment 
This thesis has considered the contractual relationships that bind the strata 
manager to the owner corporation and thus all owners within a strata development. 
The thesis has highlighted key questions about accountability and transparency 
within the strata environment – not just about how the relationship between these 
two key players is conducted, but how service contracts are negotiated and 
overseen for the complex on behalf of the owner corporation. The strata industry 
and owners would benefit from more detailed information about the contractual 
issues faced by owner corporation and the amount of transparency experienced in 
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appointing and overseeing service contractors and strata managers. Lessons 
learnt from the housing industry contractual stranglehold throughout the 1980s and 
1990s need to be assessed and applied to the strata industry. Research into how 
much power owner corporations have when it comes to negotiating contractual 
terms with strata managers is increasingly important given that there is an existing 
industry wide base contract supported by Strata Australia.  
9.2.4  Assessing training within the strata environment 
The year 2013 heralds a new era for strata managers within Australia. The 
introduction of the Certificate IV in Property (Strata Management) signals a change 
to the way in which strata managers are viewed by society. In order to gauge the 
effectiveness of training for strata managers, it would be strategic to undertake a 
skills assessment of strata managers before and after the training to better 
understand how the training has assisted strata managers to undertake their role. 
Further research could be conducted to determine whether the training undertaken 
by strata managers has been beneficial to the owner corporation.   
9.2.5 Financing for strata 
This thesis raised a financing issue relevant to the owner corporation. There is a 
need to understand how well consumers understand and budget for maintenance 
deficits. This aspect needs to be understood at both the prospective purchaser 
level and at the existing owner level. Research in this area is important because it 
has ramifications in terms of overall housing affordability. 
9.2.6  To what extent does the strata environment access 
non-profit (and profitable) grants 
This thesis has provided evidence that under current ATO Ruling 2505, owner 
corporation are non-profit organisations. The 1988 ruling was originally designed to 
relieve owner corporation from tax obligations and reporting requirements 
attributable to for-profit organisations. However the growth in owner corporation 
numbers and size of those organisations over the past decade means that there 
are a significant number of strata corporation now able to access the provisions of 
Ruling 2505. More research is needed to determine how many organisations 
access this provision. More research is needed to determine the impact (if any) of 
non-profit status for strata organisations is impacting on the non-profit sector in 
terms of grant usage that may have primarily been designed to assist charitable 
and sporting organisations. 
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9.3  Contribution to knowledge 
Throughout this research I have posed the following three questions: 
a. How does the governance of organisations (owner corporations) work?  
b. Within owner corporations, how do stakeholders interact to impact 
governance? The particular emphasis is on the interaction between 
strata managers and the committee of management. 
c. Can structuration theory be used to explain governance within the 
owner corporation? 
Here I outline how I have extended knowledge in these three areas. 
9.3.1 How does the governance of organisations (owner 
corporations) work? 
Governance is a system of structure, processes and procedures. Though there are 
differences between the owner corporation and other organisational forms, 
governance is still a central concept for the owner corporation. Structure is 
determined by not only by legislative imperative, but by the power vested in other 
systems as well. Structure is determined by developers, local and state planning 
agents, and by strata managers who influence the type and number of rules made 
as by-laws. Reflexive monitoring by owner corporation has had little influence on 
structure which remains fixed in the past time. Where structural changes are made, 
generally they appear to be at the behest of industry bodies such as Strata 
Australia and the state based derivatives.   
Processes and procedures are evident. Reflexive monitoring by both strata 
managers and committees of management occur. However, meaning is sometimes 
lost or does not lead to structural change.  
This thesis makes contribution through gaining new understandings of the owner 
corporation environment through demonstrating the power plays involved between 
committees of management and strata managers. It assesses the similarities and 
differences between the way in which other organisations function and the way in 
which the owner corporation functions, highlighting similarities and differences.  
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9.3.2 Within owner corporations, how do stakeholders 
interact to impact governance? 
This thesis presented a total of four different models to depict the various 
stakeholder relationships. Each of these models provided information about the 
hierarchical relationships that owners have with each other, with the committee of 
management or with the strata manager and developer. It extended the known 
ways in which we view developer influence over the owner corporation by linking 
them to the strata industry and strata managers. There appears to be a wresting of 
power between the strata managers and the owner corporation, committee of 
management. The wresting of power between the two leads to negative outcomes 
for governance. Both parties felt in some way that the other party was to blame. 
Strata managers blamed owners and their committees of management for not 
being responsive in attending AGM. Yet where the committees were responsive 
and wanted to take control of their complexes, strata managers appeared unwilling 
to let go of the reigns, usurping the power vested in the committee chair at 
meetings. Committee chairs wanted access to both primary and secondary 
contract details in order to more effectively monitor their organisation. While this 
information was difficult to get, there appeared to be no understanding of how 
important the keeping of these documents and adequate handover of documents 
were within the owner corporation. The result was a lack of trust or dismissal of the 
other between these two key players, often creating a downward relationship spiral, 
and leading to greater distrust between the two parties. The processes and 
procedures were negatively impacted by a relationship that should have helped 
enhance the owner corporation‟s ability to function. Few owner corporation 
appeared to be meeting regulatory requirements in terms of sinking funds and 
planned maintenance regimes. Again blame was laid at the door of both parties, 
with strata managers stating that the process was there, but the decision making 
ability of the committee of management was lacking. Whereas committees of 
management found that the administrative duties performed by strata managers 
led to reliability of plans and setting up of sinking funds or contracts to be 
questionable.   
These issues are raised in the context of governance within a specific organisation, 
the owner corporation. As key players, the relationship between strata managers 
and committees of management have a role to pay in sustaining structure, 
processes and procedures. By concentrating on where these may go astray, a 
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better understanding of how each party (strata manager and committee of 
management) contributes to the functioning of the owner corporation is gained. In 
particular, there is a greater understanding of how the contractual mechanisms 
between each party enhance power relations between the two. 
9.3.3 Can structuration theory be used to explain 
governance within the owner corporation? 
Throughout this thesis, the application of structuration theory has been used to 
highlight enabling and constraining forces within the owner corporation. Both 
impact on governance.  
This thesis has extended theoretical knowledge through the application of 
structuration theory to the owner corporation context by providing a framework that 
included an extension of Briande and Bellemare‟s (2006) model. The extended 
model included the application of three timeframes in which structure and 
signification changed considerably.  
A model was presented that detailed the combined structural forces that occur in 
the past timeframe. The political, banking, insurance and construction industries 
combine with council, developers, real estate and strata industry to present a 
powerful lobby group against which agency of individual owners or owner 
corporation appear ineffective. The reflexive monitoring of these industries in terms 
of how they may potentially affect the owner corporation or individual owners is 
missing.  
The present timeframe was explored in detail but needed to reference the past 
timeframe in order to contextualise structure, processes and procedures. It found 
that while the system was set up to facilitate an exchange of power between the 
two timeframes, a lack of signification meant that the change to power relationships 
did not always exist. Strata managers seemed more closely aligned to developers 
than to the owner corporation and committee of manager whom they were 
employed to assist. Both strata managers and committees of management 
appeared to struggle with governance issues as a result of this power imbalance. 
Through the application of structuration theory to the owner corporation 
environment, new understandings of the owner corporation environment and 
organisation form have been gained. I have demonstrated the utility of structuration 
theory in this power/organisational context. There has been a particular emphasis 
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on the power plays involved between committee of management and strata 
managers. 
9.4  Concluding comments 
All projects contain an element of risk. A thesis is no different in this respect. Risk 
and mitigating risk within the thesis are necessarily a part of any research project. 
Yet the best laid plans can go astray. All researchers become immersed in their 
project. It sometimes comes as a surprise then, that not everyone has the same 
lens. The insights detailed in this thesis were yielded through the close 
engagement of one researcher with the contemporary experience of a number of 
closed communities in the form of owner corporation. It is from a practitioner point 
of view that I started, and from this that I leave the final word.  
The role of the review of literature within this thesis extended beyond outlining a 
theoretical gap or gaps. Firstly, by using a combination of academic literature and 
document analysis as outlined by Pels (2000), Cresswell (1998) and Mills (1958), I 
have deliberately defined the owner corporation as a non-profit organisation. This 
is an important step for the following reasons. The owner corporation has impacts 
on wider society, particularly in relation to the tax system and economy as a whole. 
Secondly, it placed the issue in terms of the compact city and patterns of place. 
Lastly, it links the issues of collective action, control, and contract management to 
other non-profit boards and therefore enables valuable learning opportunities by 
comparing like with like. 
Theoretical insights were gained through the application of structuration and power 
paradigms. I outlined an approach that allowed exploration of four key themes. 
These themes attempted to fill a number literature gaps. First, there was the role of 
agents within the „past‟ time-span as they relate how knowledgeable prospective 
purchasers are about the strata environment they are purchasing into. Second, the 
role of the developer and council were considered in terms of the impact they had 
on future viability of the owner corporation. Third, the issue of trust, conflict and 
collection action was considered as it related to the relationship between the strata 
manager and the owner corporation. Next, contractual issues faced by the strata 
manager and the owner corporation were commented on. This was followed by a 
discussion of perceived, effective attributes considered necessary to facilitate 
sound working relationships between owner corporation and their strata managers. 
Integral to this was a discussion of the proposed certification processes for strata 
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managers and the need for training and support networks for owner corporation. 
The application of structuration theory coupled with the power and conflict 
paradigm throughout this thesis has ensured that the rules, legitimation processes 
and reflexive monitoring undertaken by a range of actors were considered. Each 
has been identified, commented on and placed within a whole. What is left is a 
sense of a complex organisation placed within political and societal expectations. It 
is expected to function as an organisation without the usual safeguards associated 
with organisations. That is, those who enter into the organisation often are 
unaware that they have done so, and have diminished power to act due to the 
collective nature of the organisation. 
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Appendix 1  
Litmus test questions 
Semi structured interview questions 
Seeking Participants Flyer 
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1.1 Litmus test questions applied to qualitative interview 
participants 
 
Litmus Test questions 
 Where is the complex located? 
 How old is the complex? 
 Are you an owner? 
 Is it a commercial complex?  
 Have capital works been undertaken to the building in the past 
6 years? 
 Did the owners deliberately come together to create a 
community? 
 Is or has your owner corporation been involved in any legal 
disputes? 
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1.2 Semi structured interview questions 
 
Consent 
 Do you freely consent to this interview and it being taped? 
 Do you have an active body corporate? 
 Are you an owner, position holder, external manager? 
 Do you have the other owners permission to participate? 
 
General questions 
 What is the size of the complex? How many unit entitlements 
are there? 
 Is it an apartment complex or free standing units or houses? 
 What are the common areas within your complex? 
 How often do units tend to change hands? 
 Is it mainly rented or owner occupied? 
 What is your relationship with the other owners? 
 How well generally do you think the complex is managed? 
 
Governance 
 When was the last time a meeting was held? 
 Is there anything about the way things are currently run that is 
of concern to you? 
 If there is no body corporate how do you get things done? 
 What sort of issues come up and how are they resolved? 
 Have there been any by-laws made? 
 What do you do about pets /unruly behaviour? 
 Who pays the insurance on each unit? The common areas? 
 What are the reasons for that? 
 Who sets the levy contribution? How often is that paid?  
 What would happen if there was a sudden expense to the 
common property? 
 If you could not resolve an issue, what would happen? 
 How many elected members are there?   
 How often do you hold meetings? Is this sufficient? 
 How do you induct new members to the board? 
 What sort of a change over period do you have for new 
external managers? 
 What issues are referred to you external manager? 
 Has there ever been a matter that cannot be resolved through 
either the board or the external manager? 
 What is your assessment?  
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Stakeholder cohesion 
 How do you communicate with people not on the boards? 
 How do you communicate with your external manager? 
 What sort of issues do you deal with? 
 What is the grievance procedure? 
 Can you give me an examples? 
 
Professionalism 
 What is the background of people who live in the complex? 
For example, legal, accounting?  
 How do you determine whether the BC needs external 
management? Is it time or qualification related decision?  
 If you were to have a board, what qualifications do you think is 
relevant for board members? For external managers? 
 Is this sufficient for your needs? 
 How is knowledge about the complex or procedures passed 
between old and new owners? 
 How is knowledge about the complex or procedures passed 
between the external manager and board members? 
 Do you have a sinking fund for future large item expenditure? 
 If there were changes to the laws governing strata units, how 
would you find out about them? 
 How has the complex dealt with changes to government 
policies such as the introduction of digital TV and Optic fibre, 
board band introduction? Are you ready for changes? 
 
Sourcing strategy 
 How do you determine whether the owner corporation needs 
external management? Is it time or qualification related 
decision?  
 What qualifications do you think is relevant for board 
members? For external managers? 
 How well do you think the owner corporation is being run? 
Does it meet the owners needs?  Legislative needs? 
 How did the current manager get appointed?  
 What is his current term of appointment? Is this his first term? 
Will he be reappointed? 
 What sort of issues do you deal with? 
 How do you deal with contract issues? 
 Are there any current contracts for cleaning, gardening etc? 
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1.3 Seeking participants flyer 
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